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CASE COMMENTS
BANKRUPTCY-DISCHARGEABILITY OF BANKRUPT'S LIABILITY FOR PERSONAL
INJURIES CAUSED BY RECKLESS DRIVING.

[Federal]

Under the changing philosophy of American bankruptcy legislation
over a period of a century and a half, the bankrupt has been elevated
from the status of a presumptively fraudulent defaulter, largely at the
mercy of his creditors, to the position of an honorable unfortunate
entitled to an economic rebirth.' This development of concern for the
bankrupt has, however, been accompanied by criticism of the practice of absolving the debtor from liabilities which do not fall within
the scope of normal commercial indebtednesses. 2 A determination,
therefore, of the proper application of Section 17 of the Bankruptcy
'Indicative of the early feeling toward bankrupts is the following statement by
James Madison in a discussion of uniform bankruptcy legislation: "The power of
establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy .... will prevent so many frauds where
the parties or their property lie or be removed into different states, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn in question." The Federalist No. 42, as
quoted in i Collier, Bankruptcy (14th ed. 1940) 5. As stated in Collier at page 8,
early bankruptcy laws were largely ineffectual and soundly criticized because most
debtors proceeded against were already in jail. The present consideration for unfortunate debtors developed slowly, the early Acts making no provision for voluntary
bankruptcy and allowing discharge only under severe restrictions. For example, under
early bankruptcy laws the debtor was allowed to retain only a small portion of his
assets after a certain specified percentage of creditors were paid. Also discharge was
possible only if two-thirds in number and value of the bankrupts' creditors signed
and consented to the allowance of the discharge. In 1841, however, a limited provision was made for voluntary proceedings. From that beginning there has developed the present Chandler Act with its ready access to involuntary bankruptcy
and discharge. See s Collier, Bankruptcy (14 th ed. 194o) 6 et seq.
"Typical of such criticism is the following: "Upon the facts in this case the
court cannot find that the accident was the result of willful and malicious injury.
If the court were permitted to do moral justice instead of legal justice it would
refuse to discharge the bankrupt of the judgments. There are too many accidents
resulting in judgments which are wiped out in bankruptcy. The practice has
grown up wherein a person will negligently operate his automobile and then when
a judgment for such injuries is rendered against him, will obtain the protecton of
the Bankruptcy Law by filing a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, as in this case,
but this court is powerless to afford any protection to the victims of these negligent
operators of automobiles. Operators of automobiles may drive in a careless and
negligent manner and go unscathed of justice by filing a petition in bankruptcy.
Many a person has been maimed and seriously injured and could obtain no relief for the negligent operation of the automobile which caused the injuries by
reason of protection afforded such operators under the Bankruptcy Law ....The
remedy is not with the court. It is unfortunate that this court is compelled to grant
the motion of the judgment-debtor." Francine v. Babayan, 45 F. Supp. 321, 322
(E. D. N. Y. 1942).
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Act, which sets forth the types of non-dischargeable liabilities, requires
a court to strike a balance which provides the desired financial rejuvenation for the bankrupt without releasing him from liability for
culpable conduct.
The balancing process becomes very difficult when courts are faced
with the problem of determining whether liability for damages resulting from an automobile accident is non-dischargeable as arising
from conduct which constitutes "willful and malicious injury to the
person" within the contemplation of the Bankruptcy Act.3 The late
decision of In re Carncross,4 by a federal district court in New York,
typifies the reluctance of some American courts to accept any degree
of negligence as a basis for refusing to discharge the liability for a
judgment obtained for injuries caused by the bankrupt's reckless driving of a motor vehicle. Prior to bankruptcy, Carncross injured four
persons when his automobile collided with another car. The victims,
two of whom died as a result of the injuries, obtained judgments
against the bankrupt in a state court under an allegation which charged
him with driving at a high rate of speed, running a boulevard stop
sign and red light, and flagrantly violating the traffic laws of New York.
Judgments were entered against the defendant upon the verdicts returned by the jury for the plaintiffs, after the trial judge had charged
the jury that "the sole question is whether or not he (Carncross) was
guilty of willful negligence... .- 5 Subsequently, a garnishee order was
issued upon the bankrupt's employer pursuant to the judgment in
the trial court, but the court in the principal decision granted Carncross's motion to enjoin the enforcement of that order. In resolving
the issue of whether the judgment had been obtained for damages
for willful and malicious injury, the judge recognized that the debtor
was guilty of willful negligence, but denied that such negligence was
within the purview of Section 17 a (2) B. 6 Noting that there had been
no allegation of "malice" in the action for damages, the court dedared: "The words 'malicious' and 'intentional' are not synonymous;
:Sec. 17a (2) B, ii U. S. C. § 35 (1953). For discussions of this section of the
Bankruptcy Act see: 1 Collier, Bankruptcy (14th ed. 1940) § 17.17; 6 Am. Jur.
1oo8; 8 C. J. S. 1522; Note (1950) 13 A. L. R. (2d) 168 (concerned with the automobile accident phase of the subject).

"114 F.
F. Supp.
Supp. 119
N.D.Y.N.
1953).
5114
119, (W.
120 D.
(W.
Y.1953 ) .
OThe section reads: "A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from

all of his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as ... are
liabilities ... for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of
another...."
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nor does the one include the other. Something more than an intention
to do the thing afterwards pronounced as a wrong and inexcusable is
'7
necessary to constitute malice."
An analysis of the cases involving circumstances analogous to that
of In re Carncrossreveals that while the general rules utilized by the
courts are few in number, the application of those rules in similar
situations leads to decisions which vary greatly in result. It is universally accepted that liability for injuries caused by ordinary negligence in
the operation of a motor vehicle is not excepted from a general discharge in bankruptcy.8 On the other hand, it is settled that liability
for a deliberate and intentional injuring of a particular person is not
discharged. 9 In the great number of cases which lie in the penumbra
between the two extremes, courts have failed to agree on any definite
formula for deciding the issue. A numerical majority of cases have
decided, in accord with the principal decision, that no degree of negligence can produce a "willful and malicious injury" within Section
17 of the Bankruptcy Act.' 0 These decisions frequently draw support
from a half-century-old dictum of the United States Supreme Court
in Tinker v. Colwell to the general effect that an intent to be negligent
is not an intent to injure the person hurt by such negligence." As a
7114 F. Supp. 119, 12o (W. D. N. Y. 1953). At least one court in a case involving
trespass to property has found the two terms virtually synonymous by use of the
following logic: An act done intentionally and voluntarily is done willfully, and
malice within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act is a wrongful act done willfully
and intentionally without just cause or excuse. Tudryck v. Mutch, 320 Mich. 86, 30
N. W. (2d) 512 (1948).
Prater v. King, 73 Ga. App. 393, 37 S. E. (2d) 155 (1946); Rembert v. Robinson,
65 S. (2d) 805 (La. App. 1953); Bielawski v. Nicks, 29o Mich, 401, 287 N. W. 56a
(1939); Wyka v. Benedicts, 266 App. Div. 1025, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 907 (1943); Marbry
v. Cain, 18o Tenn. 500, 176 S. W. (2d) 813 (1944) cert. den., 321 U. S. 8oo, 64 S. Ct.
938, 88 L. ed. 1087 (1944).
"In re Goodman, 85 F. Supp. 628, 47 Am. B. R. (N. s.) 534 (E. D. N. Y. 1940);
Gorczyca v. Stanoch, 808 Ill. App. 235, 81 N. E. (2d) 408, 45 Am. B. R. (N. s.) 197
(1941); Thibodeau v. Martin, 14o Me. 179, 35 A. (2d) 653 (1944); Kite v. Hamblen,
192 Tenn. 643, 241 S. W. (2d) 6o1 (1951).
"1Reckless and wanton negligence was held not willful and malicious in: In re
Vena, 46 F. (2d) 81 (W. D. Wash. 1930); Prater v. King, 73 Ga. App. 393, 37 S. E.
(2d) 155 (1946); Campbell v. Norgart, 73 N. D. 297, 14 N. W. (2d) 260 (1944); Seward
v. Gattin, 193 Tenn. 299, 246 S.W. (2d) 21 (1952); Randolph v. Edmonds, 185 Tenn.
37, 202 S. W. (2d) 664 (1947); Panagopulos v. Manning, 93 Utah 198, 69 P. (2d) 614
(1937).
For further discussion see: Langhran, Can Automobile Accident Judgments Be
Discharged in Bankruptcy? (1946) 51 Com. J. L. 61; (1946) 20 J. N. A. Ref. Bankr. 11o.
""It is not necessary in the construction we give to the language of the exception in the statute to hold that every willful act which is wrong implies malice.
One who negligently drives through a crowded thoroughfare and negligently runs
over an individual would not, as we suppose, be within the exception. True he
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fuither argument for this view, it is often contended that the remedial
nature of the Bankruptcy Act requires a strict interpretation in favor
12
of the debtor.
The modern trend, however, in both federal and state courts favors
the interpretation that "'willful and malicious injuries to the person,'
as used in the Act... does not necessarily connote ill will or special
malice, but [means] that a wrongful act done in utter disregard of
the legal rights of others and without just or lawful support, evidencing a reckless disregard and indifference to the safety of human life
and resulting in injury to the person or property of another does constitute 'wilful and malicious' injury within the intendment of the
Act."' 3 These decisions are based upon the theory that bankruptcy
should not be allowed to function as a refuge for reckless drivers,
and that to rule otherwise would emasculate state laws which attempt
to control negligent drivers by revoking driving permits until judg14
ments for damages caused by automobile accidents are paid.
drives negligently, and that is a wrongful act, but he does not intentionally drive
over the individual." Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473, 489, 245 S. Ct. 505, 510, 48
L. ed. 754, 761 (1904).
But the same decision goes on: "It was an honest debtor and not a malicious
wrongdoer, that was to be discharged." 193 U. S. 473, 488, 24 S. Ct. 505, 509, 48 L.
ed. 754, 76o (19o4). This latter statement gives rise to the anomaly of the same case
being cited as support both for cases which discharge and those which refuse to
discharge liability for reckless driving.
2'Randolph v. Edmonds, 185 Tenn. 37, 202 S. W. (2d) 664 (1947). See also 1
Collier, Bankruptcy. (14th ed. 194o) 16o9.
'"Doty v. Rogers, 213 S. C. 361, 49 S. E. (2d) 594, 596 (1948). In accord is the
most recent case decided upon the question at the time of this writing. Wegiel v.
Hogan, 28 N. J. Super. 144, 1oo A. (2d) 349 (1953). Accord also: Harrison v. Donnelly, 153 F. (2d) 588 (C. C. A. 8th, 1946); Fitzgerald v. Herzer, 78 Cal. App. (2d)
127, 177 P. (2d) 364 (1947); Rosen v. Shingleur, 47 S. (2d) 141 (La. App. 1950);
McClure v. Steele, 326 Mich. 286, 4o N. W. (2d) 153 (1949); Ex parte Cote, 93 Vt.
so, io6 Atl. 519 (1918).
"'This latter consideration has now ceased to be of any great importance due
to the Supreme Court decision of Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U. S. 33, 62 S. Ct. 24, 86 L.
ed. 21 (1941)- In a 5-4 decision, upon reargument after a 4-4 decision, the Court
held that a state statute providing for the suspension of the license of the operator
of an automobile because of an unsatisfied judgment against the operator, arising
from motor car operation, may be enforced against a discharged bankrupt, even
if his petition was filed after the judgment.
All but three states are now said to have some form of financial or safety responsibility legislation. Note (1952) 3o N. C. L. Rev. 39o at 395, n. 33. The Virginia courterpart of this general type of legislation is 7 Va. Code Ann. (Michie,
195o) § 46-392: "A discharge in bankruptcy listing a claim for damages arising out
of the operation of a motor vehicle shall not relieve the judgment debtor from any
of the requirements of this chapter."
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While the cases disclose no precise definition of what misconduct
amounts to a willful and malicious injuring of another, a compilation
of decisions reveals that most courts tend to brand certain specified acts
of negligence as sufficiently reprehensible to bring the liability within
the scope of Section 17. Thus, where it appeared that the bankrupt was
driving on the wrong side of the road, 15 deliberately disregarding a
traffic signal,' 6 or passing another car while it was impossible to see
ahead, 17 courts have held such neglect to result in non-dischargeable
liability. However, the acts of driving with excessive speed,'s driving
while intoxicated,' 9 passing a streetcar or school bus, 20 violating a

penal law for which the offender serves a jail sentence, 21 colliding
with a parked car,22 or negligently crossing a railroad track 23 have
been held not to entail sufficient disregard for the safety of others
to be classified as willful and malicious. Therefore, it appears that
rarely is a single act of negligence considered so irresponsible as to
constitute non-dischargeable liability; but where there is a combination of several such acts leading to the accident, as in the principal
1in re Dutkiewicz, 27 F. (2d) 334 (W. D. N. Y. 1928); Margulies v. Garwood, 178
Misc. 970, 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 946 (1942); Doty v. Rogers, 213 S. C. 361, 49 S. E. (2d) 594
(1948); Ex Parte Cote, 93 Vt. io, io6 At. 519 (1918).
1
Breitowich v. Tharpe, 323 Ill. App. 261, 55 N. E. (2d) 392 (1944), cert. den.
323 U. S. 8ol, 65 S. Ct. 561, 89 L. ed. 639 (1945). But cf. Wolkoff v. Minker, 42 N. Y.
S. (2d) 87 (1943) (where motorist disregarded traffic signal and injured plaintiff,
complaint failed to show sufficient deliberateness). Contra: In re Longdo, 45 F. (2d)
246 (N. D. N. Y. 193o).
'-Margulies v. Garwood, 178 Misc. 970, 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 946 (1942). Contra: Randolph v. Edmonds, 185 Tenn. 37, 202 S. W. (2d) 664 (1947). This latter case is a
restatement of the old rule in every respect.
1
8Freedman v. Cooper, 126 N. J. L. 177, 17 A. (2d) 609 (1941); Campbell v.
Norgart, 73 N. D. 297, 14 N. W. (2d) 26o (1944); Fleshman v. Trolinger, 18 Tenn.
App. 2o8, 74 S. W. (2d) io69 (1934); Ely v. O'Dell, 146 Wash. 667, 264 Pac. 715,
57 A. L. R. 151 (1928).
'In re Wilson, 269 Fed. 845 (D. C. Md. 192o); Bielawski v. Nicks, 290 Mich. 401,
287 N. W. 56o (1939). But cf. Rosen v. Shingleur, 47 S. (2d) 141 (La. App. 1950) (court
stressed that bankrupt had "deliberately" become intoxicated and driven his
automobile while in no condition to do so).
20In re Tillery, 16 F. Supp. 877, 32 Am. B. R. (N. s.) 161 (N. D. Ga. 1936); Wyka
v. Benedicts, 266 App. Div. 1025, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 907 (1943); Panagopulos v. Manning, 93 Utah 198, 69 P. (2d) 614 (1937), rehearing den. 93 Utah 215, 72 P. (2d)
456 (1937).
"Greenfield v. Tucillo, 129 F. (2d) 854, 49 Am. B. R. (N. s.) 529 (C. C. A. 2d,
1942); Randolph v. Edmonds, 185 Tenn. 37, 202 S. W. (2d) 664 (1947).
OCampbell v. Norgart, 73 N. D. 297, 14 N. W. (2d) 260 (1944); Prater v. King,
73 Ga. App. 393, 37 S. E. (2d) 155 (1946); Bonnici v. Kindsvater, 275 Mich. 304,
266 N. W. 36o (1936).
"Nunn v. Drieborg, 235 Mich. 383, 209 N. W. 89 (1926).
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case, a court following the modern trend will probably hold that the
24
liability is not discharged.
While in the last analysis the determination of whether a particular
claim arising out of an automobile accident involves a willful and malicious injury will depend upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the injury, the courts are influenced by the nature of the charges
of misconduct contained in the complaint against the tortfeasor.
Though the plaintiff's allegations are, of course, not conclusive, a
judgment which is not based on an allegation of willful and malicious
conduct is seldom declared to be based on a wrongdoing of such gravity
as to justify denying a discharge in bankruptcy.2 5 And if the defendant
stipulates, or in any other way concedes, that his conduct amounted to
willfulness or wantonness, the claim arising therefrom will generally
be regarded as within the statutory exception, irrespective of the particular acts or omissions involved.2 6 Further, where punitive damages
2'A combination of wrongful acts resulted in liability in: Harrison v. Donnelly,
153 F. (2d) 588 (C. C. A. 8th, 1946); McClure v. Steele, 326 Mich. 286, 4o N. W.
(2d) 153, 13 A. L. R. (2d) 16o (1949); Saueressig v. Jung, 246 Wis. 82, 16 N. W. (2d)
417 (1944).
2-While most courts disclaim reliance upon the judgment giving rise to the
liability in question (and persist in saying that they look at the entire record), a
jury's verdict based on instructions as to ordinary negligence resulted in a refusal
to except a judgment from discharge, even though the complaint under which
the conviction was obtained charged willful and wanton misconduct: Dacon v. Wilman, 310 Mich. 1o3, 16 N. W. (2d) 68o (1944).
In Reell v. Central Illinois Electric and Gas Co., 317 Ill. App. io6, 45 N. E.
(2d) 5oo (1942), the court relied on the fact that the liability arose from a complaint charging willful and wanton conduct by defendant of his automobile to
except the debt from a general discharge. The complaint was also relied on in
Fitzgerald v. Herzer, 78 Cal. App. (2d) 127, 177 P. (2d) 364 (1947).
Thus, while most courts profess to search the entire record to determine the
nature of the bankrupt's liability, cases are often found where the appellate tribunals have relied for their decision almost exclusively upon the complaint and
judgment entered in the lower court. But a few cases have indicated they would
not look to the record and testimony to determine the true character of the injury
involved: Mockenhaupt v. Cordie, 181 Minn. 582, 233 N. W. 314 (193o); Chambers
v. Kirk, 41 Okla. 696, 139 Pac. 986 (1914).
Due to the unqestionable importance attached by bankruptcy courts, therefore, to the nature of the bankrupt's judgment debts, it would seem advisable for all
lawyers prosecuting potential bankrupts in automobile negligence actions to allege
willful and malicious injury, even though such changes would not necessarily be
determinative as to whether the liability was non-dischargeable.
^'In McClure v. Steele, 326 Mich. 286, 40 N. W. (2d) 153, 13 A. L. R. (2d) 16o
(1949), it was held that a discharge in bankruptcy was not a bar to the collection
of a judgment based on a stipulation between the parties that the personal injuries
inflicted on plaintiff's wife by defendant's car being driven over the curb and
sidewalk were the result of defendant's "willful and wanton negligence," which
was tantamount to an admission that defendant was guilty of causing "willful and
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have been assessed for the bankrupt's tort, the courts most often conclude that the wrongful act was willful and malicious within the
meaning of Section 17, even though the result is based on other considerations in addition to the incidence of punitive damages. 27 Inasmuch as exemplary damages can be awarded for gross and willful
negligence or willful and wanton conduct without proof of actual
malice, 28 it appears that the courts recognize that injuries can be regarded as being willful and malicious, and therefore giving rise to a
liability non-dischargeable in bankruptcy, even though the bankrupt
malicious injuries to the person or property of another" within the meaning of
the exception in the Bankruptcy Act. In Fitzgerald v. Herzer, 78 Cal. App. (2d)
127, I77 P. (ad) 364 (1947), where the acts of the defendant in striking plaintiff
with his automobile were charged to have been done while driving in a grossly
careless, reckless, negligent, and wanton manner, and the defendant by permitting
a default to be entered, confessed the truth of all material allegations in the complaint including the allegations of wantonness, recklessness and gross carelessness, it was held that the default judgment conclusively established that the claim
was for willful and malicious injury excepted from operation of the discharge in
bankruptcy.
It is submitted, therefore, that defense counsel for a potential bankrupt in
negligence cases should not allow a plea of guilty or a confession of judgment.
Such admissions might serve as prima facie evidence that any liability resulting
therefore should not be discharged, if the complaint charged negligence of the
requisite sort.
OSan Francisco & Suburban Home Bldg. Society v. Leonard, 17 Cal. App. 254,
119 Pac. 405, 412 (1911) states the following proposition as to punitive damages:
"...the power thus specially given the court was intended to be exercised in those
cases only where the evidence discloses that the defendant has committed the
tortious act charged against him wantonly or by oppression or with malice, express or implied...." In re Bums, 58 F. Supp. 717 (N. D. Cal. 1944) considered exemplary damages as prima facie evidence of willful and malicious conduct. Bell
Manufacturing Co. v. Cross, 123 S. C. 507, 117 S.E. 196 (1923) indicated actual and
punitive damages contributed to the court's decision not to discharge a judgment debt in: Harrison v. Donnelly, 153 F. (2d) 588 (C. C. A. 8th, 1946); Doty v.
Rogers, 213 S. C. 361, 49 S. E. (2d) 594 (1948).
The absence of punitive damages was deemed not to affect the existence of
malice under Sec. 17 a (2) in: In re Wernecke, i F. Supp. 127 (W. D. N. Y. 1932);
In re Franks, 49 F. (ad) 389 (W. D. Pa. 1931); Thibodeau v. Martin, 140 Me. 179,
35 A. (ad) 653 (1944). The presence of exemplary damages was not sufficient to
constitute a nondischargeable liability in Randolph v. Edmonds, 185 Tenn. 37, 202
S. W. (2d) 664 (1947).
18
"[While ill will or evil motive is usually requisite for exemplary damages, they
may be granted if it is shown] that he [defendant] was so wanton and reckless as to
evince a conscious disregard for the right of others. 'Gross negligence' is a somewhat
ambiguous expression. In the sense of extreme carelessness merely, it would not
suffice, but only when it goes further and amounts to conscious indifference to harmful consequences.... [for example] one who drove an automobile in a city street at
dusk rapidly, without lights or warning [was liable for exemplary damages]."
McCormick, Damages (1935) § 79.
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was not shown to have had a specific malicious intent to injure his
victim.
An application of the foregoing principles to In re Carncross29
suggests the conclusion that the principal case is not in accord with
the modem trend of decisions. Cases with very similar facts are being
resolved contrary to the Carncross holding, and the court's refusal to
give cumulative effect to the numerous heedless acts involved (coupled
with the grave result of such wrongs) constitutes a retrogression in the
movement to develop a realistic interpretation of "willful and malicious injury." None of the cases cited by the court in support of its
decision pertained to comparable automobile accidents, and none of
the factual situations involved was similar in so far as the degree of
30
negligent conduct was concerned.
The insistence of the court in In re Carncrosson specific malicious
intent is also inconsistent with principles widely applied to passing on
the non-dischargeability of liability arising from other types of wrongs.
New York courts in particular have held that the keeping of a dog
known by the bankrupt to be vicious gives rise to a non-dischargeable
liability to a person who has been bitten by the dog.31 Likewise, legislative intent as manifested in court decisions is that a "defalcation"
by a fiduciary under Section 17 a (4)32 does not necessarily involve
any wrongful motive on the part of the bankrupt. Thus, it was held
that where a receiver appointed by a state court spent the money
allowed him by an order of the court, without waiting for expiration
of time to appeal, and the allowance was revoked on appeal, the liability for the repayment of the money was not discharged in bank25114 F. Supp. 119 (W. D. N. Y. 1953).
'*The court relied upon only three cases as precedents, none of which was
discussed. In re Ellman, 48 F. Supp. 518, 50 Am. B. R. (N.s.) 257 (W. D. N. Y. 1942)
was the only case which concerned an automobile accident, and it was obviously a
case of only ordinary negligence. McClellan v. Schmidt, 235 Fed. 986 (D. C. N. J. 1916)
involved only simple negligence with a strong hint of contributory negligence. In
re Levitan, 224 Fed. 241 (D. C. N. J. 1915) was a case decided upon technical conversion. It is difficult to understand how these three unrelated and rather old cases
could support the Carncross decision without at least some further justifying
precedents or arguments.
"'Beam v. Karaim, 47 N. Y. S. (2d) 193 (1944); Yackel v. Nys, 258 App. Div. 318,
16 N. Y. S. (2d) 545 (1939); Peerson v. Mitchell, 205 Okla. 530, 239 P. (2d) 1028, 26 A.
L. R. (2d) 1362 (1950); Jaco v. Baker, 174 Ore. 191, 148 P. (2d) 938 (1944). For a
complete discussion of this phase of willful and malicious injury, see Note (1952)
26 A. L. R. (2d) i368-..
4Section 17 a (4), 11 U. S. C. § 35 (1953): "A discharge in bankruptcy shall
release a bankrupt from all his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part,
except such as ... (4) were created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation or
defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity."
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ruptcy3 3 In neither of these instances has the bankrupt shown an
actual malicious or criminal intent, even though he did intend to
treat the money as his own or to keep a vicious dog. Surely, it cannot be thought that the commission of homicide by reckless and irresponsible driving is less reprehensible than the spending of money
34
under apparent legal sanction or the harboring of a dangerous dog.
It is obvious that the court in the principal case refused to be influenced by the allegations and findings in the trial at which the
judgments in question were obtained. The court's succinct demand
that "something more than an intention to do the thing after pronounced as a wrong. .. "35 be present to constitute malice may be conceded. But the charge to the jury upon which the bankrupt had been
held liable for damages included the instruction that: "To be willfully
negligent one must be conscious of his conduct, and although having
no intent to injure, must be conscious from his knowledge of surrounding circumstances and existing conditions that his conduct will
naturally and probably result in injury."36 It would appear, therefore,
that the "something more" demanded in the Carncross decision was
was present in the form of the bankrupt's consciousness that his conduct would probably result in injury to others.
It must be concluded that if the decision in the principal case is
meant as a restatement of the older view of Tinker v. Colwell,37 the
court relied on a weak and unusual line of authority to support its
position. If, on the other hand, the court was attempting to set out
a new theory for deciding this type of case, its pronouncement of the
nebulous "something more" test does not elucidate in the slightest
the present conflict over what constitutes willful and malicious injury. Viewed under either alternative, the decision, by providing the
irresponsible driver with a ready means of avoiding liability by resort
to bankruptcy, fails to serve an urgent need of the public for protection against the increasingly alarming menace of recklessness on
3
the highways. s
WILLIAt B. PoFF

"Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F. (2d) 51o (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
"Liability has also been held non-dischargeable when it arose from the willful
and malicious procuration of a breach of contract, In re Minsky, 46 F. Supp. 104
(S. D. N. Y. 1942), or, from willful copyright infringement, Gordon v. Weir, ill
F. Supp. 117 ( E. D. Mich. 1953).
"In re Carncross, 114 F. Supp 119, 120 (W. D. N. Y. 1953).
"In re Carncross, 114 F. Supp. 119, 120 (W. D. N. Y. 1953) [italics supplied).
"193 U. S. 473, 24 S. Ct. 505, 48 L. ed. 754 (19o4). See note 11, supra.
"1See note 2, supra. There are three possible solutions to the problem of how
to prevent negligent drivers from obtaining financial safety from the bankrupt laws.
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CONTRACTS-REMEDIES OF INSURED FOR INSURER'S BREACH OF APPRAISAL
AGREEMENT IN FIRE INSURANCE POLICY. [Ohio]

American courts have almost uniformly followed the historic English doctrine' that executory arbitration agreements are, in the absence
of statute,2 revocable by either party to the agreement at any time
before an award is made,3 and that equity will not undertake to decree specific performance of such agreements. 4 In this connection
One solution is suggested by the Supreme Court decision Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U. S.
33, 62 S. Ct. 24, 86 L. ed. 21 (1941). (See note 14, supra). By virtue of that decision

states may revoke driving permits until tort judgments are paid, without fear of
such laws being considered in contravention of the Bankruptcy Act. A second, and
perhaps a preferable, solution would be an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act
itself. A proposed amendment to Sec. 17 a (a) is: " A discharge in bankruptcy
shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except such as ... (2) are
liabilities for obtaining property by false pretenses or false representations, or for
willful and malicious injuries to property, or for injuries, whether willful, malicious,
or negligent, to the person of another, or for alimony." Note (1936) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q.
Rev. 44o, 448, n. 63. A third alternative device lies within the control of the
bankruptcy courts under the doctrine of Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234, 54
S. Ct. 695, 78 L. ed. 1230, 93 A. L. R. 195 (1934), whereby the court may utilize
its ancillary jurisdiction to intervene in state courts where the bankrupt seeks to
evade his liability for culpable conduct. The bankruptcy courts have been reluctant to use their power in that regard except in cases of "extreme embarrassment"
or special circumstances.
"The doctrine has generally been thought of as originating from dictum in
Vynoir's Case, 8 Co. 8oa, 8ib, 77 Eng. Rep. 595, 597 (16o9). See Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration (1934) 83 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 132, 138.
Scott v. Avery, 5 H. L. Cas. 811, io Eng. Rep. 1121 (1856); Kill v. Hollister, i Wilson 129, 126 Eng. Rep. 532 (K. B. 1746); Wellington v. MacKintosh, 2 Atk. 569,
.6 Eng. Rep. 741 (Ch. 1743). For a general discussion of the historical basis and
development of this doctrine see: Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration (1934) 83 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 132; Jones, Historical Development of
Commercial Arbitration in the United States (1928) 12 Minn. L. Rev. 240; Sayre,
Development of Commercial Arbitration Law (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 595.
2For the effects of statutory changes see notes 11 through 13, infra; 3 Am. Jur.
Arbitration and Award §§ 5-9, 32, 39, 51, 69, and 77.
'Tejas Development Co. v. McGough Bros., 65 F. (2d) 276 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1947);
Insurance Co. of North America v. Kempner, 132 Ark. 215, 200 S. W. 986 (i9i8);
Dolman v. Board of Commissioners, 116 Kan. 2o, 226 Pac. 240 (1924); 6 C. J. S.,
Arbitration and Award § 33. For an extensive annotation covering arbitration and
appraisal, see: Note (1914) 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 348. Where the arbitration agreement
has been fully executed and an honest award made, it will bind the parties. See, 3
Am. Jur., Arbitration and Award § 3o.
,'Tobey v. Bristol County, 23 Fed. Cas. No. 14,o65, at 1313 (C. C. D.

Mass.

1845); Davila v. United Fruit Co., 88 N. J. Eq. 602, 1o3 AUt. 519 (q918); Rison v.
Moon, 91 Va. 384, 22 S. E. 165 (1895). See, Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.,
264 U. S. 109, 120, 44 S. Ct. 274, 276, 68 L. ed. 582, 585 (1924). Also, Hayes, Specific

Performance of Contracts for Arbitration of Valuation (1916) 1 Corn. L. Rev. 225.
The refusal to decree specific performance of arbitration contracts has had two specific bases: First, that arbitration contracts are contrary to public policy in that they
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the term "revocable" means that the breach of the agreement may not
be pleaded as a defense to a suit on the principal contract brought
by the breaching party, and that the parties to the agreement may
revoke the authority of the arbitrators at any time before an award is
made, the revoking party becoming liable for damages for the breach
of the agreement. 5 At the same time, many courts have drawn a distinction between arbitration agreements and appraisal clauses by
making the latter enforceable to the extent of barring suit brought by
the breaching party on a contract which includes a clause providing
that, as a condition precedent to an action on the contract, a party
must submit to appraisers specific preliminary, incidental, or collateral questions of fact not involving questions of substantive lia6
bility.
However, equity has remained hesitant to decree specific performance of appraisal agreements where they are considered of the
tend to oust the courts of their jurisdiction; second, that at common law, while
an arbitration contract is deemed to be valid, it is, at the same time "revocable,"
either party having the power to terminate the agreement at any time time before
an award is made, without the breach of the agreement being available as a defense to an action at law brought by the breaching party. Thus, when an equity
court is asked to give specific performance of an arbitration contract, it finds itself
in the untenable position of having its decree rendered nugatory if the defendant
exercises his legal power to revoke the authority of his arbitrator. If the court
should enjoin the defendant in the exercise of his power of revocation, the court
would be establishing a new rule as regards arbitration contracts and refusing to
follow the rules of the law courts of its concurrent jurisdiction. On the other hand,
if the equity court should appoint the arbitrators itself, it could not compel them
to act or agree since equity can not compel the performance of a personal act requiring the exercise of skill or discretion. Simpson, Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts (1934) 83 U. of Pa. L. Rev. i6o, 161-164.
rHamilton v. Home Insurance Co., 137 U. S. 370, 11 S. Ct. 133, 34 L. ed. 708
(18go); Munson v. Straits of Dover S. S. Co., 99 Fed. 787 (S. D. N. Y. 19oo); Insurance Co. of North America v. Kempner, 132 Ark. 215, 200 S. W. 986 (1918); W. H.
Blodgett Co. v. Bebe Co., 19o Cal. 665, 214 Pac. 38 (1923). See, Red Cross Line v.
Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109, 121, 44 S. Ct. 274, 276, 68 L. ed. 582, 585 (1924);
Nelson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 157 N. C. 194, 72 S. E. 998, looo (1911);
Simpson, Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts (1934) 83 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
16o; Note (1914) 47 L. R. A. (N.S.) 348.
OHamilton v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 136 U. S. 242, 10 S. Ct.
945, 34 L. ed. 419 (i8go); Western Assurance Co. v. Hall, 112 Ala. 318, 2o So. 447
(1896); Holmes v. Richet, 56 Cal. 307, 38 Am. Rep. 54 (188o); Pacific Nat. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Beavers, 87 Ga. App. 294, 73 S. E. (2d) 765 (1952); F. & M. Skirt Co. v.
Rhode Island Ins. Co., 316 Mass. 314, 55 N. E. (2d) 461 (1944); Kelly v. Trimont
Lodge, 154 N. C. 97, 69 S. E. 764 (1910). See Nelson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,
157 N. C. 194, 72 S. E. 998, 1ooo (1911); 3 Am. Jur., Arbitration and Award §§ 3,
35, and 75; Note (1923) 26 A. L. R. 1077. As to the validity of such condition precedent clauses when the arbitration is to determine the question of ultimate liability,
see, Burnham, Arbitration as Condition Precedent (1897) 11 Harv. L. Rev. 234.
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essence of the contract or made expressly a condition precedent to
the accrual of a cause of action on the contract, upon the reasoning
that in granting relief the court would be making a contract for the
7
parties.
Many jurisdictions have changed the common law effect of arbitration contracts by statutes.8 While the provisions and effects of such
legislation are many and varied, 9 some, including the Ohio law, 10 have
been modeled upon the New York statute, which provides that arbitration provisions in a written contract "shall be valid, irrevocable and
enforceable."" This type of statute allows the party seeking arbitration
to obtain an order of court compelling the parties to proceed to arbitration, or to enjoin an action brought in violation of the arbitration
7The effects of the "validity" of appraisal contracts depend upon whether the
appraisal provisions can be considered the essence of the contract or merely incidental thereto. Where they are deemed to be of the essence of the contract, the contract remains executory and there can be no cause of action upon the contract until
the appraisal provisions are fulfilled or legally excused, nor will equity decree its
specific performance. Goerke Kirch Co. v. Goerke Kirch Holding Co., i18N. J.
Eq. 1, 176 At. 902 (1935); Woodruff v. Woodruff, 44 N. J. Eq. 349, 16 At. 4 (1888);
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Stephens, 214 N. Y. 488, loS N. E. 856 (1915); Milnes v.
Gery, 14 Ves. Jr. 400, 33 Eng. Rep. 574 (18o7). Nor will the court order the contract to be otherwise performed for to do so would make a contract for the parties.
See Andalusia v. Alabama Utilities Co., 222 Ala. 689, 693, 133 So. 899, 902 (1931).
On the other hand, where the appraisal clause is merely incidental to a contract
under which substantial rights and liabilities may arise irrespective of the appraisal
clause and the contract has been partly performed or the parties can be put in
status quo, equity will give specific performance of the contract. Texas Co. v. Z. &
M. Independent Oil Co., 156 F. (2d) 862 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946); Castle Creek Water Co.
v. Aspen, 146 Fed. 8 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o6); Bristol v. Bristol & Warren Waterworks, 19
R. I. 413, 34 At. 359 (1896). Since the cases do not seem to have considered this distinction in the field of insurance contracts with appraisal provisions, the courts
must assume that such provisions are of the essence of the contract. Whether appraisal provisions are to be considered of the essence of the contract or merely
incidental is a difficult problem. For a discussion of this point see Note (1947)
33 Va. L. Rev. 494"See 6 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1938) § 192o; 3 Am. Jur. Arbitration and
Award §§ 5, 32 and 77.
OArbitration agreements have been regulated in all but two states, Oklahoma
and South Dakota; in forty-six states a submission agreement conforming to the
statute is irrevocable and usually specifically enforceable, either directly or indirectly; in the thirteen most important commercial states the statutes provide
for the specific performance of arbitration clauses. 6 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed.
1938) § 192o. However, the arbitration clause still runs into the traditional common law hostility as to its enforceability. W. W. Blodgett Co. v. Bebe Co., i9o Cal.

665,

214

Pac. 38

(1923).

"0Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (1937) § 12148.
uN. Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1448 et seq. The statutes of New York, Ohio, and
eleven of the other important commercial states are based upon the Draft State
Arbitration Act, sponsored by the American Arbitration Association. 6 Williston,
Contracts (Rev. ed. 1938) § 1920.
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agreement, or to obtain collateral enforcement by court appointment
of arbitrators.' 2 However, the courts have strictly construed the statutes
as in derogation of the common law, and have fallen back on the
distinction between arbitration and appraisal to find the statutes inapplicable to appraisal agreements.' 3
Where the fulfillment of the terms of the appraisal provisions in
an insurance policy is expressly made a condition precedent to the
maintenance of a suit on the contract, the courts give effect to the
condition by barring suit on the policy by the insured where he is at
fault in failing to carry out the appraisal agreement.' 4 Where the
failure to appraise is due to the fault of the insurer, the courts have
held that such conduct abrogates the appraisal clause and that the
insured, if free from fault, may bring an action on his policy. 1 Further, it is recognized that the non-breaching party may institute an
action for damages for the breach of the agreement.' 6 Where the parties
have already entered into the appraisal procedure, damages would be
obtainable; however, if the breach occurred before the appraisal procedure had been instituted damages would be negligible, if provable
7
at all.'
129 U. S. C. §§ 4, 3, and 5 (1946); Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (1937) §§ 12,48-3, -2,
and -4; N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1450, 1451, and 1452.
'In re Thurston, 48 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931); Franks v. -Franks, 294 Mass.
262, 1 N. E. (2d) 14 (1936); Matter of Fletcher, 237 N. Y. 44o, 143 N. E. 248 (1924)
[now nullified by N. Y. Laws (1941) c. 228]; Grote v. Stein, 99 Pa. Super. 556 (1930).
See Toledo S.S. Co. v. Zenith Transp. Co., 184 Fed. 391, 401 (C. C. A. 6th, 1911)
showing many other cases using the distinction between arbitration and appraisal
for purposes of statutory construction. The reassertion of this distinction to defeat
statutory application has been criticized; Phillips, The Paradox in Arbitration
Law: Compulsion as Applied to A Voluntary Proceeding (1933) 46 Harv. L. Rev.
1258 at 1273; Sturges, Arbitration Under the New Pennsylvania Arbitration Statute
(1928) 76 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 345 at 359; Notes (1929) 17 Cal. L. Rev. 643 at 648; (1930)
43 Harv. L. Rev. 809 at 811; (1947) 33 Va. L. Rev. 494.
"Hamilton v. Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance Co., 136 U. S. 242, 10 S.
Ct. 945, 34 L. ed. 419 (1890); Mason v. Fidelity Phoenix Ins. Co., 258 S. W. 759
(Mo. App. 1924); Davis v. Atlas Assur. Co., 16 Wash. 232, 47 Pac. 436 (1896).,
"Cinema Schools v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., I F. Supp. 37 (S. D. Cal. 1932);
Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Bishop, 154 Ill. 9, 39 N. E. 1 1o2 (1894). This rule rests upon
the principle that no one can be allowed to profit by his own fault or wrong,
Headley v. Aetna Ins. Co., 212 Ala. 384, 80 So. 466 (1918); and that no one should
be tied up indefinitely against his will and without his fault, by an ineffectual arbitration or appraisal, Read v. State Ins. Co., 103 Iowa 307, 172 N. W. 665 (1897). See,
Bernhard v. Rochester German Ins. Co., 79 Conn. 388, 65 At. 134, 137 (19o6); Note
(1933) 94 A. L. R. 499, 506.
"'See Munson v. Straits of Dover S. S. Co., 99 Fed. 787 (S. D. N. Y. 19oo) for a
general discussion of the damages situation and for a collection of cases and other
authority.
"'Munson v. Straits of Dover S. S. Co., 99 Fed- 787, 790, (S. D. N. Y. igoo) (negligible damages recoverable where breach occurred before submission); Pond v. Harris,
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In the recent case of Saba v. Homeland Insurance Co.' s the Ohio
Supreme Court faced the problem of whether the insured has any
remedies other than the traditional ones of suit on the policy or for
damages for breach of contract in a situation wherein the failure to
comply with the provisions of an apprasial clause was due to the fault
of the insurance company. Plaintiff held standard fire insurance policies issued by defendant companies upon his property, when on September

19, 1951,

the property was destroyed by fire. The parties were

unable to agree on the amount of the loss, and plaintiff, acting pursuant to the provisions of the appraisal clause of his policies, 19 made a
written demand upon defendants to name an appraiser, and informed
defendants of the name of the appraiser he had selected. Subsequently,
defendants informed plaintiff they had named no appraiser and would
not do so. Plaintiff, having fully complied with the terms of the appraisal agreement, filed a motion for the appointment of an umpire
by the Court of Probate. That court appointed an umpire, and the latter, with plaintiff's appraiser, made an award which was subsequently
sued upon in the Court of Common Pleas. Defendant appealed from the
order appointing the umpire, but both the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the ruling of the Probate Court.
113 Mass. 114 (1873) (damages recoverable for loss of time and for trouble and
nccessary expenses in preparing for a hearing, such as employing counsel, taking
depositions, paying witnesses and arbitrators, and etc.); Hawley v. Dodge, 7 Vt. 237
(1835) (parties agreed to discontinue suit and submit to arbitration; upon revocation
of submission, plaintiff recovered costs and expenses incurred in discontinued suit);
McKenzie v. Mitchell, 123 Ga. 72, 51 S. E. 34 (195o)
(for breach of agreement to
submit a claim to arbitration, necessary expenses in preparing for arbitration
may be recovered).
"159 Ohio St. 237, 112 N. E. (2d) 1 (953).
"'Appraisal. In case the insured and this company shall fail to agree as to the
actual cash value or the amount of loss, then, on the written demand of either, each
shall select a competent and disinterested appraiser and notify the other of the appraiser selected within twenty days of such demand. The appraisers shall first
select a competent and disinterested umpire; and failing for fifteen days to agree upon
such umpire, then, on request of the insured or his company, such umpire shall
be selected by a judge of a court of record in the state in which the property
covered is located. The appraiser shall then appraise the loss, stating separately
actual cash value and loss to each item; and, failing to agree, shall submit their
differences, only, to the umpire. An award in writing, so itemized, of any two
when filed with this company shall determine the amount of actual cash value and
loss. Each appraiser shall be paid by the party selecting him and the expenses
of appraisal and umpire shall be paid by the parties equally.
"Suit. No suit or action on this policy for recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless all the requirements of this policy
shall have been complied with, and unless commenced within twelve months next
after inception of the loss." Saba v. Homeland Insurance Co., 159 Ohio St. 237, 112
N. E.(2d) 1,2 (1953).
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In holding the agreement to be equally binding on both parties,
the Supreme Court stressed the language of the agreement that: "... in
case the insured and this company fail to agree as to the actual cash
value of the amount of the loss, then, on written demand of either,
each shall select a competent and disinterested appraiser and notify the
other of the appraiser selected .... -20 The Court ruled that the word
"shall" was mandatory upon "each" of the parties, insurer as well as
insured, and that the provisions were irrevocable by "either" party. It
was pointed out that since plaintiff could exercise the remedy of suit
on the policy whether it contained an appraisal agreement or not, the
inclusion of such agreement, for which plaintiff paid premiums, would
confer benefit only on defendant if the court held that plaintiff had no
remedy other than suit upon the policy. This would be so since defendant had the right to compel appraisement as a condition precedent
to a suit by the insured upon the policy. The court further ruled that
the failure of defendant to select an appraiser constituted a failure to
agree upon an umpire, and that under such circumstances, plaintiff
had the right to ask the court to select an umpire. The court added
2
that such procedure was consistent with the Ohio arbitration law. '
One judge in dissent argued that courts will not declare specific
performance of arbitration or appraisal clauses, that the remedies for
the breach of an appraisal agreement are a suit for damages or a suit
on the policy, and that the remedy allowed by the majority opinion
22
was beyond the scope of the contract and the authority of the court.
Also, he took the position that since the provisions of the clause in
question did not call for the determination of the liabilities of the
parties, but only for a determination of the amount of loss, it was
an appraisal clause, whereas the statute of the state applied only to
arbitration agreements.
As the dissent contended, the Supreme Court, in approving the
order of the Probate Court appointing the umpire upon motion of
the insured when the insurer failed to appoint an appraiser, has gone
beyond the traditional remedies afforded the insured in such a situation. 23 Since the result was reached in the face of a lack of any pre=159 Ohio St. 237, 112 N. E. (2d) 1, 2 (1953).
0Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (1937) § 12148-4.
"Since the appraisal clause provided for selection of an umpire by the court
after failure of the appraisers to agree and upon the request of either party,
the court went beyond its authority and the scope of the contract as agent for
the parties in issuing summons on, hearing the motion to appoint, and in appointing an umpire when one party failed to select an appraiser. Judge Hart, dissenting, 159 Ohio St. 237, 112 N. E. (2d) 5, 7 (1953).
"See notes 15 and 16, supra.
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cedent, 24 the correctness of the decision must rest upon the validity of
the arguments advanced.
In their use of the term "revocable" in reference to arbitration and
appraisal agreements, the courts mean that a breach of the agreement
can not be pleaded as a defense to a suit on the principal contract
brought by the breaching party, and that either party to the contract
may revoke the authority of the arbitrators at any time before an
award is made, the non-breaching party being allowed a suit for
damages for breach of contract. Thus, if the Ohio court's contention
be conceded, that the fulfillment of the provisions for selection of
appraisal is obligatory on both parties-that is, that the provision is
"irrevocable"-in order to attribute any substance to this argument
it must necessarily follow that some method of enforcement of the provision exists. It is a generally recognized principle that the parties to
an apprasial provision in an insurance contract are under a duty
to act in good faith and to make a reasonable effort to carry out the
provisions, 25 but the overwhelming weight of authority holds that
compliance with such a clause is waivable by the insurer26 and that
"'The majority opinion cites no direct authority, and Judge Matthias, in dissent, pointed out: "But diligence of counsel has failed to disclose a decision of any
court of last resort of the question clearly presented in the instant case." 159 Ohio
St. 237, 112 N. E. (2d) 1, 4 (1953). Cases which would seem to be the closest in
point are Hardware Dealers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U. S. 151, 52
S. Ct. 69, 76 L. ed. 214 (1931) and National Fire Ins. Co. v. Shuman, 44 Ga. App.
819, 163 S. E. 3o6 (1932), 5o Ga. App. 846, 178 S. E. 758 (1935). In the Glidden case
the insured named his arbitrator, but insurer refused to name one. Following the
procedure prescribed by the state compulsory appraisal statute and provided for
in the policy, the court appointed an umpire, who, with insured's appraiser, made
the award. The Supreme Court, ruling that the state had power to regulate insurance and that the procedure adopted by the state was not violative of due process, held this award to be binding. The state statute and the policy expressly provided that an award made by one appraiser and the umpire should be as valid and
binding as if two appraisers had been selected. In the Shuman case the Georgia
court held: "The mere failure of the insurance company to select an appraiser
does not warrant the appointment of an umpire to act solely with the appraiser
appointed by the insured. It follows that, where the insurer has selected no appraiser and has not otherwise participated in or consented to an appraisement,
a finding or report on the loss, made by an appraiser selected by the insured and
an umpire appointed by the court, is not binding upon the insurer." 44 Ga. App.

8ig, 163 S.E. 306

(1932).

-See Bernhard v. Rochester German Ins. Co., 79 Conn. 388, 65 Ad. 134, 136
(i9o6); Uhrig v. Williamsburg City Fire Ins. Co., 1o N. Y. 362, 4 N. E. 745, 746
(1886); 3 Am. Jur., Arbitration and Award § 54.
-6Harwood v. United -States Fire Ins. Co., 136 Me. 223, 7 A. (2d) 899 (1939);
Gratz v. Insurance Co. of North America, 282 Pa. 224, 127 Ad. 620 (1925); Hanover
Fire Ins. Co. v. Drake, 170 Va. 257, 196 S. E. 664 (1938); 29 Am. Jur., Insurance
§ 1246; Notes (1914) 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 337, 425; (1933) 94 A. L. R. 499, 5o 6.
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such waiver may be implied from the acts, omissions, or conduct of
the insurer.27 While the Ohio court is not holding that the insurer may
not waive his rights under the contract, it is saying that should he
do so, the insured has the right to have the court appoint an umpire.
Such procedure is collateral enforcement and certainly analogous to
specific performance, which the courts have steadfastly refused to allow in these cases. 28 The words of the plaintiff's appraisal provision
are substantially the same as those contained in the policies involved
in the cases establishing the doctrine permitting waiver by the insurer.29 Thus, to hold that their mandatory nature requires enforcement of the provision is not giving a reason nor establishing a justification for allowing enforcement, but is, in effect, making the court's
conclusion inevitably evolve out of its assumption.
The further assumption of the court that an insured pays higher
premiums for a policy containing appraisal provisions than for a policy
without such provisions is also highly questionable. The conditioning
of the right of action on the policy on compliance with the appraisal
provision is an attempt by the parties to overcome the courts' refusal
to compel its performance.3 0 The purpose of such clauses being to
provide a speedy, just, and inexpensive method of determining the
amount of loss, 3 1 it seems clear that a substantial benefit accrues to
the insurer by making possible more efficient disposition of claims,
and that policies containing appraisal provisions would have a lower
premium rate.
While the majority of the Ohio court placed great emphasis on
the language of the appraisal provisions in holding them irrevocable
and binding upon the parties, it failed to lay equal stress on the provisions which expressly provided that the selection of the umpire shall
be made by the duly appointed appraisers, or by the court by application of one of the parties only upon a failure of the named arbitrators
to agree.3 2 The court's declaration that failure to select an arbitrator
constitutes a failure to agree upon the umpire is tantamount to saying
that the failure of a party to appoint an appraiser is the same as the
failure of the appraiser to agree upon an umpire. This conclusion
seemingly could be based only on the theory of an agency relationship.
'Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Drake, 17o Va. 257, 196 S. E. 664 (1938).
nSee note 7, supra.
'See provision of policies in cases cited in note 26, supra.
10See Note (1947) 33 Va. L. Rev. 494, 496.
"See Kavli v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 2o6 Minn. 36o, 288 N. W. 723, 725 (939);
Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Ballard, 112 S. W. (2d) 532, 534 (rex. Civ. App. 1938).
"See note 19, supra, for provisions of the appraisal clause.
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Although it is sometimes stated that the arbitrator is the agent of the
party selecting him, 33 such is clearly not the case, since once an arbitrator has been appointed he is not subject to the direction or control of either party, 34 and must be free from interest and bias in ex-

ercising his authority over the matters entrusted to his consideration, 35
one of which is the selection of a disinterested umpire. But, even if
an agency relationship is assumed the court's decision requires that the
acts of the principal (insurer's failure to select an appraiser) be deemed
the acts of his agent (arbitrator's failure to agree upon an umpire),
rather than that the acts of the agent be deemed to be the acts of the
principal.
Also, by the terms of the contract the parties have evidenced their
intention that the disinterested arbitrators or appraisers select the disinterested umpire, whose only duty is to resolve any differences which
arise between the appraisers. The right to have the third man appointed by a court was provided for only if the first two fail to agree
upon their selection of the third man. It was not the intent that one
appraiser and one umpire settle the question as to the amount of the
loss under the policies. Yet, the court allows the appointment of an
umpire without the prior appointment of a second appraiser, thus
allowing appraisal and award to be made by only two men, contrary
to the express language of the policy, and contrary to authority that
an award made by an appraiser and an umpire, without the selection
of the other appraiser, is invalid.36 It seems strange that the language
of this part of the appraisal provision was not deemed to be as mandatory upon the parties as was the language stressed by the court dealing with the appointment of appraisers.
The decision was not based upon Ohio's Arbitration Act, and it is
doubtful if the holding is "consistent with the legislative policy of this
state.. .,37 unless it be the broad intent of the legislature that arbitration contracts are to be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable...."'
Further, even if the court had based its decision upon the Ohio statute,
-See, Wilkinson v. Pritchard, 145 Iowa 65, 123 N. W. 964, 966 (1909); 3 Am.
Jur., Arbitration and Award § 84.
2
'Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc. v. Cohn, 68 F. (2d) 42 (C. C. A. ioth, 1933);
Shawnee Fire Ins. Co. v. Pontfield, 11o Md. 353, 72 Ad. 835 (19o9). See Kavli v.
Eagle Star Ins. Co., 2o6 Minn. 360, 288 N. W. 723, 726 (1939).
'Davy's Executor v. Faw, 7 Cranch 171, 3 L. ed. 305 (1810); Orr v. Farmers
Mut. Hail Ins. Co., 356 Mo. 372, 201 S. W. (2d) 952 (1947).
"National Fire Ins. Co. v. Shuman, 44 Ga. App. 819, 163 S. E. 3o6 (1932), 5o Ga.
App. 846, 178 S. E. 758 (1935).
'1159 Ohio St. 237, 112 N. E. (2d) 1, 3 (1953).
"Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (1937) § 12148-1.
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it would seem that the case required no more than the appointment
of an abitrator to represent the insurer, in view of the "mandatory"

language of the contract and the limited duty of the umpire.3 9
The court's manifested intent to allow the insured a direct and
effective benefit from the appraisal provisions of his policy certainly

seems commendable. In according this benefit, however, it has advanced several lines of reasoning which are, at best, highly tenuous.

The court would have been on far sounder ground and would have
prevented possible future litigation upon this point by holding that
the state's Arbitration Act is applicable to appraisal provisions, or

that the traditional objections to the specific performance of appraisal
contracts are no longer insurmountable barriers, and then ruling that
under either the statutory or the contract procedure the plaintiff
should first have moved for the appointment of an appraiser to represent the insurer.
WILLIAN, C. GUTHRIE, JR.

DECEDENT'S E STATES-LIABILITY OF ADMINISTRATOR FOR COSTS OF UNSUCCESSFUL WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION. [West Virginia]

Wrongful Death Acts, in creating a new cause of action for damages
to compensate the dependents of persons killed by tortious acts, generally provide that suit shall be brought by the personal representative
of the decedent on behalf of the beneficiaries designated in the statutes.' Since the Acts do not specify whether the expenses of suit shall
'Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (1937) § 12148-4: "If a method of naming or appointing
an arbitrator or umpire be provided and any party ... to the contract shall fail
to avail himself of such method, or if for any other reason there shall be a lapse
in the naming of an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, or in filling a vacancy,
then upon the application of either party to the controversy the court of
common

pleas... shall ... designate

and

appoint

an

arbitrator

or

arbitrators

or umpire, as the case may require...-" [Italics supplied].
1

"Every such action shall be brought by and in the name of the personal representative of such deceased person; and the amount recovered in every such action
shall be distributed to the parties and in the proportion provided by law in relation to
the distribution of personal estate left by persons dying intestate." W. Va. Code
Ann. (Michie, 1949) § 5475; 7 Mass. Laws Ann. (Michie, 1933) c. 229, § 5; Ohio
Code Ann. (Throckmorton-Baldwin, 1940) § io5o9-167. Developments in the LawDamages (1947) 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1 3 at 167: "Under a death act, death resulting
from personal injury gives rise to a new cause of action, which in most states is
vested solely in the personal representative. While others permit only specific beneficiaries to sue, still others allow suit to be brought by various persons depending
upon the circumstances of each case."
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be borne by decedent's estate or by his beneficiaries, controversies over
the payment of such expenses have arisen frequently after wrongful
death suits have failed to obtain recovery for the beneficiaries and
there are therefore no proceeds from the suits out of which the costs
may be borne.
The difference of judicial opinion as to the proper resolution of
this problem is demonstrated by the West Virginia court in the recent
case of State ex rel. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Daugherty.2 Two actions
for the wrongful death of a husband and wife had been brought by
the administrator, and judgments for plaintiffs were rendered in each.34
On appeal the actions were consolidated and the decisions reversed.
The defendant railroad, by a mandate issued at the same time as the decision was announced, was granted costs to be obtained from funds of
the estate in the hands of the administrator.5 Since the administrator
had previously settled his accounts and was no longer in possession of
funds of the estate with which to pay, the railroad brought actions of
debt for the costs against the administrator, Daugherty, in his official
capacity as representative of the estate, and against the surety on his
bond given to secure proper administration. The West Virginia Court
of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, dismissed the action holding
that the administrator was liable only in his private, personal capacity,
and not in his official position as representative of the estate, and that,
therefore, the surety on the administrator's official bond was not liable
for his failure to pay the costs of the wrongful death suit. 6
The conclusion of the West Virginia court, which is in accord with
the majority of American courts,7 was based on the fact that had
S. E. (2d) 338 (V. Va. 1953.)
3Daugherty v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 135 W. Va. 688, 64 S. E. (2d) 231 (195).
'Daugherty v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 135 W. Va. 688, 64 S. E. (2d) 231 (1951).
rState ex rel. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Daugherty, 77 S. E. (2d) 338, 342 (W.
Va. 1953). The dissent in the principal case maintained that since the question of
costs was definitely decided in the previous decision in the controversy, the matter
is res judicata, and not to be considered again by the court. The opinion of the
majority of the court in the principal case ignored this contention.
6"'In causes of action wholly accruing after his decedent's death, the personal
representative is in general liable individually .... And wherever an action is
brought against an executor or administrator, on promises said to have been made
by him after the decedent's death, he is chargeable in his own right and not as
representative.' Whatever action was taken by the administrator in instituting
the two actions against the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, and incurring
court costs thereon, occurred after Jesse P. Stringer and Josephine M. Stringer
were dead." State ex rel. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Daugherty, 77 S. E. (2d) 338, 341
(w. Va. 1953).
7Toledo, St. L. & W. R. Co. v. Connolly, 79 C. C. A. 218, 149 Fed. 398 (1907);
Kuykendall v. Edmondson, 205 Ala. 265, 87 So. 882 (1921); Yelton v. Evansville & I.
277
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damages been recovered, they would not have been considered as part
of the decedent's estate.8 At common law, the cause of action for personal injuries, being a personal right of the injured party, died with
him, and could not be enforced by his personal representative on behalf of the estate.9 This oppressive rule has been modified by wrongful death legislation which originated in England in Lord Campbell's
Act.' 0 Various state statutes modeled after that Act now afford a
remedy for the dependents of the victim after his death. Though suit is
brought by the decedent's personal representative, the statutes create a
new cause of action for the harm which the tortfeasor inflicted on the
dependents," and only the beneficiaries named in the statutes receive
the damages awarded, which serve to recompense them mainly for the
loss of decedent's care and support. Thus, since the estate is not to
benefit from any possible recovery, the majority of the courts refuse
to allow the estate to be charged with the costs of an unsuccessful
suit.' 2

An analogous situation is found in stockholder's derivative suits
in the field of corporation law. It appears that before the directors,
who are bound to bring suit or defend on behalf of dissatisfied stockholders, can recover costs of the litigation from the corporation, the
corporation itself must be benefited by the suit.'3 It has been further
suggested that if the rule were that the estate of deceased could be
charged with costs of an unsuccessful wrongful death suit, the result would be a diminution of the assets of the estate to the unjustifiable detriment of creditors, legatees, and other distributees of the
R. Co., 134 Ind. 414, 33 N. E. 629, 21 L. R. A. 158 (1893); Moore v. Omaha Warehouse Co., 1o6 Neb. 116, 182 N. W. 597, 26 A. L. R. 98o (1921); Hartness v. Pharr,
133 N. C. 566, 45 S. E. 9o, 98 Am. St. Rep. 725 (19o3); Note (1921) 14 A. L. R. 516.
8
Boulden v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 2o5 Pa. 264, 54 AtI. 9o6 (1903); Connor v.
N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 28 R. I. 56o, 68 At. 481 (19o8); Note (1918) 31 Harv. L.
Rev. 1161.
93 Holdsworth, History of English Law (3rd ed. 1927) 333; Holdsworth, The
Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton (1916) 32 L. Q. Rev. 431; McCormick,
Damages (1935) 336.
"9 & 1O Vict. c. 93, 86 Stat. at Large 531 (1846).
nJeffersonville Railroad Co. v. Swayne's Adm'r, 26 Ind. 477 (1866); McCormick,
Damages (1935) 336; Note (1953) 1o Wash & Lee L. Rev. 261, 265.
"In re Butler, 2o F. Supp. 995 (W. D. Va. 1937); Kuykendall v. Edmondson,
205 Ala. 265, 87 So. 882 (1921); Smith v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 67 Ind.
App. 397, 117 N. E. 534 (1917).
"Red Bud Realty Co. v. South, 96 Ark. 281, 131 S. W. 340 (191o); New York
Dock Co., Inc. v. McCollom, 173 Misc. io6, x6 N. Y. S. (2d) 844 (1939); 13 Fletcher,
Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations (1943 Revision) § 6045; Note (1944)
152 A. L. R. 9o9.
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estate, who would not be in position to benefit by a successful suit.14
The courts which hold that money recovered as damages in wrongful death actions is not part of decedent's estate, maintain that the
administrator sues in his private capacity as a trustee- for the statutory
beneficiaries, who are usually decedent's next-of-kin, and not as personal representative of the estate. 15 It is reasoned that the legislature
designated the administrator to bring suit because he is likely to be
familiar with the beneficiaries, their needs, and financial situations
and therefore is an appropriate person to act in their behalf.16 Thus,
the administrator is allowed to occupy two positions at the same time
for different purposes, one as the official personal representative of
the estate and the other as a private person acting as trustee for the
beneficiaries under the wrongful death statute.
Since the surety provides bond for the administrator in his official capacity as representative of the estate, he is not liable for defaults of the administrator committed in any other capacity. However,
by a liberal interpretation of statutes requiring a surety for all acts
of administration, some courts hold the surety liable for the administrator's misappropriation of funds after he has recovered damages
in a wrongful death action.17 This result is especially justified when
the amount of the bond is increased after such a recovery, since this
action indicates the intention of the parties to have the bond cover that
fund.' 8 Even though the money recovered is not considered as part
of the estate, the surety is held liable for its proper distribution under
this view, on the theory that by statute the administrator has duties
both to settle the estate properly and to distribute any proceeds recovered from a wrongful death action.' 9
The dissent in the principal case was based largely on two grounds.
The first was that money recovered in a wrongful death action is to
be considered a part of the decedent's estate, and the second was that
"'Thompson & Lively v. Mann, 65 W. Va. 648, 64

S.W. 920, 22 L.

R. A.

(N.s.)

1o9 (1909).

568 (19o8); Fetty
"White v. Ward, 157 Ala. 345, 46 So. 166, 18 L. R. A. (N.s.)
v. Carroll, 118 W. Va. 401, 19o S.E. 683 (1937); Richards v. Riverside Iron Works,
56 W. Va. 51o, 49 S. E. 437 (19o8); Note (1918) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 16i.
"0Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Charman, x6i Ind. 95, 67 N. E. 923 (19o3).
WVatkins v. Purnell, 187 Ark. 837, 62 S. W. (2d) 2o (1933); Vukmirovich v.
Nickolich, 123 Minn. 165, 143 N. W. 255 (1913); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.
Young, 107 Okla. 151, 231 Pac. 261 (1924); Boyd v. Richie, 159 S.C. 55, 155 S.E.
844 (1930).
"United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Decker, 122 Ohio St. 285, 171 N. E.
333 (1930).
"Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Young, 107 Okla. 151, 231 Pac. 261 (1924).
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certain practical difficulties and inequalities would arise if the administrator is not held to be acting as personal representative of the
estate in bringing a wrongful death suit.
In support of his contention that the damages constitute part of
the estate, the dissenting Justice advanced five arguments: 20 that only
the administrator, in his official capacity can bring suit; that .this administrator is the only one who can enforce collection and distribute
the fund collected; that the beneficiaries of the wrongful death
statute are the same people as those to whom the personal property
of an intestate passes; that when the fund has been collected it is
held by the administrator as any other money or personal property of
the deceased; and that the duties of the administrator have not been
properly completed until the fund is distributed according to the
statute. In the view of the dissent, these considerations outweigh the adverse argument that the fund cannot be regarded as part of the estate
because it is not subject to decedent's debts or other liabilities of the
estate. A few other courts have afforded support for this position by
holding that the administrator is acting as the personal representative
of the estate when he prosecutes a wrongful death action. 21 They
maintain that since the statute requires the administrator to bring
the suit for wrongful death, he can act in no other capacity than as
personal representative, and therefore any failure to pay costs adjudged
against him is a breach of duty, the performance of which the surety
has guaranteed.
However, the reasoning of the courts which hold that any money
recovered is part of the estate of decedent and that the personal representative can sue only in his official capacity as personal representative seems open to question on two grounds. One ground is undue
minimization of the importance of the fact that the assets of the estate
are generally available for payment of the obligations of the decedent,
and that the wrongful death statutes specifically designate the recovery as for the benefit of the named relatives. The second ground
is the unrealistic assumption that the same individual cannot stand in
two different legal capacities at the same time.
Nevertheless, practical considerations have been raised which may
be said to refute the view that the administrator acts in his private
capacity in instituting a wrongful death action. Stress is placed on the
OState ex rel. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Daugherty, 77 S. E. (2d) 338 at 344
(W. Va. 1953).
"Goltra v. Illinois, 53 Il1. 224 (1870); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Young,
107 Okla. 11, 231 Pac. 261 (1924).
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fact that the statute requires the administratorto bring suit.2 2 In instances in which the beneficiaries themselves are legally incapable of
contracting with the administrator to indemnify him for the expenses of an unsuccessful suit, the administrator would be left without any source of compensation for such action and would therefore
be loathe to sue. Thereby the purpose of the statute to aid the designated beneficiaries would be defeated. The dissent in the principal
case suggests that the beneficiaries would even have a cause of action
2
against the administrator for his failure to sue. 3
When this problem is more closely examined, however, it appears
to be not too difficult of solution. Before an administrator sues on a
wrongful death cause of action, he has the right to require the beneficiaries to give a bond to indemnify him for the expenses of the suit
brought solely for their benefit.2 4 Beneficiaries who are not legally
capable of contracting for bond generally have guardians who could
act for them. It does not appear likely that any court would hold the
administrator liable for failure to bring suit when the beneficiaries
have refused to guarantee him compensation for the costs he might
incur in an unsuccessful action.
Another consideration advanced by the dissent in the Daugherty
case is that if damages for wrongful death are recovered, the beneficiaries would not be protected by the administrator's bond in the
distribution of the money, unless it be considered as part of the estate
and thus covered by the bond. However, at the time the judgment is
obtained, this deficiency can be overcome by increasing the amount
25
of the bond to include any amount so recovered.
One appealing argument for the minority position which is not
specifically referred to in the cases lies in the belief that underlying
the wrongful death statutes is the strong public policy of aiding
indigent beneficiaries, thereby relieving the state of the necessity of
supporting them. In some instances these beneficiaries may be financially unable to provide a bond to secure payment of court costs, and
in such cases it would appear that the policy of the statutes might
be thwarted because the administrator could not be persuaded to
bring suit. But this consideration does not seem to justify a depletion
of the decedent's estate by charging the cost of suit against it and
--Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Young, 107 Okla. 151, 231 Pac. 261 (1924).
3State ex rel. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Daugherty, 77 S. E. (2d) 338 at 343 (W.
Va. 1953).
2'Page v. Cave, 94 Vt. 3o6, iii Ad. 398 (192o).
2United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Decker, 122 Ohio St. 285, 171 N. E.
333 (193o).
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thereby prejudicing creditors who were in no way responsible for the
expenditures of suit and who could in no way benefit from the suit.
The legal rights of creditors of the estate to have full payment of their
just claims is surely as strong as the public policy to relieve the state
of the burden of supporting indigents.
Consideration of the reasoning of both the majority and dissent
leads to the conclusion that the result of the principal case is sound.
It appears that if any money were recovered in a wrongful death action, it would not be part of the decedent's estate. Therefore, the
administrator in bringing suit acts in his private capacity as trustee
for the beneficiaries, and the surety on his official bond is not liable
for court costs in an unsuccessful action.
WILLIAM

H.

DRAPER, JR.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-DOMICILE AS JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR
DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH

BOTH

PARTIES MAKE APPEARANCE.

[Federal]
One of the critical issues underlying recent Supreme Court decisions in the field of divorce is whether migratory divorces are to be
given judicial sanction by the relaxation or abolition of the jurisdictional requirement of domicile. Justice Rutledge has pin-pointed the
controversy in observing: "Stripped of its common-law gloss, the basic
constitutional issue... is whether the states shall have power to adopt
so-called 'liberal' divorce policies and grant divorces to persons coming from other states while there transiently or for only short periods
not sufficient in themselves, absent other objective 1criteria, to establish
more than casual relations with the community."
The recent case of Alton v. Alton 2 presented the Supreme Court
'Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 256, 65 S. Ct. 1092, 1107, 89 L. ed.
1577, 1595, 157 A. L. R. 1366, 1383 (1945) (dissenting opinion).
2207 F. (2d) 667 (C. A. 3rd, 1953), cert. granted, 347 U. S. 911, 74 S. Ct. 478, 98
L. ed. 352 (1954). Subsequent to the preparation of this comment, the Supreme Court
has declined to accept the opportunity to pass on the issue of the Alton case.
Certiorari was granted on Feb. 8, 1954, and the case was argued on April 7. However, on June i, the case was declared to be moot and the lower courts were directed to vacate their judgment and dismiss the proceeding, because Mr. Alton had
secured a valid divorce decree in Connecticut on April 28, 1954. Justice Black dissented on the ground that Mrs. Alton was entitled to have the divorce case tried in
the Virgin Islands, inasmuch as under Williams v. North Carolina "the Connecticut
divorce decree does not necessarily protect petitioner from conviction for bigamy
in the Virgin Islands or anywhere else." Justices Douglas and Jackson took no part
in the decision of the case. 22 U. S. L. Week 4279, June 1, 1954.
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with the opportunity to resolve this problem by dividing the jurisdictional requirements for divorce by dispensing with domicile as a jurisdictional requisite in those divorces in which both parties are before
the court, while retaining the requirement in the ex parte divorce.
Mrs. Alton, plaintiff-wife, left her home in Connecticut and, after six
weeks and one day residence in the Virgin Islands, sued for divorce,
relying upon the following act of the Legislative Assembly:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 8 and 9 hereof,
if the plaintiff is within the district at the time of the filing of
the complaint and has been continuously for six weeks immediately prior thereto, this shall be prima facie evidence of domicile, and where the defendant has been personally served within
the district or enters a general appearance in the action, then
the Court shall have jurisdiction of the action and of the parties
thereto without further reference to domicile or to the place
where the marriage was solemnized or the cause of action
arose." 3
Defendant waived service of process and appeared generally, but did
not contest the allegations of the complaint. The commissioner to
whom the case was referred recommended that a divorce be granted
for "incompatibility of temperament." 4 During the hearing before the
United States District Court of the Virgin Islands, plaintiff introduced
evidence to establish her residence, but the court asked for further
evidence of domicile. When this was not furnished, the action was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. On appeal to the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit the decision was affirmed by a 4 to 3 vote.5
Judge Goodrich, speaking for the majority, ruled that the opening
clause of the statute was invalid, reasoning that six weeks residence
is not a rational basis on which to base a presumption of domicile.
It was further pointed out in the opinion that "it is much easier to
support a presumption or prima facie rule which allows a conclusion
such as negligence to be drawn from named operative facts than it
is to support a conclusion lifting a court into jurisdiction over that
which it would not otherwise have."6 The minority, speaking through
Judge Hastie, looked to other fields of the law in which intent has
-Bill No. 55, 17 th Legislative Assembly of the Virgin Islands passed May ig,
1953, approved May 29, 1953 amending § 9 of the Divorce Law of 1944.
'This is one of the eight grounds for divorce in the Virgin Islands and is not
a ground for divorce in Connecticut. Alton v. Alton, 207 F. (2d) 667 at 668,
n. 1 (C. A. 3rd, 1953).
'The Court of Appeals approached the District Court's decision on review "as
though the legislation in question had been passed by one of the States in this
Circuit." Alton v. Alton, 207 F. (2d) 667, 670 (C. A. 3rd, 1953).
GAlton v. Alton, 207 F. (2d) 667, 67, (C. A. 3rd, 1953).
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been presumed from less rationally connected facts, and argued that
7
the prima facie rule was within the legislative competence.
That part of the statute which empowered the court to grant a
divorce decree without reference to domicile was held to violate the
requirements of due process of law. The majority reasoned that a
domiciliary state has so great an interest in the marital status of its
inhabitants that it should have exclusive power to dissolve that status.
In refutation of this holding, the dissent argued that the limitation
of the divorce power to the domiciliary state was a rule created by
nineteenth century judges, and does not have such ancient roots as to
entitle it to constitutional sanction. 8
The solution of the problem engendered by the marital relation
has been left to the individual states,9 since there is no language in
'The remainder of this comment will give no further consideration to this
portion of the Virgin Islands statute, as it is felt that the significance of the
decision lies in the court's treatment of the problem of domicile as a jurisdictional
basis. However, the minority's treatment of the evidentiary rule appears to be more
compelling than that of the majority. The majority reasoned that domicile was
not logically inferable from six weeks residence and struck down the prima facie
rule on the basis of Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R. Co. v. Turnipseed, which
established the principle that "it is only essential that there shall be some rational
connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed ..." 219 U. S.
35, 43, 31 S. Ct. 136, 138, 55 L. ed. 78, 80 (igo). But, as the dissenting opinion
pointed out, the majority gave too strict an interpretation to the Turnipseed
rule. In Yee Hem v. United States, which relied upon the Turnipseed case, the
Court stated: "If the effect of the legislative act is to give to the facts from which
the presumption is drawn an artificial value to some extent, it is no more than
happens in respect of a great variety of presumptions not resting upon statute."
o
268 U. S. 178, 185, 45 S. Ct. 47 , 472, 69 L. ed. 9o4, go6 (1925). The rule does not
require that domicile be logically inferable from six weeks residence standing
alone, but merely that the fact of residence be a normal and proper item in the
total body of evidence introduced and sufficient to establish the ultimate fact
of domicile. It does appear that the prima facie rule of the statute meets this
requirement. For a scholarly treatment of presumptions, see Laughlin, In Support
of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions (1953) 52 Mich. L. Rev. 195.
8"According to orthodox Anglo-American legal doctrine, jurisdiction to
divorce is based upon domicile. The origin of this rule is not clear and no adequate historical study seems to have been made. It goes back at least to Story's
treatise." Cook, Is Haddock v. Haddock Overruled? (1943) 18 Ind. L. J. 165, 166.
Cook observed that Story relied upon several early Massachusetts decisions which
in turn rested upon a Massachusetts statute of 1795 which provided that a suit
for divorce must be brought in the county "where the parties live." In England
the domiciliary concept was adopted in the famous case of Le Mesurier v. Le
Mesurier, [1895] A. C. 517. The development of English law in the field of
divorce jurisdiction is thoroughly treated in Griswold, Divorce Jurisdiction and
Recognition of Divorce Decrees-A Comparative Study (1951) 65 Harv. L. Rev. 193.
OWilliams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S.287 at 3o8, 63 S.Ct. 2o7 at 218, 87 L. ed.
279 at 291, 143 A. L. R. 1273 at 1285 (1942).
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the Constitution authorizing the federal government to regulate domestic relations,1 0 and the Supreme Court has steadfastly disclaimed
any responsibility for the regulation of marital policy." However,
where conflicts have arisen between the divergent policies of two states,
the Supreme Court has entered the field to determine the extraterritorial effect of a divorce decree under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the Constitution.12 These decisions of the Court all concern whether
the decree of one state must be accorded full faith and credit when
under collateral attack in a sister state.'3 Unlike these decisions, the
principal case does not involve a collateral attack or a question of extraterritorial recognition but rather an attack under the Due Process
Clause upon the validity of a state divorce statute.
The Supreme Court has had little occasion to discuss the validity of
divorce from the standpoint of due process,' 4 and the Alton case repre-

sents the first instance in which a federal court has considered an attempt to abolish domicile as a basis for divorce jurisdiction. 15 Many
decisions of the Supreme Court have held that domicile is a jurisdic..,,... it is certain that the Constitution of the United States confers no
power whatever upon the government of the United States to regulate marriage...." Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S.14, 31, 23 S. Ct. 237, 240, 47 L. ed. 366,
369 (90). See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 at 271, 65 S. Ct. 1o92 at
1114, 89 L. ed. 1577 at 1604, 157 A. L. R. 1366 at 1392 (1945); Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 at 304, 63 S. Ct. 207 at 216, 87 L. ed. 279 at 289, 143 A. L. R.
1273 at 1283 (1942).
2"We cannot... turn this into a divorce and probate court for the United
States." Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 3o4, 63 S. Ct. 207, 216, 87 L. ed.
279, 289, 143 A. L. R. 1273, 1283 (1942). "But the discharge of this duty does not
make of this Court a court of probate and divorce." Williams v. North Carolina, 325
U. S. 226, 233, 65 S. Ct. 1o92, 1097, 89 L. ed. 1577, 1583, 157 A. L. R. 1366, 1371
(1945).
n"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the Public Acts,
Records, judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings
shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U. S. Const., Art. IV, § i. "Such Acts,
records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the
same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State,
Territory or Possession from which they are taken." 62 Stat. 947 (1948), 28 U. S. C.
§ 1738 (1952).
"See Lorenzen, Extraterritorial Divorce-Williams v. North Carolina II (1945)
54 Yale L. J. 799 at So6, n. 24.
"See Lorenzen, Extraterritorial Divorce-Williams v. North Carolina II (1945)
54 Yale L. J. 799 at 8o6.
'A single state decision has considered a legislative attempt to waive domicile
as jurisdictional requisite. Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73, 36 S. (2d) 236 (1948).
Like the Alton case no question of extraterritorial recognition was involved. The
opinion failed to make clear the precise grounds on which the Alabama court held
the statute invalid. See Notes (1948) 62 Harv.L. Rev. 514; (1948) 1 Ala. L. Rev. 97.
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tional prerequisite to extraterritorial recognition under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. 16 The most significant of these decisions, both those
involving ex parte divorces 17 and those involving divorces based on
personal service of the defendant, must be reviewed to determine
what light they shed upon the problem raised by the principal case.
The Supreme Court has reiterated its adherence to a domiciliary
rule many times since it was first announced in Bell v. Bell'5 in 19oi.
There the New York courts denied recognition to a Pennsylvania
divorce, the wife having been served constructively. Noting that
neither party had a domicile in Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court held
that New York was not required to give full faith and credit to the
husband's Pennsylvania decree, because "No valid divorce from the
the bond of matrimony can be decreed on constructive service by the
courts of a state in which neither party is domiciled."' 9
Five years later, in Haddock v. Haddock,20 the Court determined
that New York did not have to recognize an ex parte Connecticut divorce granted to a husband who had wrongfully deserted his wife while
their domicile was New York, even though the husband thereafter
2
acquired a bona fide domicile in Connecticut prior to the divorce. 1
"6"Under our system of law, judicial power to grant a divorce-jurisdiction,
strictly speaking-is founded on domicile." Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S.
226, 229, 65 S. Ct. 1092, 1095, 89 L. ed. 1577, 1581, 157 A. L. R. 1366, 1369 (1945).
"An ex parte proceeding traditionally means a non-litigious proceeding
tending to bring about a legal effect which cannot be brought about by a private
individual alone but only by the formal pronouncement of a court. The use of the
term ex parte to characterize a divorce based upon constructive service of the defendant has been condoned by the highest authority. See Rice v. Rice, 336 U. S. 674
at 678, 69 S. Ct. 751 at 753, 93 L. ed. 957 at 961 (1949); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S.
343 at 356, 68 S. Ct. 1087 at 1093, 92 L. ed. 1429 at 1439, 1 A. L. R. (2d) 1355 at 1364
(1948); Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541 at 549, 68 S. Ct. 1213 at 1219, 92 L. ed. 1561 at
1569, 1 A. L. R. (2d) 1412 at 1419 (1948).
18181 U. S. 175, 21 S. Ct. 551, 45 L. ed. 804 (19o).
1918, U. S. 175, 177, 21 S. Ct. 551, 552, 45 L. ed. 804, 807 (19o). On the same
day the same rule was applied in the companion case of Streitwolf v. Streitwolf,
181 U. S. 179, 21 S.Ct. 553, 45 L. ed. 807 (igoi), also involving an ex parte divorce.
In this case the husband obtained a North Dakota divorce from his New Jersey
wife. New Jersey refused to honor the North Dakota decree, finding that the
husband had never acquired domicile in the divorcing state.
202o1 U. S.562, 26 S.Ct. 525, 50 L. ed. 867 (1906).
"Under the Haddock decision a state could grant a divorce to a domiciliary
spouse against a non-domiciliary spouse if the spouse not domiciled in the state
had consented to or was the cause of the separation or was personally subject to
the jurisdiction of the court. A state also had jurisdiction if it was the last state
in which the parties were domiciled as man and wife. The Haddock decision had
the undesirable effect of making fault a jurisdictional question of fact in matrimonial actions, and for this reason it was widely criticized by eminent authority.
'McClintock, Fault as an Element of Divorce Jurisdiction (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 564
at 571-574; Goodrich, Matrimonial Domicile (1917) 27 Yale L. J. 49 at 62-65.
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An ex parte divorce granted in a state other than that of the matrimonial domicile was not entitled to compulsory extra-state recognition.
All of the opinions in the Haddock case recognized that domicile
was an essential jurisdictional fact, and Justice Brown, dissenting, declared that "the courts of one state may not grant a divorce against an
absent defendant to any person who has not acquired a bona fide
22
domicile in that state."
In 1942, the famous decision in Williams v. North Carolina 3 dis-

pensed with the doctrine of matrimonial domicile as an element of di24
vorce jurisdiction, and Haddock v. Haddock was expressly overruled.
In the Williams case a North Carolina man and woman each obtained
ex parte Nevada divorces from their absent spouses, whereupon they
intermarried and returned to North Carolina. In a prosecution for
bigamous cohabitation, the Supreme Court held that, assuming the
respective Nevada domiciles to be bona fide, the Nevada divorces were
entitled to full faith and credit in North Carolina. Justice Douglas in
the majority opinion stated: "Domicile of the plaintiff, immaterial
to jurisdiction in a personal action, is recognized in the Haddock case
and elsewhere ... as essential in order to give the court jurisdiction

which will entitle the divorce decree to extraterritorial effect, at least
when the defendant has neither been personally served nor entered an
'2 5
appearance."
The Williams case was remanded to the North Carolina Supreme
Court, and on a second trial the court found that Williams had not
established a bona fide domicile in Nevada. In the second Williams v.
North Carolinadecision 26 the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction
and held that North Carolina was free to reject Nevada's finding of
domicile in favor of its own determination that Williams never lost
27
his North Carolina domicile.
=2O1 U. S. 562, 61o, 26 S. Ct. 525, 544, 50 L. ed. 867, 886 (igo6).
'317 U. S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. ed. 279, 143 A. L. R. 1273 (1942).
'The Williams case modified the Haddock rule which made "fault" a jurisdictional fact, in that the state of domicile of one of the parties now has jurisdiction to
grant an ex parte divorce without regard to which party was at fault.
2317 U. S. 287, 297, 63 S. Ct. 207, 213, 87 L. ed. 279, 285, 143 A. L. R. 1273, 1279
(1942) [italics supplied].
2 325 U. S. 226, 65 S. Ct. 1092, 89 L. ed. 1577, 157 A. L. R. 1366 (1945).
2In Esenwein v. Pennsylvania, 325 U. S. 279, 65 S. Ct. 1118, 89 L. ed. 16o8, 157
A. L. R. 1396 (1945) it was pointed out that a finding of domicile made in an

out-of-state ex parte divorce proceeding must be given prima facie validity, but
that if this prima fade case is overcome by contrary evidence the divorce need
not be recognized. This ruling was reaffirmed in Rice v. Rice, 336 U. S. 674, 69 S.
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Whether the ex parte Williams decree was valid in Nevada remains a highly controversial question, 28 but the decisions clearly indicate that such a decree has no extraterritorial validity unless one
party was domiciled in the divorcing state.
In 19o3, two years after the decision in the Bell case, the Supreme
Court in Andrews v. Andrews2 9 extended the domiciliary rule to a
divorce based upon personal service in which both parties were before
the court. Charles Andrews, domiciled in Massachusetts, went to South
Dakota, established a residence, and brought suit for divorce. The wife
received notice, appeared by counsel and filed an answer. She subsequently requested her counsel to withdraw her appearance in the suit,
which was done, and thereafter the divorce was granted. Charles at
once returned to Massachusetts and thereafter married again. After
his death, both his first and second wife asked to be appointed administratrix. Applying a statute of the state forbidding the enforcement of
a divorce obtained under such circumstances, the Massachusetts
court refused to extend full faith and credit to the South Dakota
decree.
Referring to the Bell decision as holding that "domicile was in any
event the inherent element upon which the jurisdiction must rest ..... 30
the Supreme Court reiterated that bona fide domicile in a state "was
essential to give jurisdiction to the courts of such state to render a
decree of divorce which would have extraterritorial effect." 31 The
second "wife" urged that the domiciliary rule of the Bell case should
not apply to the case before the court since both parties had appeared
in the South Dakota proceeding. To this contention the Court answered: "... . it is obvious that the inadequacy of the appearance or consent of one person to confer jurisdiction over a subject matter not resting on consent includes, necessarily, the want of power of both parties
to endow the court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter, which appearance or consent could not give."3 2 The Supreme Court observed in
passing that the statute of South Dakota made domicile the basis of
divorce proceedings in that state, but then emphasized that domicile
Ct. 751, 93 L. ed. 957 (1949), in which Connecticut's denial of recognition to a
Nevada divorce was sustained.
28See Powell, And Repent at Leisure (1945) 58 Harv. L. Rev. 93o at 935-44; Griswold, Divorce Jurisdiction and Recognition of Divorce Decrees-A Comparative
Study (1951) 65 Harv. L. Rev. 193 at

212, n. 57; Note (1952) 9 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.

61.
. 188 U. S. 14, 23 S. Ct. 237, 47 L. ed. 366 (i9o3).
"188 U. S. 14, 40, 23 S. Ct. 237, 243, 47 L. ed. 366, 373 (1903).
3188 U. S. 14, 41, 23 S. Ct. 237, 244, 47 L. ed. 366, 373 (1903)188 U. S. 14, 41, 23 S. Ct. 237, 243, 47 L. ed. 366, 373 (1903).
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in a state was essential to give jurisdiction to the courts of the state
"without reference to, the Statute of South Dakota ... -33 Although the
case does not indicate the precise constitutional ground upon which
Justice White rested his opinion,34 this dictum from the case indicates
that he considered the domiciliary requirement something more than
a matter of state prerogative-i.e., the South Dakota court was without
jurisdiction not because the legislature of South Dakota had based
jurisdiction upon domicile, but rather because domicile is essential to
jurisdiction in any event.
Not until 1938 did the Supreme Court have another opportunity
to determine the extraterritorial effect to be given a divorce granted
with both parties before the court, and that case, Davis v. Davis,P3 5 was
decided by the Court not in its capacity as the highest tribunal of the
United States, but as the highest tribunal in the District of Columbia.
The ruling was that if both parties actually appear and litigate the
jurisdictional question of domicile, they are bound by the decision.
The doctrine of res judicata is applicable to litigated questions of
jurisdiction of the subject matter.
This attack upon the vitality of the Andrews case was renewed
3388 U. S. 14, 41, 23 S. Ct. 237, 244, 47 L. ed. 366, 373 (1903).
3t"Andrews v. Andrews did not assert that any particular federal constitutional
provision made domicile a state jurisdictional requirement in divorce cases. It
emphasized state and common law concepts of domicile and a state's power 'over
its inhabitants'." Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 266, 272, n. 12, 65 S. Ct.
1092, 1115, n. 12, 89 L. ed. 1577, 16o4, n. 12, 157 A. L. R. 1366, 1393, n. 12 (1945).
Cf. "Since the case [Andrews v. Andrews] came to the Supreme Court from the Massachusetts state court on the issue whether Massachusetts gave full faith and credit to
the North Dakota [sic] decree, the Supreme Court had to give a constitutional
answer, however much it was guided by its indoctrination in common law concepts and techniques. It couldn't correct the Massachusetts courts on common law
notions alone. It had to hold that the Massachusetts court could constitutionally apply to deny effect to the North Dakota [sic] decree. If Mr. Justice White failed
to utter the relevant constraining and permitting constitutional phrases, this does
not keep the decision from going on constitutional grounds." Powell, And Repent at
Leisure (1945) 58 Harv. L. Rev. 930, 968, n. 107.
2 3o5 U. S. 32, 59 S. Ct. 3, 83 L. ed. 26, 118 A. L. R. 1518 (1938). The husband,
alleging he was a domiciliary, instituted a divorce action in Virginia. The wife was
personally served with notice in the District of Columbia, her domicile, and appeared in the Virginia action to contest the husband's allegations as to his domicile. The court found that the husband was domiciled in Virginia and granted the
divorce. The husband thereafter brought suit in the District of Columbia to have
a prior separation decree modified because of the Virginia divorce. The District of
Columbia court refused to recognize the Virginia decree, on the grounds of lack og
jurisdiction. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that,
since both parties had appeared and the domicile question had been fully argued,
the Virginia decree must be given effect in the District of Columbia.
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ten years later in Sherrer v. Sherrer.36 In the Sherrer case, the wife
left the matrimonial domicile in Massachusetts, claimed to have acquired a Florida domicile pursuant to the relevant statute and instituted a suit for divorce there. The husband retained Florida counsel, who entered a general appearance and denied the allegations of
the wife's complaint. Though Mr. Sherrer was present at the hearing,
no evidence was introduced by him on the issue of the wife's domicile
in Florida. The Florida court entered a decree of divorce in favor of
the wife after specifically finding that she was a bona fide resident of
the state and that the court had jurisdiction of the parties and the
subject matter. The husband subsequently instituted a statutory action
in Massachusetts for a declaration that he was justifiably living apart
from his wife, whose divorce and subsequent marriage he alleged to
be invalid. The Massachusetts court granted 'the relief sought, invoking the same state statute involved in Andrews v. Andrews. The Supreme Court reversed that decision, declaring that "the doctrine of
res judicata applies to adjudications relating either to jurisdiction of
the person or of the subject matter where such adjudications have
been made in the proceedings in which those questions were in issue
37
and in which the parties were given full opportunity to litigate."
To the contention that Andrews v. Andrews militated against this result, the Court after attempting to distinguish between the two cases
factually, ruled that "insofar as the rule of that case may be said to be
inconsistent with the judgment herein announced, it must be regarded
38
as having been superseded by subsequent decisions of this Court."
The attempt of Chief Justice Vinson to distinguish Andrews v.
Andrews from the Sherrer case upon the ground that in the former
the defendant withdrew her appearance after answer and before decree
30334 U. S. 343, 68 S. Ct. 1087, 92 L. ed. 1429, 1 A. L. R. (2d) 1355 (1948).
31Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343, 35o, 68 S. Ct. 1o87, 1o9o, 92 L. ed. 1429,
1435, 1 A. L. R. (2d) 1355, 1361 (1948).
"Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343, 353, 68 S. Ct. 1087, 1092, 92 L. ed. 1429, 1437,
1 A. L. R. (2d) 1355, 1363 (1948). In Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378, 68 S. Ct. 1094, 92 L. ed.
1451, i A. L. R. (2d) 1376 (1948), decided the same day as Sherrer v. Sherrer, the
husband after residing for six weeks in Nevada sued for divorce. The wife appeared
personally and through her attorney filed both an answer admitting the husband's
residence in Nevada and a cross-complaint for divorce. The Nevada court found
it had jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter, and entered a decree granting the wife a divorce. The husband remarried and returned to Massachusetts where
the wife brought proceedings against him under a decree for separate support
rendered in Massachusetts before the Nevada divorce. The Massachusetts court
disregarded the Nevada divorce as void for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
held that Massachusetts could not under the requirements of full faith and credit,
subject the Nevada decree to collateral attack by readjudicating the existence of
jurisdictional facts.
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is not persuasive, because the Andrews opinion is predicated upon the
supposition that the appearance was valid. Of course if the withdrawal
had been perfected, the decree would have been the product of an
ex parte proceeding and would present a situation different from the
Sherrer case in which both parties were before the divorcing court.
The precise reasons why the Andrews case is "inconsistent" with
the Sherrer case were not stated, but it is possible to infer that the
Supreme Court virtually overruled the only decision in which it has
ever been held that domicile is essential to jurisdiction where both
parties are before the divorcing court. The Sherrer decision further
cuts the ground from beneath the domiciliary rule by permitting the
parties by mutual consent to confer jurisdiction upon the court of a
non-domiciliary state, for both spouses having personally appeared
cannot be heard to assert that the court is without jurisdiction.
Doubt has been voiced, however, as to whether a divorce such as
Mrs. Sherrer's would be good for all purposes. Judge Goodrich raised
this question in the Alton case as follows: "A divorce not at the domicile gives no protection against a prosecution for bigamy in the state
of the domicile, although if the defendant is in court, he, himself,
may be precluded from questioning the decree on the grounds of res
judicata." 39 The argument is that although a divorce rendered by a
court without jurisdiction is protected by res judicata from collateral
attack in a sister state by a party who could not attack it in the state
where rendered, "the principle does not apply in any event as against
prosecution by public authorities for adultery, bigamy, or other
crimes." 40 As Judge Goodrich points out in the Alton case, this conjecture goes "out beyond the place where legal trails end" 41 since the
Supreme Court has never had an occasion to say what the result would
be in such a case. Of course, the second Williams case, cited by the
Judge as authority for his generalization, is positive authority that
such a prosecution would succeed where the defendant's divorce was
obtained in an ex parte proceeding. However, the ruling of the Sherrer case indicates a disposition on the part of the Supreme Court to
give greater protection to the extraterritorial validity of a divorce
based on personal service than that accorded an ex parte decree under
the second Williams case. Subsequently the Court expanded the scope
of this protection in Johnson v. Muelberger4 2 by extending the res
judicata doctrine to third parties, holding that where by the law of
'Alton v. Alton, 207 F. (2d) 667, 674 (C. A.

3rd, 1953).

' 0Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (3rd ed. 1949) 401.
"207 F. (2d) 667, 674 (C. A. 3rd, 1953).

"-340 U. S. 581, 71 S. Ct. 474, 95 L. ed. 552 (1951).
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the divorcing state a divorce could not there be attacked on jurisdictional grounds by the parties who were actually before the court or by
their privies or by strangers, the Full Faith and Credit Clause precludes
attack in every state. In Cook v. Cook 43 the Court went one step further and held that on collateral attack in a sister state, in the absence
of evidence, there is a presumption that the divorcing state had personal jurisdiction over both parties so that the decree is res judicata.
In view of these decisions it appears logically inferable that an attack
by the domiciliary state by means of a criminal prosecution upon such
a divorce would not be sanctioned by the Supreme Court.
Unquestionably the Sherrer case did not directly repudiate the domiciliary rule; however, it did neutralize the force of the rule by allowing it to be circumvented through the doctrine of res judicata. The net
effect of the res judicata holding in these cases is to give extraterritorial
recognition to divorces rendered by a non-domiciliary state when
both parties are before the court. Should the Supreme Court reverse
the decision in the Alton case and thereby affirmatively repudiate the
domiciliary rule in this area of divorce, it would amount to no more
than a candid recognition by the Court that it has already sanctioned
migratory divorce where the divorcing court has had personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
This partial abandonment of the domiciliary rule will limit a
state's power to control the domestic relations of its citizens. However, the obvious justification for such a limitation would appear to
be that the domiciliary rule "presupposes a stable and intimate attachment of both spouses to a single community which in fact and
alone has a genuine interest in their relationship," 44 while in fact
this picture is no longer characteristic of American society. But the abolition of the domiciliary requirement in cases of personal service
would not necessarily foreclose every interest of the state of domicile. As
Judge Hastie pointed out in his dissent in the principal case, " it may
well be that under the correct application of conflict of laws doctrine,
and even under the due process clause, it is encumbent upon [the divorcing state], lacking connection with the subject matter, to apply the
divorce law of some state that has such connection .... ,,45
U. S. 126, 72 S. Ct. 157, 96 L. ed. 146 (1951).
4'Alton v. Alton, 207 F. (2d) 667, 682 (C. A. 3rd, 1953).
IsAlton v. Alton, 207 F. (2d) 667, 685 (C. A. 3rd, 1953). This problem raised by
Judge Hastie need not be faced unless the domiciliary rule is abandoned. However, should the power to divorce based on personal service require the application
of foreign law to non-domiciliaries, it would appear that the whole purpose in
discarding the domiciliary requirement would be defeated. The difficulties inherent
in the present scheme would be compounded. What foreign law would the court
43342
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The inherent difficulties in applying a domiciliary rule, depending
as it does upon the proof of the mental attitude of a person toward
a place, 46 also makes its abolition as a jurisdictional fact desirable. In
any event, considering that the Constitution is silent as to the basis
for jurisdiction in divorce proceedings in which both parties are before the divorcing court, it would appear that a substitute to the
domiciliary rule is at least worth a trial.
WILLIAM

R.

COGAR

OF RESULTS OF INVOLUNTARY BLOOD TESTS
PROVE THAT ACCUSED WAS DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED. [Cali-

EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY

To
fornia]

In an effort to curtail the increasing highway accident toll, the
states have by statute assessed severe penalties for drunken driving,'
apply? That of the plaintiff's domicile? Why not the law of the defendant's domicile? Conceivably the law of matrimonial domicile would apply. (Haddock revived?) Two further possibilities are the laws of the state in which the cause of acton arose or the law of the state in which the marriage was performed.
If the court decides to apply the law of either the plaintiff's or defendant's
domicile, how is this domicile to be determined? Assuming the court takes these
hurdles and determines the foreign jurisdiction whose law is applicable, how is
this law to be known? If the spouses have hand-picked the forum to secure the advantage of its lenient laws, they certainly would not provide evidence of foreign
law. Perhaps the forum would end by applying its own law on the asumption that
the law of the foreign jurisdiction corresponds to the law of the forum.
'"Domicile has been a much-criticized concept. Justice Rutledge argued: "The
principal result of transplanting [the idea of domicile] to constitutional soil has
been to make more complex, variable and confusing than need be inherently
the allocation of authority in the federal scheme." Williams v. North Carolina, 325
U. S. 226, 255, 65 S. Ct. 1092, 1107, 89 L. ed. 1577, 1595, 157 A. L. R. 1366, 1383
(1945). It is also widely recognized that domicile is often established through
perjured testimony. Lorenzen, Extraterritorial Divorce-Williams v. North Carolina
I (1945) 54 Yale L. J. 799 at 8oi. Justice Frankfurter has sharply criticized the use
of domicile as a basis for jurisdiction in the field of tax: "In the setting of modern
circumstances, the inflexible doctrine of domicile-one man, one home,-is in danger
of becoming a social anachronism." State of Texas v. State of Florida, 306 U. S. 398,
429, 59 S. Ct. 563, 578, 83 L.'ed. 817, 837, 121 A. L. R. 1179, 1197 (1939).
"It has been held that driving an automobile while intoxicated is directly perilous to human life and is malum in se, and where another person is struck and injured, the offense of assault and battery is made out, King v. State, 157 Tenn. 635,
is S. W. (2d) 9o4 (1928). But the operation of a motor vehicle by one intoxicated is
not regarded as a public or common nuisance indictable at common law, State v.
Rodgers, 91 N. J. L. 60, 99 Ad. 931 (1916). Under modern statutes one driving a
vehicle while intoxicated is subject to a criminal prosecution. People v. Dryden,
245 Pac. 436 (Cal. App. 1926); White v. State, 195 Ind. 63, 144 N. E. 531 (1924);
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but the effectiveness of these policing programs depends on the ability
of the law enforcement officers to prove the intoxicated condition of
the accused driver. The prosecution agencies attempt to meet this
problem of proof by using evidence of intoxication based upon scientific tests performed on the defendant, such as an analysis of his blood
for its alcoholic content. 2 The resistance of defendants to the admission
of this evidence obtained by the blood tests raises several legal issues.
The contention is frequently made by an accused that the results
of blood tests are not reliable and therefore should not be admitted
in evidence. However, the courts have consistently held that the opinions of experts as to whether the individual was intoxicated or not
predicated upon the percentage of alcohol in the individual's blood,
though not conclusive, are admissible when there is a proper preliminary showing that the 'blood tests have been properly conducted. 3
Failing to have the evidence of the blood tests excluded on the
ground of unreliability, defendants have argued that the use of such
evidence violates the constitutional safeguards of accused persons embraced in the privilege against self-incrimination, the protection
against unlawful searches and seizures, and the right to due process of
law.
In the recent case of People v. Haeussler,4 the California court dealt
with each of these constitutional issues in sustaining a conviction
for drunken driving. The defendant motorist was involved in a collision with another automobile and was rendered unconscious. While
the defendant was at the hospital and still unconscious, blood was
taken from her for the purpose of typing, preparatory to a blood transfusion. A portion of that blood was used, without the defendant's permission, for an analysis of its alcoholic content. Over the defendant's
specific objections at the trial, a doctor was permitted to testify that
Commonwealth v. Black, 23o Ky. 677, 20 S. W. (2d) 741 (1929); State v. Ray, 4
N. J. Misc. 493, 133 At. 486 (1926); State v. Jones, 181 N. C. 543, io6 S. E. 827 (1921);
State v. Forsyth, 131 Wash. 61l, 230 Pac. 821 (1924). In some states the offense is a
felony, State v. Dudley, 159 La. 872, 1o6 So. 364 (1925).
2Literature on blood tests for intoxication is extensive. See Ladd and Gibson,
Medico-Legal Aspects of the Blood Test to Determine Intoxication (1939) 24 Iowa
L. Rev. 191; Martin, Admissibility of Results Obtained From Intoxication Tests and
Other Bodily Examinations of Defendant (1941) 19 Tex. L. Rev. 463; Heise, The
Specificity of the Test for Alcohol in Body Fluids (1934) 4 Am. J. of Clin. Path. 182;
Holcomb, Alcohol in Relation to Traffic Accidents (1938) 111 J. A. M. A. 1076. See
McCormick, Cases on Evidence (and ed. 1948) 33, n. 5o for the above references.
'State v. Duguid, 5o Ariz. 267, 72 P. (2d) 435 (1937); Lawrence v. City of Los
Angeles, 53 Cal. App. (2d) 6, 127 P. (ad) 931 (1942); Commonwealth v. Capalbo, 308
Mass. 376, 32 N. E. (2d) 225 (1941); Kuroske v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 234 Wis. 394,
291 N. W. 384, 127 A. L. R. i5o 5 (194o).
'26o P. (2d) 8 (Cal. 1953).
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in his opinion the results of the test indicated that the defendant was
under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. In the
Superior Court the defendant was convicted of manslaughter and of
driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor. On appeal to the District Court of Appeals the conviction was
set aside and the cause remanded. On further appeal to the Supreme
Court of California the defendant contended that the admission of
the results of blood tests in evidence deprived her of due process of
law, under the rule of Rochin v. California5 in which the United
States Supreme Court held that the forcible extraction of morphine
capsules from the defendant's stomach by use of a stomach pump was
"conduct that shocks the conscience," and a violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 The California
Supreme Court, with two Justices dissenting, sustained the conviction
and rejected the defendant's contention that she had been deprived of
due process of law. The majority of the court also held that the taking of the blood test was neither a violation of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination nor of his protection against unlawful
searches and seizures.
The privilege against self-incrimination, which is guaranteed in
respect to federal government action by the Fifth Amendment, 7 was
early held not part of the due process of law which states must afford to the defendant under the Fourteenth Amendment.8 But since
a similar provision is included in the constitutions of forty-six states, 9
the argument is available to defendants in trials in state courts that a
compulsory blood test is within the bar of the privilege, because a
blood sample taken against an accused's will can not be used as adverse evidence without forcing him to be a witness against himself.
The privilege has been stated as one of common law origin, "established both on the grounds of public policy and of humanity... because it would place the witness under the strongest temptation to
commit the crime of perjury... [as] it would be to extort a confession
of truth by a kind of duress, every species and decree of which the law
r342 U. S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 L. ed. 183 (1952) noted in (1952) 9 Wash. & Lee
L. Rev. 192.
OU. S. Const., Amend. XIV: .... nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."
7U. S. Const., Amend. V: "... nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself ..."
6Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14, 53 L. ed. 97 (19o8); Adamson
v. California, 332 U. S.46, 67 S. Ct. 1672, 91 L. ed. 1903 (1946).
OSee 8 NWigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 194o) 32o (Iowa and New Jersey have no such
constitutional provisions). Cal. Const. Art I § 13: "No person shall ... be compelled
in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself."
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abhors."' 0 This being its true basis, the privilege is held by the majority
of the courts to extend only to testimonial compulsion and not to the
production of real evidence. 1' Applying this view, the California court
properly ruled in the principal case that defendant's privilege was
not violated because in the use of an intoxication test the defendant
cannot possibly be put under a temptation to commit perjury, and
there is no chance of falsehood in the physical facts which speak for
themselves regardless of the will of the defendant.' 2 As stated by the
Oregon court in State v Cram,13 in sustaining the use of evidence
of a blood test indicating intoxication: "He was not compelled to
testify against himself. Evidence of the result of the analysis of the
blood sample was not his testimony but that of Dr. Beeman, distinct
from anything the defendant may have said or done. The blood sample
was obtained without the use of any process against him as a witness.
He was not required to establish the authenticity, identity or origin of
the blood; those facts were proved by witnesses."' 4
A search of analogous cases supports this conclusion, 1 many
courts having held in a variety of fact situations that real evidence
taken from a defendant's body may be used against him. Among these
"State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, i6o P. (2d) 283, 284, 164 A. L. R. 952, 954 (1945),
relying on 6 Jones, Commentaries on Evidence (2nd ed.) § 2474.
18 Wigmore, Evidence ( 3rd ed. 1940) §§ 2263, 2264: ".... it is not merely any
and every compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in history and in the
constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion." People v. One 1941 Mercury Sedan, 74 Cal. App. (2d) 199, 168 P. (2d) 443 (1946); O'Brien v. State, 125 Imd.
38, 25 N. E. 137 (189o); State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 16o P. (2d) 283, 164 A. L. R.
952 (1945).
-The concurring view of Justices Black and Douglas in Rochin v. California
that evidence obtained by stomach pumping constitutes involuntary self-incrimination is questionable. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) § 2266 where the
privilege against self-incrimination is regarded as covering only statements made
in court as a witness. Wigmore points out that many courts have confused the
privilege against self-incrimination and the rule against forced confession. See
Wood v. United States, 128 F. (2d) 265, 141 A. L. R. 1318 (App. D. C. 1942) for a
discussion distinguishing forced confessions from the privilege against self-incrimination.
There has also been confusion between the right against illegal search and
seizure and the privilege against self-incrimination. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3 d ed.
1940) § 2264; Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures (1921) 34 Harv. L. Rev. 361;
Notes (1904) 4 Col. L. Rev. 6o; (1948) 58 Yale L. J. 144. Much of the confusion apparently results from many court holdings that evidence procured through an unreasonable search and seizure is nevertheless admissible. When the brutality used
offends the court, it must find means other than unreasonable search and seizure to
bar the evidence. Strained interpretations of the rule against forced confessions and
the privilege against self-incrimination result.
i176 Ore. 577, 16o P. (2d) 283, 164 A. L. R. 952 (1945).
4176 Ore. 577, A6o P. (2d) 283, 289, 164 A. L. R. 952, 96o (1945).
"sNote (1941) 3 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 122, 125.
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cases are decisions holding admissible as real evidence: measurements, 16
fingerprints, 17 footprints,' 8 photographs, 19 nail-scrappings, 2 0 indentifying marks, 2' and acts requiring the removal or replacement of accused's garments for identification. 22 A similar position is advocated
in the Model Code of Evidence which asserts that no person has a
privilege to refuse: "(a) to submit his body to examination for the
purpose of discovering or recording his corporal features and other
identifying characteristics, or his physical or mental condition, or (b) to
furnish or to permit the taking of samples of body fluids or substances
23
for analysis."
If the defendant in the principal case had been conscious when the
blood was taken and had resisted the taking of the sample, the evidence
of the result of the test might have been held inadmissible. 24. Under
the view adopted by some courts, real evidence obtained as the result
of a prisoner's affirmative acts done under direct compulsion is excluded, even though the same evidence obtained without his active
participation, though against his will, is admissible. 25 Whether such
"'United States v. Cross, 9 Mackey (2o D. C.) 365 (891).
1"People v. Sallow, 1oo Misc. 447, 165 N. Y. Supp. 915 (1917).
'6Biggs v. State, 0o1 Ind. 200, 167 N. E. 129 (1929); State v. Barela, 23 N. M. 395,
168 Pac. 545 (1917).
"Shaffer v. United States, 24 App. D. C. 417 (19o4), cert. denied 196 U. S. 639, 25
S. Ct. 795, 49 L. ed. 631 (i9o5) as cited in Ladd and Gibson, Medico-Legal Aspects
of the Blood Test to Determine Intoxication (1939) 24 Iowa L. Rev. 191, 233OState v. McLaughlin, 138 La. 958, 70 So. 925 (1916).
"O'Brien v. State, 125 Ind. 38, 25 N. E. 137 (1890); State v. Oschoa, 49 Nev. 194,
242 Pac. 582 (1926); State v. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79, 33 Am. Rep. 53o (1879).
"Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 31 S. Ct. 2, 54 L. ed. 1o21 (igio) (witness
was allowed to testify that a certain blouse fitted the accused); Orr v. State, 236
Ala. 462, .183 So. 445 (1938) (witness was required to put a cap on); State v. Ah
Chuey, 14 Nev. 79, 33 Am. Rep. 530 (1879); State v. Strauss, 174 Misc. 881, 22 N. Y. S.
(2d) 155 (1940).
"Model Code of Evidence (1942) Rule 205.
"Booker v. City of Cincinnati, 5 Ohio Ops. 433, 22 Ohio L. Abs. 286 (1936)
(holding the testimony of a doctor concerning the results of test for intoxication to
which the accused was required to submit was inadmissible.) As cited in Note (1941)
15 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 344, 345. Apodaca v. State, 14o Tex. Crim. Rep. 593, 146 S.W.
(2d) 381 (1940) (holding testimony regarding intoxication tests inadmissible).
"State v. Flynn, 36 N. H. 64 (1858); People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 15o N. E. 585
(1926); 8 Wigmore, Evidence ( 3 d ed. 1940) § 2264.
This distinction has been well illustrated in State v. Griffin, 129 S. C. 200, 124 S.
E. 81, 35 A. L. R. 1227 (1924). The two questions involved were: "... (i) was the
testimony of the sheriff admissible, to the effect that he compared the shoe of the
defendant with the tracks in the potato patch, and that it fitted, when it appeared
that he had forced the defendant to remove her shoe, and made the adjustment
himself? (2) Was the testimony of the sheriff admissible, to the effect that he compelled the defendant to put her foot in the track, and that she would not do it in
the right way?" The first question was answered in the affirmative by the court,
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a nice distinction is justifiable may be open to dispute, but where the
defendant was unconscious when the blood was taken for testing,
no element of compulsion to submit to the test is involved, and the
results should be admissible as real evidence legally obtained without
26
the accused's being required to be a witness against himself.
Having disposed of the self-incrimination argument, the court in
the Haeussler case declared that the prohibition against unlawful
27
searches and seizures is "more pertinent to the present inquiry,"
but concluded that no violation of the defendant's rights occurred in
this respect.28 This constitutional protection was thought to be "pertinent" because in Wolf v. Colorado29 the United States Supreme Court
held that illegal search and seizure was barred by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the states were therefore under the same restraint as is placed on the federal government
by the Fourth Amendment. Unfortunately, however, from the standpoint of the defendant, in the Wolf case the Court refused to impose
upon the states the federal rule which forbids the admission of evi30
dence secured through illegal search and seizure. It was reasoned that
one whose rights are violated by unlawful search or seizure has alternative remedies, civil and criminal, against the offending officers, and,
therefore, he may be accorded due process of law through the exercise
of one of those remedies, without the suppression of the unlawfully
acquired evidence. For this reason, the California court concluded in
the principal case that the defendant was not deprived of due process
of law even if the evidence of intoxication admitted at the trial was
illegally obtained. Further, it was ruled that the methods used to obgiving its reason that: "In the case at bar the defendant was not being treated as a
witness; the shoe and the comparison of the shoe with the track were not the testimony of the defendant, but of the sheriff, distinct from anything she may have
said or done; the shoe was obtained from her control without the use of any process against her as a witness; she was not necessary to estabIsh it authenticity,
identity, or origin, which facts were established by the testimony of the sheriff." The
court in answer to the second question presented held that the testimony as to the
sheriff compelling the defendant "to put her foot in the track, and her conduct in
doing so" was inadmissible for the reason that the defendant was required to do an
affirmative act.
"6People v. Tucker, 88 Cal. App. (2d) 333, 198 P. (2d) 941 (1948); Black v.
People, 125 Coo. 36, 240 P. (2d) 512 (1951); State v. Cram, 156 Ore. 577, 16o P. (2d)
283, 164 A. L. R. 952 (1945); Note (1946) 164 A .L. R. 972.
'26o P. (2d) 8, 11 (Cal. 1953).
"a6o P. (2d) 8 at 12 (Cal. 1953).
n338 U. S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 93 L. ed. 1782 (1949). The specific protection
provided in the Fourth Amendment was rated to be so essential a factor as to be
included within the general concept of due process of law.
"°Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S.383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L. ed. 652 (1914).
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tain the evidence in the Haeusslercase were not so reprehensible as to
come within the prohibition of the rule in the Rochin case, 3 ' because
no brutality was involved in making the blood test.
The California court's reasoning on this point suggests some confusion of thought, because contrary to its assertion, the search and
seizure prohibition is not "pertinent to the present inquiry." This
constitutional provision was designed to serve "as a security to persons in their possessions and effects, to protect the individual from
having his home invaded at will without proper warrant issued upon
justifiable grounds, and to protect the individual from being searched
personally for his possessions without reason or suspicion."3 2 In the
principal case there was no search of defendant's premises nor seizure
of articles on defendant's premises as evidence of her guilt. An accused
properly in custody is subject to search, and incriminating evidence
found on his person may be seized. 33 The defendant having been lawfully taken into custody on justifiable suspicion of having committed a
crime, the blood test solely to determine her physical condition does
not come within the range of the constitutional restraint upon unlaw34
ful search and seizure.
If the defendant in the principal case was deprived of due process
of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, that deprivation
'13 4 2 U. S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 L. ed. 183 (1952) held that a brutal or shocking force applied to obtain evidence renders void a conviction based wholly or in
part upon the use of such evidence, because such treatment of an accused deprives
him of due process of law.
-Ladd and Gibson, The Medico-Legal Aspects of the Blood Test to Determine
Intoxication (1939) 24 Iowa L. Rev. 191, 216.
'Biggs v. State, 2o1 Ind. 200, 167 N. E. 129 (1929); People v. Chiagles, 237 N. Y.
193, 142 N. E. 583 (1920); State v. Hayes, 119 Ore. 554, 249 Pac. 637 (1926); Scaffido
v. State, 215 Wis. 389, 254 N. W. 651 (1934); Notes (1924) 32 A. L. R. 680; (1927)
51 A. L. R. 424; (1931) 74 A. L. R. 1387; (1933) 82 A. L. R. 782.

See Ladd and Gibson, The Medico-Legal Aspects of the Blood Test to Determine Intoxication (1939) 24 Iowa L. Rev. 191, 218, stating that in the case of State
v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 191 N. W. 53o (1923) the court held "First... a compulsory

physical examination is not within the scope of an unlawful search and seizure;
second, that if it were regarded to be within the scope the evidence, although
illegally obtained, would nevertheless be admissible." See Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U. S. 438, 463, 48 S. Ct. 564, 567, 72 L. ed. 944, 950 (1928): "The well

known historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment, directed against general warrants and writs of assistance, was to prevent the use of governmental force to
search a man's house, his person, his papers and his effects; and to prevent their
seizure against his will." The opposite view was expressed by the dissenting Justice in People v. Haeussler, 260 P. (2d) 8, 16 (Cal. 1953): "Because I believe in
the dignity and security of the individual and agree with the framers of the Bill
of Rights that 'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,' should 'not be violated,' I
cannot sanction the conduct of the prosecution officers in this case ... "
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must have arisen from the use of the objectionable methods in extracting the substance from the body which were prohibited by the rule of
the Rochin case. The California court ultimately recognized this factor as controlling, and reached its decision on the correct basis, inasmuch as it examined the defendant's situation in the principal case in
the light of the Supreme Court rulings in Brown v. MississippiM and
in the Rochin case. The conclusion was that "a blood test, when accomplished in a medically approved manner, does not smack of brutality,"3 6 especially since defendant was unconscious at the time, and
blood had to be removed for legitimate medical purposes. "Certainly,
this conduct cannot be characterized as shocking to the conscience..."
so as to constitute a violation of due process of law.37 The defendant's
attempt to characterize her situation as factually similar to that of the
defendant in the Rochin case is unfounded, because the elements of
force, coercion and abuse there involved were not present in the principal case.38
Although Justice Frankfurter in the Rochin case intimated
that the taking of blood tests is not within the conduct proscribed by
that decision, 39 yet the standard of "due process" there invoked by the
Court seems to be the amount of physical force and violence that can
be legally used to obtain the evidence leading to a conviction. There35297 U. S. 278, 286, 56 S. Ct. 461, 465, 8o L. ed. 682, 687 (1936). A conviction
based upon a confession obtained by torture was reversed because such a practice
amounted to a wrong "so fundamental that it made the whole proceeding a mere
pretense of a trial and rendered the conviction and sentence wholly void."
"26o P. (2d) 8, 12 (Cal. 1953).
3-26o P. (2d) 8, 13 (Cal. 1953).
3sThe dissenting Justice in the principal case compared this case with the
Rochin case, and declared: "I cannot agree that the admission of testimony concerning the results of the blood test taken without defendant's consent was not
a denial of due process. Defendant was unconscious when the blood sample was
taken by the insertion of a hypodermic needle. This necessitated the use of force,
however slight, and was an invasion of the privacy of her body. It may be admitted
that the force used here was not so brutal or shocking as that used in People v.
Rochin, but it still remains that force was used on the body of a person unable to
protect herself, or even to remonstrate against the use of such force." People v.
Haeussler, 26o P. (2d) 8, 15 (Cal. 1953). See Note (1952) Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 192,
203.
,"In deciding this case we do not heedlessly bring into question decisions
in many States dealing with essentially different, even if related, problems. We,
therefore, put to one side cases which have arisen in the State courts through use
of modern methods and devices for discovering wrongdoers and bringing them
to book. It does not fairly represent these decisions to suggest that they legalize
force so brutal and so offensive to human dignity in securing evidence from a
suspect as is revealed by this record." Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 174, 72 S.
Ct. 20 5 , 21o, 96 L. ed. 183, 191 (1952).
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fore, if the accused resists the taking of the blood test to such an extent that violent force or threats of physical abuse are used to secure
the blood sample, then the testing would probably constitute a violation of due process of law. If, on the other hand, the accused consents
to the taking of blood for an intoxication test, or offers only nominal
resistance, his rights would not seem to be violated.40 One further
question remains unanswered. Since the accused in the principal case
was in need of a blood transfusion and a sample of blood had to be
taken for testing for that purpose, she was not subjected to any additional treatment by the authorities to provide the blood used in the
intoxication test. Neither the Haeussler decision nor any other case
found has determined whether, if the defendant consented that the
blood should be taken for the purpose of testing for a transfusion only,
his constitutional rights would be violated by the use of some of the
blood for making an intoxication test and by the admission of evidence
of the results of that test.
ALVIN Y. MILBERG

FEDERAL PROCEDURE-CHOICE

OF LAw

To BE APPLIED BY FEDERAL
EXISTS ON ISSUE OF CASE.

COURT WHEN No STATE COURT DECISION

[Federal]
The question of the extent to which a federal court is bound to apply the law of the state in which it sits became, in the early years of the
nation's existence, the basis of a controversy which has not been entirely
resolved down to the present time. The first Congress of the United
States declared in Section 34 of the original Judiciary Act of 1789 (frequently called the Rule of Decision Act) that "The laws of the several
States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United
States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in
cases where they apply."' Since Congress did not specify what was
meant by the "laws of the several states," it remained for the Supreme
Court to determine whether this phrase was meant to include the
rules declared by the state judicial decisions. In making the choice between committing the federal courts to a rule of submission to or one
of independence from state decisions, the unanimous Court in 1842
10A defendant who freely gives a blood sample dearly waives his constitutional

rights, and the evidence may be used against him at his trial. State v. Duguid, 50
Ariz. 276, 72 P. (2d) 435 (1937); State v. Morkrid, 286 N. W. 412 (Iowa 1939).
ii Stat. 92 (1789), 28 U. S. C. A. § 725 (1928).
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in the celebrated case of Swift v. Tyson declared: "In the ordinary
use of language, it will hardly be contended that the decisions of
courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what
the laws are, and are not of themselves laws. They are often re-examined, reversed, and qualified by the courts themselves, whenever they
are found to be either defective, or ill-founded, or otherwise incorrect.
The laws of a State are more usually understood to mean the rules and
enactments promulgated by the legislative authority thereof, or long2
established local customs having the force of laws."
The cases to which this doctrine of Swift v. Tyson applied were
generally those brought in or removed to the federal courts on the
basis of diversity of citizenship, and it followed that where there
was no state statute or strong local custom governing the issue of substantive law in a case, a federal court was free to disregard state judicial
decisions and to determine the issue by applying principles of "general" law or jurisprudence. 3 This independence from state decisions
was regarded as desirable as a means of making possible a higher degree
of uniformity, in the rules to be applied by the federal courts all over
4
the nation.
Increasing criticism of Swift v. Tyson 5 finally brought about its
-16 Pet. 1, 16, 1o L. ed. 865, 871 (U. S. 1842).
aThe principle of applying "general law" in the federal courts was further
extended in Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 17 L. ed. 520 (U. S. 1864),
where exceptions were made to the rule of following state decisions in interpreting
state statutes; and in Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 2 S. Ct. 1o, 27 L. ed. 359
(1883), where the Court declined to follow a state court's construction of a statute
imposing stockholder's liability. The doctrine was extended into the field of torts
in Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 13 S. Ct. 914, 37 L. ed.
772 (1893); and in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349, 30 S.Ct. 140, 54 L. ed.
228 (1910) the Court felt itself free to determine the legal effect of a deed of
land where state decisions were unsettled at the time of the conveyance.
,'See Hewlett v. Schadel, 68 F. (2d) 502, 504 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1934) where Judge
Parker declared: "It is essential to the free development of trade and commerce
within its borders that the rules of law governing the people in their various relationships be as uniform as possible ....To hold to the rule of Swift v. Tyson ...
will preserve a uniform body of law upon which those who do business in other
states can depend, and which will inevitably have a unifying influence on the decisions of the state courts themselves."
5
See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789
(1923) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49. As a result of intense study of early Senate records, it
was discovered that the first draft of Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 differed
in its wording from the final version. This research led Mr. Warren to believe that
the Act as passed was meant to include state decisions as well as statutes and that
Section 34 was misinterpreted by Justice Story in his decision in Swift v. Tyson.
Also see McCormick and Hewins, The Collapse of "General" Law in the Federal
Courts (1938) 33 Ill. L. Rev. 126; Zengel, The Effect of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (1939) 14 Tulane L. Rev. i.
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downfall in 1938, when the Supreme Court in Erie Railroad v. TompkinsO not only rejected Justice Story's restrictive interpretation of the
word "laws" in the Rule of Decision Act, but also emphasized "the
unconstitutionality of the course pursued" by the federal courts in rejecting applicable state substantive law decisions.7 Under the doctrine
in force since Erie, "a federal court adjudicating a state-created right
solely because of diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that purpose, in effect, only another court of the state....,8 Where the highest state court has decided a matter of state substantive law, the federal court in the state must apply that decision. 9 Moreover, an intermediate state court decision must likewise be followed by a federal
court in deciding a state question "in the absence of more convincing
evidence of what the state law is,"'u though an unreported decision of
a state nisi prius court need not be followed."
The dilemma confronting the federal court where there is no
controlling or persuasive state court ruling on the substantive ques2
tion is well illustrated in the recent case of Jones v. Kinney.' Plaintiff
had been injured in an automobile accident while riding with her
husband. Invoking the diversity jurisdiction of the federal district court
in Kansas, she brought an action for damages against her husband's
employer, Avco Manufacturing Corp., alleging that the accident was
caused by the negligent driving of the husband while acting in the
scope of his employment and that the employer was liable under the
"304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. ed. 1188 (1938).
'Justice Holmes, in his dissenting opinion in the Black & White Taxicab :
Transfer Co. case sounded a warning note which helped lead to the Erie decision
when he declared: ". . in my opinion the prevailing doctrine has been accepted
upon a subtle fallacy that never has been analyzed. If I am right the fallacy has
resulted in an unconstitutional assumption of powers by the courts of the United
States which no lapses of time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct." 276 U. S. 518, 532, 48 S. Ct. 404, 4o8, 72 L. ed. 681, 687 (1928).
'Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S.99, io8, 65 S. Ct. 1464, 1469, 89 L. ed. 2079,

2086 (1945), where Justice Frankfurter also stated: "The nub of the policy that underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for the same transaction the accident of a
suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a State court a block
away, should not lead to a substantially different result." 326 U. S. 99, 109, 65 S. Ct.
1464, 1470, 89 L. ed. 2079, 2o86 (1945)'Sommer v. Nakdimen, 97 F. (2d) 715 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938); Metropolitan
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Buscher, 95 F. Supp. 500 (N. D. Ill. 1951); Paschall v. Mooney,
uo F. Supp. 749 (S. D. N. Y., 1953).
"Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U. S. 169, 178, 61 S. Ct. 176, 178, 85 L.
ed. 109, 113 (194o). Also Ballard v. Citizens Casualty Co., 196 F. (2d) 96 (C. A. 7th,
1952); Gault v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 102 F. Supp. 187 (D. C. Md.
1952)_

BOrder of United Commercial Travelers v. King, 161 F. (2d) io8 (C. C. A. 4th,
1947), noted in (1948) 5 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 138.
,-113 F. Supp. 923 (IV. D. Mo. 1953).
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doctrine of respondeat superior. Avco, acting under Federal Rule
13
14 (a), brought in plaintiff's husband as a third party defendant,
in order to obtain indemnity from him for whatever damages might be
assessed against the corporation as employer. Since the law of Kansas
holds that one spouse cannot recover from the other for tortious injuries, defendant-husband argued that if he should be held accountable to Avco, the final result would be to impose liability on a husband
for personal injuries to the wife, thereby indirectly accomplishing what
is contrary to Kansas law. On the other hand, defendant-employer
contended that if an agent could not be held directly accountable to
plaintiff, then neither could the principal, who is entitled to share
the immunity of its agent. Moreover, defendant-employer contended
that if it should be found to be a proper defendant, it was entitled to
indemnity from its agent on the ground that an agent owes an independent duty to his employer to avoid inflicting injury on others in
the course of his employment. Thus, the basic issue to be resolved was
whether under Kansas law a wife could sue her husband's employer
in tort under the respondeat superior theory. Under the Erie decision,
the case must be decided on the basis of Kansas law, but since no decisions of the Kansas courts could be found on this point, the federal
court was free to apply general law as evidenced by the decisions of
other states. 14 Where other state courts differ as to what the rule of law
should be, as is true in regard to this issue of an employer's liability to
the wife, the federal court can make its independent determination of
what law to apply to the case. 15
13In the principal case no question was brought up as to Avco Corporation's
right to implead plaintiff's husband for indemnity despite the fact that no diversity of citizenship existed between plaintiff and her husband, the third party
defendant. In this situation where there is no diversity between the original plaintiff and the third-party defendant, there is little trouble in upholding jurisdiction
on the grounds of diversity of citizenship. The fact that the original plaintiff
and the third-party defendant lack diverstity of citizenship is immaterial, for
the judgment when granted will run between citizens of different states. If, however,
the original plaintiff had amended her pleadings to assert a claim against the
third-party defendant or if he had asserted a defense against the plaintiff's claim,
the federal court's jurisdiction would have been defeated, for then the thirdparty action would no longer be ancillary, and diversity would be required.
"'Beck v. F. W. Woolworth Co., iii F. Supp. 824 (N. D. Iowa 1953); Pinson v.
Abbott, 93 F. Supp. 120 (D,C. N. M. 195o).
"Egyptian Supply Co. v. Boyd, 117 F. (2d) 6o8 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cassetty, 119 F. (2d) 6o2 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941); Hodges v. Johnson, 52 F. Supp. 488 (W. D. Va. 1943). Also see Moore, Commentary on the United
States Judicial Code (1949) 338: "If there is no persuasive state ruling on the
question, the federal court must exercise its judgment based 'upon whatever principles of state law are applicable, or by having recourse to the general rules of
law applied according to its own best judgment, examining on a common-law ques-
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In those jurisdictions which hold that the wife cannot sue her
husband's employer, the courts reason that the master's liability is
derivative or secondary, and since no recovery could be had against
the servant-husband, none may be had against the master. 16 Although
the servant-husband is culpable, he is not liable; thus neither is his
employer liable, because "liability and not culpability is the true
basis for the doctrine of respondeat superior."' 17 It is further contended
that since the law prohibits a recovery in tort between the spouses,
to allow the wife to recover from her husband's employer would be
accomplishing indirectly that which could not be done directly, for the
employer in turn could recover indemnifying damages from the servant-husband for breach of duty.'s
On the other hand, those jurisdictions allowing the wife recovery
against the employer even though she could not recover from her
husband, maintain that the servant's act is in essence the act of the
master, within the maxim that "he who acts through another acts himself."'19 As stated in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Huff, "The right to
sue the employer is not a dependent, but a primary, right; the liability
of the employer is not based upon the employee's liability, and is not
subordinate or secondary thereto. The liability of the employee is for
his wrongful conduct, and the liability of the employer is for his
breach of duty through his employee acting for him.... "20 The American Law Institute has endorsed this view, though the reasoning advanced for it is in somewhat different terms: "If an agent has an immunity from liability as distinguished from a privilege of acting, the
principal does not share the immunity. Thus, if a servant, while acting
within the scope of employment, negligently injures his wife, the
master is subject to liability." 21 It is pointed out that the master's
tion the decisions thereon in other jurisdictions and the principles of the common-law."
"'Maine v. Maine & Sons Co., 198 Iowa 1278, 2o N. W. 20 (1924); Riser v. Riser,
240 Mich. 402, 215 N. W. 29o (1927); Emerson v. Western Seed & Irrig. Co., 116
Neb. 18o, 216 N. IV. 297 (1927).
"Riegger v. Bruton Brewing Co., 178 Md. 5P8, 16 A. (2d) 99, loo, 131 A. L. R.
307, 309 (1940).
'Emerson v. Western Seed 9- Irrig. Co., 116 Neb. 18o, 216 N. W. 297 (1927);
Raines v. Mercer, 165 Tenn. 415, 55 S. W. (2d) 263, 264 (1932): "Since the defendant in error could not maintain her action against her husband, alleged to
be directly responsible for her injury, she could not avoid the forbidden frontal
attack by an encircling movement...."
"1McLaurin v. McLaurin Furniture Co., 166 Miss. 18o, 146 So. 877 (1933); Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N. Y. 253, 164 N. E. 42, 64 A. L. R. 293,
(1928).

21348Ohio App. 412, 194 N. E. 429, 431 (1933).
"Restatement, Agency (1933) § 217.
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recovery over from the servant-husband does not purport to arise from
the subrogation of the employer to the wife's rights against the husband, but rather, is based on the husband's breach of duty to his
22
master.
Since there was no Kansas state court decision adopting one or
the other of these views as to the employer's liability to the wife, the
federal district court deciding the principal case was required to make
an "educated guess" as to what rule the Kansas Supreme Court will
adopt if the issue comes before it. In making its guess the federal court
looked to the Restatement of the Law23 and to the better reasoned
cases 24 constituting the majority view. For, although the weight of
authority in this country is in accord with the Kansas rule precluding
a wife from suing her husband for a personal tort, 25 the majority of
the jurisdictions which have passed on the point at issue in the principal case do allow a wife to maintain a suit against the husband's employer for damages for injuries caused by the husband's negligence
while acting in the scope of his employment. 26 It might be contended,
however, that since Kansas has declared that a wife should not be able
to recover from her husband for personal torts, a federal court should
'A servant owes an independent duty to indemnify his master for damages
resulting from his negligence. Tallior v. Tallior, 345 Ill. App. 387, 1o3 N. E. (2d) 507
(1952); Hudson v. Gas Consumers' Ass'n, 123 N. J. L. 252, 8 A. (2d) 337 (1939); Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N. Y. 253, 164 N. E. 42, 64 A. L. R. 293
(1938).
"Restatement, Agency (1933) § 217.
21In Garneto v. Henson, 88 Ga. App. 320, 76 S. E. (2d) 636 (1953) it is stated
that "while the authorities of other states show a diversity of opinion on the subject,
the more widely adopted and, as we conceive, more well-considered view, is that
such a relationship represents a disability of coverture personal to the husband, and
does not enter into the relationship of master and servant or the law pertaining
thereto, which places liability upon the master for the injury inflicted by the
servant within the scope of his employment." The court then cited numerous
cases applying this line of reasoning. See cases cited, note 26, infra. See Notes
(1939) 25 Corn. L. Q. 312; (1938) ii6 A. L. R. 646 endorsing this as the view based on
the sounder reasoning.
2"The weight of authority is, however, that a wife may not sue her husband
for either an intentional or a negligent tort to her person." Madden, Persons and
Domestic Relations (1931) 223. See Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P(2d) 66o (1939) for a comprehensive survey of the cases.
"McLaurin v. McLaurin Furniture Co., 166 Miss. 18o, 146 So. 877 (1933); Caplan v. Caplan, 268 N. Y. 445, 198 N. E. 23, lo A. L. R. 1223 (1935); Schubert v.
August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N. Y. 253, 164 N. E. 42, 64 A. L. R. 293 (1928);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Huff, 48 Ohio App. 412, 194 N. E. 429 (1933); Koontz
v. Messer, 320 Pa. 407, 181 Atl. 792 (1935); Poulin v. Graham, 102 Vt. 307, 147 Atl.
698 (1929); Prosser, Torts (1941) 909 ("...about two-thirds of the courts which

have considered the question have held that the employer is liable even though
the servant is not.");Note (1938) 116 A. L. R. 646.
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not hand down a decision, however sound in legal theory, which obviously though indirectly defeats state policy in this type of situation.
The Kansas court when confronted with the issue in some subsequent
case will not be bound by the federal court's decision, although the
state court might well be inclined to follow it. If the state courts generally were to adopt as a matter of "comity" the policy of adhering
to the decisions of the federal courts in this type of situation, it would
substantially contribute to the harmonious working of the two court
systems within the state and would give a new and more realistic meaning to the concept of the federal court as "in effect, only another
2
court of the state." 7
JOSEPH H. CHUmiBLEY

FEDERAL PROCEDURE-FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT As FORUM FOR SUIT
AGAINST DEFENDANT SERVED UNDER NON-RESIDENT MOTORIST STATUTE. [United States Supreme Court]
In recent years a sharp conflict has developed among several of
the federal courts of appeals as to whether the federal district courts
are available as the forum in which an action may be commenced by
a non-resident who has obtained service upon another non-resident
through the use of a typical Non-Resident Motorist Statute.1 In such
cases the jurisdictional elements of complete diversity of citizenship
3

and the requisite jurisdictional amount

2

are properly present, but

27Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, io8, 65 S. Ct. 1464, 1466, 89 L. ed.
2079, 2086 (1945).
1

"Every one of the forty-eight states and the District of Columbia has a nonresident motorist statute."McCoy v. Sler, 205 F. (2d) 498, 502 (C. A. 3rd, 1953). The
District of Columbia statute is typical: "The operation by a non-resident or by
his agent of a motor vehicle on any public highway of the District of Columbia
shall be deemed the equivalent to an appointment by such non-resident of the
director of vehicles and traffic or his successor in office to be his true and lawful
attorney upon whom may be served all lawful processes in any action or proceedings
against such non-resident growing out of any accident or collision in which said
non-resident or his agent may be involved while operating a motor vehicle on any
such public highway, and said operation shall be a signification of his agreement
that any such process against him, which is so served, shall be of the same legal
force and validity as if served upon him personally in the District of Columbia."
D. C. Code (1951) tit. 40, § 40-403. For an excellent article on this subject see
Culp, Recent Developments in Actions Against Non-Resident Motorists (1938) 37
Mich L. Rev. 58.
262 Stat. 930 (1948), 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (Supp. 1949).
362 Stat. 930 (1948), 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (Supp. 1949).
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the pivotal point is whether venue has been properly laid within the
mandate of the federal venue statute which fixes the district in which a
suit may be brought in a federal court. 4 The venue provisions are
designed for the convenience of the litigants,5 particularly the defendants, 6 and as such, constitute a personal privilege which the defendant may assert or waive at his election.7 It is conceded that waiver
of this privilege may be made by "failure to assert it seasonably, by
formal submission in a cause, or by submission through conduct,"8 but
the question as to what specific acts constitute a waiver of the right to
insist upon compliance with the venue statute has caused considerable
difficulty.
The leading case involving waiver of the venue privilege is Neirbo
Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.9 which, while not disturbing the
proposition that venue could be waived, "radically expanded the
notion as to what constituted a waiver."' 1 In this diversity case, a
Delaware corporation was sued in the Federal District Court for the
Southern District of New York by a non-resident. Defendant interposed
an objection to the venue since under the then existing venue statute"
a suit against a corporation had to be brought in the state wherein
either the defendant or plaintiff resided. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court found that the federal venue statute had been satisfied because
defendant corporation had previously designated an agent in New York
upon whom service of summons could be made in that state pursuant to
"A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship
may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district
where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside." 62 Stat. 935 (1948), 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (a)
(Supp. 1949).
5
Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 74 S. Ct. 83, 85, 98 L. ed. 7, 8 (1953).
6The purpose of the venue statute is "to save defendants from inconveniences to which they might be subjected if they could be compelled to answer in any
district." General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore Ry., 260 U. S.261, 275, 43 S.Ct.
1o6,

113, 67 L. ed. 244, 254 (1922).

'Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Comm., 324 U. S.635, 65
S. Ct. 821, 89 L. ed. 1241 (1945); Industrial Ad. Ass'n v. Com'r, 323 U. S. 31o, 65 S.
Ct. 289, 89 L. ed. 260 (1945); Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 3o8
U. S. 165, 6o S. Ct. 153, 84 L. ed. 167 (1939).
8
Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 3o8 U. S. 165, 168, 6o S.Ct. 153,
155, 84 L. ed. 167, 170 (1939); Commercial Ins. Co. v. Stone Co., 278 U. S.177, 179,
49 S.Ct. 98, 99, 73 L. ed. 252, 253 (1929).
'3o8 U. S.165, 6o S. Ct. 153, 84 L. ed. 167 (1939).
103 Moore, Federal Practice (2nd ed. 1952) § 19.04, p. 2124.
"The venue statute, as it existed at the time of the Neirbo decision, had no
special provision dealing with a corporate defendant. The statute was amended
in 1948 to provide that in diversity cases a corporation may be sued, among other
places, in any district in which it is doing business, thereby making the ruling of
the Neirbo case academic. 62 Stat. 935 (1948), 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (c) (Supp. 1949).
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a New York statute1 2 requiring such an appointment as a condition
precedent to the doing of business within the state. The Supreme Court
established the so-called "Neirbo doctrine" in holding that by designating an agent upon whom service of summons may be made defendant
had consented to be sued in the courts within the state, including the
federal courts.
The question thereafter arose as to whether the Neirbo doctrine
applied to a situation arising under a typical Non-Resident Motorist
Statute providing that by operating a vehicle upon the highways of a
state the operator thereby makes a state official his agent to receive
service of process as to any cause of action arising out of that operation.
It was not clear that such "appointment" of a statutory agent could be
regarded as the equivalent of an appointment of an actual agent as in
the Neirbo situation, so as to amount to consent to be sued and to
preclude the defendant from later asserting his venue privilege. Sereral district courts have ruled that such a case falls within the waiver
concept expressed in the Neirbo case since the defendant by operating
his vehicle has manifestly submitted to the terms of the statute; 13 but
n-This is now § 2o of the General Corporation Laws of New York, originally
enacted as Laws of 1892, c. 687, pp. 1805-18o6, which provides: "A foreign corporation ... shall not do business in this state without having first obtained from the
secretary of state a certificate of authority.. . . [Such a certificate shall show] the
business which it proposes to do within this state, and a designation of the secretary
of state as its agent upon whom all process in any action or proceedings against
it may be served within this state." The facts indicate that in the Neirbo case, an
actual agent of the defendant company, one William J. Brown, had been appointed.
"Falter v. Southwest Wheel Co., 1o9 F. Supp. 556 (W. D. Pa. 1953); Archambeau
v. Emerson, 1o8 F. Supp. 28 (W. D. Mich. 1952); Jacobson v. Schuman, 1o5 F. Supp.
483 (D. C. Vt. 1952); Garcia v. Frausto, 97 F. Supp. 583 (E. D. Mo. 1951); Urso
v. Scales, 9 ° F. Supp. 653 (E. D. Pa. 1953); Morris v. Sun Oil Co., 88 F. Supp. 529
(D. C. Md. 1950); Blunda v. Craig, 74 F. Supp. 9 (E. D. Mo. 1947); Steele v. Dennis,
62 F. Supp. 73 (D. C. Md. 1945); Krueger v. Hider, 48 F. Supp. 708 (E. D. S. C.
1943); Andrews v. Joseph Cohen & Sons, 45 F. Supp. 732 (S. D. Tex. 1941); William
v. James, 34 F. Supp. 61 (W. D. La. 194o). Contra: Waters v. Plyborn, 93 F. Supp.
651 (E. D. Tenn. 195o).
District court judges were not alone in believing that the Neirbo doctrine, involving waiver of the venue requirement, would be applicable to cases wherein
service was obtained by use of a Non-Resident Motorist Statute. See 3 Moore, Federal
Practice (2nd ed. 1952) § 19.04, pp. 2128-2129: "While the Neirbo doctrine has its
greatest applicability to corporate persons, it is equally applicable to any defendant person where by valid state law he has consented to be sued in its courts.
Thus where a nonresident motorist, who is involved in an accident within the
state, has consented by virtue of a state statute to be sued in the courts of the
state, he has likewise consented to be sued in a federal court held in the state and
has waived any objection to venue." Accord: Note (1948) 42 Ill. L. Rev. 780 at 789.
For an excellent discussion of the rationale of the Neirbo case in connection with the
same subject as this comment, see Note (195o) 26 Ind. L. J. 285.
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contrary decisions recently appearing in both the First 14 and Third'1
Circuits prompted the Supreme Court to review the problem in the
recent case of Olberding v. Illinois CentralR. Co.16 There, the railway
company, an Illinois corporation, brought suit in a federal district
court in Kentucky against Olberding, an Indiana citizen, who was the
owner of a truck which, while temporarily in Kentucky, allegedly
struck and damaged the plaintiff corporation's overpass, resulting in
the subsequent derailment of one of plaintiff's trains. Service was obtained upon the defendant by service on the Kentucky Secretary of
17
State who, under the Kentucky Non-Resident Motorist Statute,
becomes the agent of non-resident motorists for this purpose. Defendant appeared specially and sought dismissal of the action on the
ground that venue had been improperly laid in Kentucky since the
action was not "brought in the judicial district where all plaintiffs
and all defendants reside" as required by the Judicial Code.' 8 Despite
the fact that there was complete diversity of citizenship and in excess
of $3,000 involved, unless the defendant had waived his right to object to venue either by consent to be sued or some equivalent action,
the defendant was correct in objecting to the venue being laid in
Kentucky, since neither party resided in that state. The district court,
applying the principle enunciated in the Neirbo case, overruled the
defendant's objection to venue, and subsequently a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff. This action and reasoning was approved by the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,' 9 which thereby came into conflict with the decisions of the Courts of Appeals for the First and Third
Circuits. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 20 and in a 7-2 decision
reversed the judgment and held that since the defendant had neither
appointed an agent nor manifested consent to be sued in any manner,
the statutory venue requirement is a bar to this action being maintained in Kentucky. The majority opinion noted that while "consent
'2Martin v. Fischback Trucking Co., 183 F. (2d) 53 (C. A. Ist, 195o).
' 5McCoy v. Siler, 205 F. (2d) 498 (C. A. 3 rd, 1953).
1346 U. S. 338, 74 S. Ct. 83, 98 L. ed. 7 (1953).
""Any nonresident operator or owner of any motor vehicle who accepts the
privilege extended by the laws of this state to nonresidents to operate motor vehicles or have them operated within this state shall, by such acceptance and by
the operation of such motor vehicle within this state, make the Secretary of State
his agent for the service of process in any civil action instituted in the courts of
this state against the operator or owner arising out of or by reason of any accident
or collision or damage occurring within this state in which the motor vehicle is
involved." Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) § 188.o2o.
1862 Stat. 935 (1948) 28 U. S. C. § i39g (a) (Supp. 1949).
"Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 2o F. (2d) 582 (C. A. 6th, 1953).
'345 U. S. 950, 73 S. Ct. 867, 97 L. ed. 1373 (1953).
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to be sued in that state was attributed to the defendant," 21 there was
no evidence that the defendant actually consented, and upon these
facts the case does not fall within the doctrine of the Neirbo case. The
Court refused to find that the defendant consented to be sued merely
by operating a motor vehicle in a state having a Non-Resident Motorist Statute, and distingushed the situation from the Neirbo case
on the ground that there defendant had appointed his own agent,
albeit under the mandate of the New York statute.
While recognizing the validity of the Non-Resident Motorist
Statute as a proper exercise of the state's police power, 22 the Court rejected the idea that "implied consent" to be sued was the basis for holding a non-resident personally liable where such substituted service has
been employed. 23 Thus, since there was no consent by the defendant,
either actual or fictitious, to be sued in Kentucky, the requirement of
proper venue remained unsatisfied. The majority was unwilling to
apply the Neirbo doctrine to anything short of an actual appointment
24
by defendant himself of an agent to receive service of process.
In the decisions from the First and Third Circuits which previously
reached the same result as that now reached by the Supreme Court in
the principal case, the courts had attempted to distinguish the situation involved there from that of the Neirbo case. One court 25 suggested that under the facts of the Neirbo case there was a voluntary
act of appointing an agent, whereas in cases involving the Non-Resident Motorist Statutes there is a note of compulsion within the language of the statute. As pointed out by the dissent in the principal
case there is little substance in such a distinction for there is an element
2'74 S. Ct. 83, 85, 98 L. ed. 7, 9 (1953).
2Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 48 S. Ct. 259, 72 L. ed. 446 (1928); Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. ed. iogi (1927).
="In point of fact, however, jurisdiction in these cases does not rest on consent
at all.... The defendant may protest to high heaven his unwillingness to be sued
and it avails him not." 74 S. Ct. 83, 85, 98 L. ed. 7, 9 (1953). See Scott, Hess and Pawloski Carry On (195o) 64 Harv. L. Rev. 98, ioo: "It is clear, however, that it is
quite immaterial whether the motorist consents or does not consent; the state has
power to subject him to the jurisdiction of its courts under the circumstances
designated under the statute." See also, Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresident Motorist
(1926)
39 Harv. L. Rev. 563.
2
However, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that a corporation had waived venue even though there was no actual appointment of an agent
where, under a Virginia statute, a foreign corporation is presumed to have appointed a state officer as its agent upon whom process might be served as to any
causes of action arising out of business within the state. Knott Corp. v. Furman,
163 F. (2d) 199 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1947), cert. denied 332 U. S. 8og, rehearing denied
332 U. S. 826 (1947). See Note (1948) 61 Harv. L. Rev. 723.
1-Martin v. Fischback Trucking Co., 183 F. (2d) 53 (C. A. 1st, 195o).
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of coercion equally strong in both situations. 26 In the Neirbo situation,
the corporation is prohibited from doing business within the state
unless it appoints an agent to receive process, while the Non-Resident
Motorist Statute prohibits the non-resident from using the highways
unless he accepts a designated official as his agent to receive process.
The difference is purely one of technique and not one of substance. In
both instances the conditions are attached to that conduct which the
state may control, or even prohibit, except perhaps in so far as it
tends to interfere with interstate commerce.
Though the Court in the principal decision rejected "implied
consent" as the basis of personal liability under the Non-Resident
Motorist Statutes, in the Neirbo case the conclusion was reached that
the defendant corporation had consented to be sued in the federal
courts of the state where it had obviously not consented. 27 Furthermore, the Court in the Neirbo decision found that the action which
constituted consent to be sued in the state courts was the equivalent of
consent to be sued in the federal courts, yet in the principal case the
Court vigorously denied that consent to be sued in the state courts
through the use of the Non-Resident Motorist Statute is the same as
consent to be sued in the federal courts within that state.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in previously taking
the same position now adopted by the Supreme Court, suggested that
the federal courts "should not be astute tb widen federal diversity jurisdiction." 28 Yet, paradoxically enough, the Neirbo doctrine, which expanded the notion of waiver, was developed to prevent the nullification
of federal jurisdiction. 29 Thus, it seems that the pendulum may have
2Justice Reed, dissenting: "I see no difference of substance between the signing of a paper under the New York statute upon which Neirbo is based and the
acceptance, by action in driving a motor car, of the privilege of using the state
highways under the Kentucky statute. In each case there was no federal venue except by waiver and consent." Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 74 S. Ct. 83, 87, 98
L. ed. 7, 11 (1953).
'7Judge Learned Hand commented as follows: "When it is said that a foreign
corporation will be taken to have consented to the appointment of an agent to
accept service, the court does not mean that as a fact it has consented at all, because the corporation does not in fact consent; but the court, for purposes of justice, treats it as if it had. It is true that the consequences so imputed to it lie
within its own control, since it need not do business within the state, but that is
not equivalent to consent; actually it might have refused to appoint, and yet its
refusal would make do difference. The court, in the interest of justice, imputes
results to the voluntary act of doing business within the foreign state, quite independently of any intent." Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 22
Fed. 148, 151 (S. D. N. Y. 1915).
"McCoy v. Siler, 2o5 F. (2d) 498, 5o (C. A. 3rd, 1953).
"By expanding the notion of waiver of venue, the Supreme Court was able
to make corporations amenable to the federal judiciary without having to upset
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begun to swing back in the direction of restricting the scope of federal
jurisdiction. 30 This conclusion may be supported by the assertion of
the Olberding opinion that "The requirement of venue is specific
and unambiguous; it is not one of those vague principles which, in the
interest of some overriding policy, is to be given a 'liberal' construction."31 Despite this language, the position taken in regard to venue
and the closely allied concept of "waiver of venue" by the decision of
the Neirbo case was certainly, to say the least, "liberal."3 2 In fact that
decision was primarily designed to answer the need of an "overriding
policy" of making corporations amenable to suits brought in federal
courts sitting in states in which the corporations were doing business. Whether the present decision is in fact "loyal to the decision and
reasoning of Neirbo..."3 is certainly a debatable question, but it does
have the merit of finally resolving a point where formerly there was
conflict.
The overall effects of the Olberding decision are worthy of notice.
First, a non-resident plaintiff who desires to obtain service pursuant
to a state's Non-Resident Motorist Statute and bring suit in that state
against a non-resident tortfeasor is limited to the forum provided by
the state, 34 whereas the non-resident defendant has a choice of answerthe entrenched concept that a corporation is a citizen, for diversity purposes, only
of the state of its incorporation, as announced earlier by Bank of Augusta v. Earle,
13 Pet. 519, 38 L. ed. 274 (1839).
'With automotive-tort litigation comprising the bulk of all tort litigation
today, one may feel sure that federal judges sitting in districts through which
arterial highways pass will certainly welcome the Supreme Court's decision in the
instant case which will divert a large quantity of this litigation to the state courts, unless the defendants choose to remove to the federal courts.
3174 S. Ct. 83, 85, 98 L. ed. 7, 9 (1953).
-See 3 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1952) § 19.o4, which characterizes the
doctrine of the Neirbo case as radically expanding the concept of waiver. A comment in an Illinois Law Review speaks of the Neirbo decision as "liberalizing the
federal venue requirements." Note (1948) 42 I1. L. Rev. 780, 781.
1174 S. Ct. 83, 86, 98 L. ed. 7, 9 (195)-The method of service provided for in the typical Non-Resident Motorist
Statute satisfies due process so as to enable a resident plaintiff to bring his action
in the federal court of the district wherein he resides. Zavis v. Warren, 35 F. Supp.
689 (E. D. Wis. 1940); Clancy v. Balacier, 27 F. Supp. 867 (S. D. N. Y. 1939). See
2 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1948) § 4.16, p. 937; also see F. R. C. P. Rule 4
(d) (7). The majority opinion in the principal case used very guarded language in its
reference to the method of obtaining service provided by the Non-Resident Motorist
Statutes: "We have held that this is a fair rule of law as between a resident injured party (for whose protection these statutes are primarily intended) and a nonresident motorist, and that the requirements of due process are therefore met."
Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 74 S. Ct. 83, 85, 98 L. ed. 7, 9, (1953).
Quaere: Does the language used indicate that it might be something less than
a "fair rule" where such service is employed by a non-resident plaintiff against a
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ing in that court or of removing the cause to the federal court of that
district. 35 Second, the decision of the principal case has produced a
local inequality in that a resident plaintiff has a choice of forums
against a non-resident defendant, because as to him there is no venue
problem since he resides in the state wherein he was injured. Third,
the non-resident plaintiff who chooses to obtain service upon a nonresident defendant by the Non-Resident Motorist Statute must forego the advantages incident to bringing his action in the federal court
including the federal court's simplified procedure, its possibly less
crowded dockets, its liberal rules relating to evidence and pre-trial
techniques, and finally its simplified method of realizing upon a judg36
ment once obtained.
The plaintiff injured in a state in which neither he nor the defendant resides need not entirely forego the advantages of the federal system. He still may bring his action in the appropriate federal court in
either the state where he resides or where the defendant resides, providing, of course, he can obtain proper service, but serious disadvantages remain. Witnesses will have to be summoned from possible
great distances, or else depositions will have to be taken with consequent expense and delay; furthermore, the federal court where such
an action may be brought may have to ascertain and apply the unfamiliar law of a distant state. Another unfortunate aspect of this
situation is that when such a suit has been brought in a federal court
far removed from the scene of the accident, there is no possibility
that the action might be transferred to a federal court sitting near
the situs of the injury under the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
inasmuch as this doctrine is geared to and limited by the venue requirements for an original action-i.e., a cause of action may be trans37
ferred to a court where the action might have been brought originally.
Since, because of the venue requirement, the plaintiff could not have
commenced the suit in the forum near, or at the scene of the wrong,
he can not transfer it there under forum non conveniens, despite the
non-resident defendant? If so, why did the Supreme Court fail to address itself to
this question in the principal case as was done by Maris, J. in McCoy v. Siler, 205
F. (2d) 498, 501 (C. A. 3rd, 1953), who, in objecting to the extra-territorial effect
given such service, declared: "The district court, therefore did not, in my opinion,
acquire jurisdiction of the person of the defendants."
'3 Removal is provided for by 62 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U. S. C. § 1441 (a) (Supp.
1949).
-1162 Stat. 958 (1948), 28 U. S. C. § 1963 (Supp. 1949) (providing for the registration of judgment obtained in one federal court in a second federal court).
3762 Stat. 937 (1948) 28 U. S. C. § 1404 (a) (Supp. 1949): "For the convenience
of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any
civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought."
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fact that the Supreme Court and the Congress have given recognition
to the desirability, in normal situations, of having a trial as near the
scene of the wrong as possible. 38
If it is believed that the non-resident motorist should be able to
take advantage of the simple method of obtaining service afforded by
the typical Non-Resident Motorist Statute and still be able to initiate
his action in the federal court sitting within the state where the accident occurred, two possible solutions are presented. The first, and
most obvious, is for Congress to amend the venue statute to permit
such suits. The second method is for the states to require every nonresident motorist, as he enters the state, to sign an appropriately
worded statement which would be his consent to be sued in the courts
of that state.39 While such a procedure would interrupt and delay interstate travel it would apparently be a proper exercise of the state's
police power. 40 However, it is seriously to be doubted that a state
would resort to such a practice since the Non-Resident Motorist StatuGulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 67 S. Ct. 839, 91 L. ed. 1055 (1947).
By way of illustration, consider the following hypothetical situation: P, a citizen of
California is involved in an auto collision with an automobile driven by D, a citizen
of Oregon while both are visiting in Virginia. P, suspecting that the dockets are
crowded in the Virginia state courts, decides to bring suit against D in a federal
court. P knows that D regularly comes to California on business; therefore P returns to California and later is successful in getting personal service on D while the
latter is in San Francisco, and institutes suit in the federal district court located
there. P must arrange for witnesses to the accident to come to California from
Virginia, and D must do likewise. The federal district court sitting in California
must apply Virginia law and determine the facts of a case that transpired 3,000
miles distant. The federal court sitting in California cannot transfer the case to
the appropriate federal court sitting in Virginia because § 14o4 (a) of the Judicial
Code is geared to the venue requirement of original jurisdiction. Prior to the
decision in the principal case, P could sue D in the appropriate federal court sitting in Virginia where all the witnesses were available and where the federal court
was familiar with the applicable Virginia law.
"Just such a course was suggested by the dissenting opinion in McCoy v. Siler,
205 F. (2d) 498, 504 (C. A. 3rd, 1953): "One can well conceive of the respective States
if the majority view prevails, creating ports of entry for the incoming nonresident
motorist wherein he shall 'sign in' and expressly designate a state official as his
agent for service in case he has an accident within the State; otherwise, entry prohibited. The respective States could even compel the execution of an express waiver
of the federal venue privilege by the incoming motorist and such a course I believe, would meet no constitutional barrier."
This suggests a novel point. While it appears to be settled that a state cannot
by legislation modify or repeal a congressional statute on the venue of federal
courts [Murphree v. Mississippi Pub. Corp., 149 F. (2d) 138 (C. A. 5 th, 1945), affirmed
326 U. S. 438, 66 S. Ct. 242, 9 o L. ed. 185 (1946)J apparently if the states adopted
the scheme suggested by the dissent in the McCoy case they could be doing, in effect,
what the Supreme Court prohibits.
"Kane v. State of New Jersey, 242 U. S. 16o, 37 S. Ct. 3o, 61 L. ed. 222 (1916).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

234

[Vol. XI

utes, while made available to non-residents as against other non-resi42
dents, 4 1 are primarily for the benefit of the residents of the state,
and as to them, the venue requirement will not bar access to the federal courts.
KIMBER L. WHITE

LABOR LAw-ScoPE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION To FIND UNLAWFUL PURPOSE IN LABOR ACTIVITY IN ORDER

To

JUSTIFY INJUNCTION.

[Cal-

ifornia]
The availability of the Unlawful Purpose Doctrine as a device to
justify the invocation of judicial discretion in the resolution of labor
controversies has been recognized and apparently extended by the

recent California case of Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks International Ass'n,1 in which the doctrine was applied to block an attempt
to unionize supervisory employees.
The Unlawful Purpose Doctrine in its present form has grown from
two historical roots. 2 The first of these is the Criminal Conspiracy
Doctrine, from which in turn evolved the Civil Conspiracy Doctrine.
The former, as applied to labor, was succinctly expressed by Lord
Mansfield in his statement that "everyman may work for what price
he pleases, but a combination not to work under certain prices is an
indictable offense." 3 In early labor cases conspiracies were found in
unionists striking4 and boycotting5 to obtain their ends. The conspiracy doctrines were first applied to labor in 15486 and, did not cease
to be a force in English labor law until the passage of the Trade Dis"1Fine v. Wencke, 117 Conn. 683, 169 At. 58 (1933) (plaintiff a resident of Massachusetts, defendant a resident of New York); Hoagland v. Dolan, 259 Ky. 1, 81 S.
W. (2d) 869 (1935) (suit brought in Kentucky state court, both parties residents
of Ohio). The Tennessee Non-Resident Motorist Statute is unique in that under its
provisions the right to proceed against a non-resident motorist is limited to residents. 6 Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) § 8671.
"See Culp, Recent Developments in Actions Against Nonresident Motorists
(1938) 37 Mich. L. Rev. 58, 75.
(2d) 721 (Cal. 1953).
Frantz, Peaceful Picketing for Unlawful Objectives (1950) 28 N. C. L. Rev. 291.
3
Rex v. Eccles, 1 Leach Cl. 274, 168 Eng. Rep. 240, 241 (1783). For an excellent
discussion of the Criminal Conspiracy Doctrine in labor see I Teller, Labor Disputes
and Collective Bargaining (1940) § 28.
'Commonwealth v. Pullis, 3 Commons and Gilmore, Documentary History of
American Industrial Society 59, 245.
'Quinn v. Leathem, H. L. [goi ] A. C. 495.
6See Prentice Hall, Labor Course (1948) § 1023.

1261 P.
2
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19o6.

7

The Criminal Conspiracy Doctrine had a short

life in the United States. In 1842 Commonwealth v. Hunt,s in holding
that it was not unlawful for the union to induce all those engaged in
the same occupation to become members of it, dealt "the doctrine of
criminal conspiracy a considerable setback." 9 Although that decision
marked the end of the use of the doctrine in criminal cases, the American courts continued, in civil actions for damages and injunctive
relief, to regard the development of labor organizations as involving
civil conspiracies. 10
The second root of the Unlawful Purpose Doctrine, the "Presumptive Tort Theory," is associated with the name of Justice Holmes
who, in his dissenting opinion in Vegelahn v. Guntner," gave able
expression to this theory which proposes that intentional harm caused
by labor unions should be actionable unless "justified." Holmes' concept of what should constitute justifiable aims or purposes of labor
was much broader than the scope of activity permitted to unions by
12
courts adhering to the civil conspiracy approach.
The courts, in failing to differentiate between these two theories of
conspiracy and justification, were responsible for the evolution of
the two into one broad concept which has been variously known as
the "objectives"

test,'

3

the doctrine of "just cause,"' 4 the "lawful

1

purpose" doctrine, 5 and the "unlawful purpose" doctrine.' 6 Generally speaking, by whatever name it is known, the approach is that
an otherwise legitimate method employed by a labor organization will
be enjoined if the objective or purpose sought to be attained is unlawful. In regard to objectives other than increased wages, shorter
hours, and better working conditions, the courts in the early part of
the twentieth century were hopelessly divided over what should con76 Edw. VII, c. 47, L. R. Stat. 246 (i9o6).

'4 Metc. 111, 38 Am. Dec. 346 (Mass. 1842).
OGregory, Labor and the Law (ist ed. 1946) 29.
"-Note (1943) 41 Mich L. Rev. 1143 at 1144.
n167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077, 1079 (1896).
"" .. it must be true, that, when combined, they [members of a union] have
the same liberty that combined capital has, to support their interests by argument, persuasion, and the bestowal or refusal of those advantages which they
otherwise lawfully control ....The fact that the immediate object of the act by
which the benefit to themselves is... to injure their antagonist does not necessarily
make it unlawful...." Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077, 1o81, 1082
(1896).
"Note (1943) 41 Mich. L. Rev. 1143.
"Forkosch, The Doctrine of Just Cause (1950) 1 Lab. L. J. 789.
"Tobriner, A New Concept of Labor Law (1953) 4 Lab. L. J. 2o at 204.
"Howard, The Unlawful Purpose Doctrine in Peaceful Picketing and Its Application in the California Cases (1951) 24 So. Cal. L. Rev. 145.
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stitute a legitimate aim of labor activity.17 This lack of accord is understandable, since the application of the doctrine left to the individual judge almost complete freedom to interpose his own views.
As unions achieved greater strength, some of their objectives which
had once been considered questionable eventually became recognized as
legitimate labor ends, at least so far as- the liberal courts were concerned. As a greater number of labor aims gained judicial sanction, the
Unlawful Purpose Doctrine lost some of its vitality. The Norris La-

Guardia Act18 and its state prototypes further restricted the doctrine
by confining to specified situations the power of the courts to enjoin
labor activity.
During the 1940's many state courts apparently came to the conclusion that the pendulum had swung too far in favor of labor.19 They
pointed to the extensive freedom of unions under the Norris-LaGuardia Act and similar legislation, and particularly to the doctrine of
Thornhill v. Alabama2o which accorded to picketing the status of constitutionally protected freedom of speech. Looking for a means to
equate this disbalance between the privileges of labor and management, the courts found their solution in the flexible Unlawful Purpose
Doctrine. In their attempt to restrict the freedom given to unions by
the anti-injunction statutes, the courts' method, as exemplified by the
New York case of Opera on Tour v. Weber,21 was to proscribe the par'-Note (1943) 41 Mich L. Rev. 1143 at 1145.

'847 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 1O (1947).
3OThe following cases have expressly stated dissatisfaction at the freedom accorded to labor: Colonial Press v. Ellis, 321 Mass. 495, 74 N. E. (2d) 1 (1947); Saveall
v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 76 N. E. (2d) 12 (1947). For a particularly stinging disavowel of the stand taken by the Supreme Court of the United States that picketing
is protected as freedom of speech, see dissent of Steinbert, J., in State ex rel. Lumber and Sawmill Workers v. Superior Court for Pierce County, 24 Wash. (2d) 314,
164 P. (2d) 662 (1945).
The following cases exemplify this point of view in their holding: Opera on
Tour v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 34 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941) (strike to compel abandonment of labor saving device held not a labor dispute); Amalgamated Meat Cutters
v. Green, 119 Colo. 92, 200 P. (2d) 924 (1948) (demand for closed shop after workers
voted against it held not a labor dispute); Construction & General Labor Union v.
Stephenson, 221 S. W. (2d) 375 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (picketing to demand unionization held not a labor dispute).
1031o U. S. 88, 6o S. Ct. 736, 84 L. ed. 1093 (1940).
21285 N. Y. 348, 34 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941). In this case the defendant Musician's
Union called a secondary strike as part of an effort to compel abandonment of
labor saving devices. New York had a little Norris-LaGurdia Act, which defined
a labor dispute as "any controversy concerning terms of conditions of employment."
N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 876. The Act further provided that a court should not issue
an injunction in a labor dispute, but since it was not possible to have a labor
dispute for an unlawful purpose, the New York court was able to enjoin the activity simply by proscribing the defendant's conduct as for an illegal purpose.
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ticular union purpose as unlawful, 22 and since there could be no labor
dispute in law (even though there was obviously a dispute in fact) for
an unlawful purpose, the courts could, without contravening the statute enjoin the activity by which labor sought to gain its end.23
The doctrine was found to be also well suited for circumscribing
the position taken by the Supreme Court in the Thornhill case that
picketing is within the constitutional protection afforded to freedom of speech. Within a period of a few years, four applications of
the Unlawful Purpose Doctrine by state court decisions, sustained by.
the United States Supreme Court, served to render the Thornhill doctrine nothing more than a "historical footnote. '24 Giboney v. Empire
Storage and Ice Co.,2 5 the first of the series, represents only a slight
recession from the Thornhill doctrine, since the objective sought by
the union through its picketing activities would have forced the employer to violate a state criminal statute. The decision in Building
Service Employees International Union v. Gazzam 26 worked a further
modification, since the objective sought here would have forced the
employer to violate the public policy provision in a civil law (the
state's "little Norris LaGuardia Act") against employer influence of
the employees' choice of bargaining representative. The judiciary
moved a longer step away from the Thornhill case in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke.27 In this case the union objective would not have required the employer to violate positive civil
or criminal law, but only the common law as declared by judicial decisions. The interpretative process continued in the same trend in
Hughes v. Superior Court,28 wherein the only basis for enjoining the
picketing was that the court decided, without any reference to civil,
criminal or common law, that the purpose of the concerted action
contravened public policy.
-- For a union to insist that machinery be discarded in order that manual labor
may take its place and thus secure additional opportunity of employment is not
a lawful labor objective." 285 N. Y. 848, 34 N. E. (2d) 349, 353 (1941).
"See Teller, Focal Problems in American Labor Law-Opera on Tour v. Weber
(1942) 28 Va. L. Rev. 727.
"'Burstein, Picketing and Speech (1953) 4 Lab. L. J. 791, 8o3.
2357 Mo. 671, 210 S. W. (2d) 55 (1948), aff'd 336 U. S. 49 o , 69 S. Ct. 684, 93 L.
ed. 834 (1949).
^29 Wash. (2d) 488, 188 P. (2d) 97, 11 A. L. R. (2d) 133o (1947), aff'd 339 U. S.
532, 70 S. Ct. 784, 94 L. ed. 1045 (1950).
2133 Wash. (2d) 646, 207 P. (2d) 206 (1949), aff'd 339 U .S. 470, 70 S. Ct. 773, 94 L.
ed. 945 (195o)832 Cal. (2d) 85o, 198 P. (2d) 885 (1948), aff'd 339 U. S. 460, 70 S. Ct. 718, 94
L. ed. 985 (1950).
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, In the recently decided Safeway Stores case, 29 the rank and file
clerks of plaintiff's grocery chain belonged to defendant's union,
which instituted a strike to force plaintiff to recognize it as the collective bargaining representative for store managers. Plaintiff sought an
injunction against the strike and attendant picketing, on the ground
that the purpose to be attended by that activity was illegal, since store
managers owe undivided loyalty to their employer and such representation of them by the rank and file union would severely injure
plaintiff. Defendant union maintained that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the controversy because exclusive jurisdiction was
vested in the National Labor Relations Board.
The California Supreme Court, while noting that before 1947 the
subject matter would have been within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Board, found that Section 2 (3)of the
Taft-Hartley Act excludes from the definition of "employee" any individual employed as supervisor,30 and since plaintiff's store managers
were supervisory employees, the state court was not deprived of jurisdiction over the controversy by the federal statute,
In passing on the legality of these activities of the defendant union
the court concluded, as the plaintiff contended, that the store managers
owed complete loyalty to the employer, and that their representation
by a rank and file employees' union would divide their loyalty. It
was therefore held that "the coercion-sought to be exercised by the defendants under the circumstances of this case was not reasonably related to any legitimate interest of organized labor; that the activities
of the defendants were not in the furtherance of any proper labor objective, and that as a matter of sound public policy were enjoinable
3
within the equity jurisdiction of the court." '
The dissenting Justices argued that the majority of the court
failed to give effect to Section 923 of the state labor code which declares that "the individual workman shall have full freedom of association, self-organization and designation of representatives of his
own choosing." Their contention was that the court should recognize
that the words of the statute are unqualified in extending to all employees the freedom to choose their own bargaining representative.
The majority of the court took no cognizance of this provision, however, as is indicated by the statement in the opinion that in Califor2Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks International Ass'n, 261 P. (2d) 721 (Cal.
1953).
'°6i Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 152 (1953 Supp.)
m261 P. (2d) 721, 726 (Cal. 1953).
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nia "there is no constitutional or legislative guide on the subject. '3 2
Thus, because the statute does not specifically state that supervisory
employees are included within its terms, the majority Justices ignored
the implications of the general, inclusive language of the Act. Noting
the provision of the Taft-Hartley law which excludes supervisory
employees from its protection, the California court observed that "the
field as to them [supervisory employees] was left open to state control." 33 The Court then assumed itself to be the proper agency to

exercise that "state control," and determined that the public policy
of California prohibited store managers from being represented by
34
a rank and file retail clerk's union.
Since the objective sought by the union here was not in violation
of any criminal 35 or civil statute 36 nor of any common law rule established by previous judicial decision,3 7 but only of public policy as anF261 P. (2d) 721, 726 (Cal. 1953).
(2d) 721, 724 (Cal. 1953).
'Supervisory employees have been "the industrial question mark" since the
National Labor Relations Act was passed. It appeared that the problem was finally
settled by Packard Motor Car Co. v. N. L. R. B., 330 U. S. 485, 67 S. Ct. 789,
91 L. ed. 1040 (1947), which decided that employees did come within the protection of the Act. Congress, in passing the Taft-Hartley Act, legislatively overruled this decision by excluding supervisory employees from the protection of
the Act as amended. The reasoning which prompted Congress to take this step is
well illustrated by the comment of Senator Flanders that "unless an employer can
hire and fire, demote and promote, and transfer these men [supervisory employees]
he has lost control of his business." If this argument is valid on a national scale, it
is certainly valid also on a local plane.
There is every reason to believe that if a supervisory employee belonged to a
rank and file union, divided loyalty would be engendered, as the majority of the
court in the principal case contends. 261 P. (2d) 721 at 726 (Cal. 1953). The store
manager's ability to act independently would be impaired by membership in a union
in which he is subject to fine or discharge from employment for any conduct which
the executive board of the union considers to be improper. Certainly the employer
would have lost control of his business if the union could exercise such authority
over his supervisory personnel.
On the other hand, the minority in the principal case, quoting from the Packard Motor Car case, contended that "Even those who act for the employer in some
matters ... still have interests of their own as employees.... his [a supervisory employee's] interest properly may be adverse to that of the employer when it comes to
fixing his own wages, hours, seniority rights or working conditions." 261 P. (2d) 721,
727 (Cal. 1953). This may be true in part; but by the very act of accepting a position in which he will carry out such discretionary responsibilities as hiring and
firing in behalf of his employer, the individual may be expected to relinquish
some of the rights and freedoms of the individual rank and file employee.
'As was the case in Giboney v. Empire Storage 8: Ice Co., 336 U. S. 49 o , 69
S. Ct. 684, 93 L. ed. 834 (1949).
-As was the case in Building Service Employees International Union v. Gazzam, 336 U. S. 532, 70 S. Ct. 784, 94 L. ed. 1O45 (195o).
3As was the case in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339
U. S. 470, 70 S. Ct. 773, 94 L. ed. 995 (195o).
F261 P.
2
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nounced by the court, it is clear that this decision is in a class with
Hughes v. Superior Court.3 8 There, too, the union activity was in
contravention of public policy as declared by the Supreme Court of
California. However, in the principal case, the declaration of public
policy was a direct refutation of what appears to have been a statement
of the state public policy in Section 923 of the legislative labor code,
whereas in the Hughes case there was no legislation on the subject.
Since the California Supreme Court has assumed the authority to decide a very close policy question on the basis of its own discretion
when it could have found the answer in a legislative mandate, this
case marks an extension of the Unlawful Purpose Doctrine even beyond the liberal application of the Hughes case and demonstrates more
clearly than any earlier decision the vital role the discretion of the
courts has played in the development of modem labor law.3 9
The fact that the Unlawful Purpose Doctrine depends for its valid
use on the socio-economic wisdom of those courts which employ it, has
been the basis for its severest criticism. 40 The critics feel that the use
of the injunction predicated on the application of the doctrine has
not proved effective in labor controversies, and that such problems
can best be controlled by the legislature rather than the courts.41 On
339 U. S. 460, 70 S. Ct. 718, 94 L. ed. 985 (1950).
'*That this judicial discretion is a vital force in the operation of the Unlawful
Purpose Doctrine is indicated by the analysis of Morris K. Forkosch, in which the
doctrine is broken down into four successive inquiries:
"') Has the employer suffered legal damages by intentional conduct depriving
him of his enjoyment of legally recognized and ordinarily enforced rights?
2) Are the union's actions (methods, means) judicially peaceful, legal, and not
otherwise condemned by law or policy?
3)Is the union's primary motive one of self-betterment, and secondarily damage
to the employer?
4) Regardless of the preceding questions and their 'factual-legal' answers, does
public policy alter any of these 'usual' answers?" Forkosch, The Doctrine of
Just Cause (1950) 1 Lab. L. J. 789, 793.
By this analysis, if this first question is answered in the negative, the employer
has no ground for relief. But if it is answered in the affirmative, then the next
two questions must be considered, and the negative answer to either may furnish
grounds for an injunction. Even if they are answered in the affirmative, however,
injunctive relief may still be based on the court's resolution of the last question.
Relating these questions to the fact situation of the principal case, it is apparent that the employer has suffered legal damage, but that the union's methods
were judicially recognized, and that the primary motive was the advancement of
the union's interest. Therefore, but for the policy consideration, the court would
probably not have enjoined the strike activities. Public policy, as determined by
the court, then, is the fulcrum of the doctrine.
' 0Forkosch. The Doctrine of Just Cause (195o) 1 Lab. L. J. 789; Frantz, Picketing for Unlawful Objective (1950) 28 N. C. L. Rev. 291.
4
1"Injunction in labor disputes have not generally proved to be an effective
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the other hand, the same judicial freedom has been the basis on which
advocates of the doctrine have praised it as a useful vehicle for the
42
rapid disposal of labor problems by wise and moderate judges.
Whether or not the lodging of such broad discretion in the courts is
wholly desirable, the experience of the past fifteen years, confirmed
most recently by the California court's action in the principal case,
indicates that the future will see even greater use of the Unlawful
43
Purpose Doctrine.
GRAY C.

CASTLE

LABOR LAW-VALIDITY OF PICKET OF PREMISES OF VENDEE OF PRODUCTS
OF EMPLOYER INVOLVED IN LABOR DISPUTE. [West Virginia]
Traditionally the American courts have refused to allow a union to
publicize its dispute with an employer by picketing the premises of
a vendee of the employer's products.' It has been suggested that the
basic reason for the consistent judicial hostility to these secondary
pickets lies in the courts' historical insistence that labor controversies
should be localized to the dispute between the employees and the immediate employer, and should not be extended to subject the employer's
intermediary distributor to the economic disadvantage of losing trade
means of settling them; disputes between workers and employers ... can best be
controlled not by the courts, but by the legislature...." Traynor, J., in Park &
Tilford Import Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 27 Cal. (2d) 599,
165 P. (2d) 891, 897, 162 A. L. R. 1426, 1433 (1946).
""The Unlawful Purpose Doctrine may well have a legitimate place in the
field of labor if it is applied by the courts with wisdom, restraint, and a proper
appreciation of the dangers which experience has taught are involved in the indiscriminate use of the injunction in labor disputes." Howard, The Unlawful Purpose
Doctrine in Peaceful Picketing and Its Application in the California Cases (1951)
24 So. Cal. L. Rev. 145, 173. See also Tobriner, A New Concept of Labor Law
(1953) 4 Lab. L. J. 203 at 2o5.
""The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Giboney,
Hughes, Gazzam, and Hanke cases... have given a renewed vitality to the unlawful purpose doctrine and projected it into the foreground of the labor field."
Howard, The Unlawful Purpose Doctrine in Peaceful Picketing and Its Application in the California Cases (1951) 24 So. Cal. L. Rev. 145, 172.
'Grandview Dairy v. O'Leary, 158 Misc. 791, 285 N. Y. Supp. 841 (1936); Driggs
Dairy Farms Inc. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees' Local Union, 49 Ohio App.
303, 197 N. E. 250 (1935); Parker Paint & Wall Paper Co. v. Local Union, 87 W.
Va. 631, 1o5 S. E. 911 (1921); 1 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining
(1940) § 123.
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because of the public's sympathy for those picketing the employer at
2
the distributor's place of business.
However, in 1937 a departure from this theory was made by the
New York court in Goldfinger v. Feintuch,3 where it was determined
that the peculiar nature of some businesses, such as the manufacture
of meat products and their distribution through retailers, made picketing at the site of the labor dispute-the plant or factory-ineffective as
a means of informing the public of the dispute, because the public encountered the business not at the plant, but rather at the retail establishment through which the employer dispenses his products. It
was reasoned that under those circumstances the union should be allowed to follow the subject matter of the dispute to the retailer or
distributor of the product of the employer, provided that the picketing
was directed at the product sold or distributed at the vendor's establishment rather than at the vendor's business itself.4 The New York
Court of Appeals justified the allowance of intervention by picketing a
vendor in such situations by observing that: "Where a manufacturer
pays less than union wages, both it and the retailers who sell its products are in a position to undersell competitors who pay the higher
scale, and this may result in unfair reduction of the wages of union
members." 5 Thus, one court countenanced the argument labor had so
fruitlessly put forth for many years.
In subsequent New York decisions, this theory was subjected to an
important limitation: 6 the picket of a customer of the employer's am-1Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining (1940) 3oo. In Gomez v.
Union Office and Professional Workers of America, 73 F. Supp. 679 (D. C. D. C.
1947) a picket of a licensee by a union which had grievance with the licens'r was
enjoined on the ground that the decisions of the Supreme Court seem to indicate
that defendants should be restricted, so far as their freedom of speech is concerned,
within a reasonable radius of the area within which the labor dispute has arisen.
N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) gso, 116 A. L. R. 477 (1937).
4Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 91o, 913, 116 A. L. R.
'276

477, 481 (1937): "We do not hold more than that, where a retailer is in unity of
interest with the manufacturer, the union may follow the nonunion goods and
seek by peaceful picketing to persuade the consuming public to refrain from
purchasing the nonunion product, whether that is at the plant of the manufacturer
or at the store of the retailer in the same line of business and in unity of interest
with the manufacturer." See s Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining (1940) § 123.

5Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, s1 N. E. (2d) 910, 913, 116 A. L. R.
477, 480 (1937).
OA significant limitation to the New York theory and one which has been
closely followed by the courts of that state is the requirement of a "unity of interest." Under this requirement, the picketing is limited to those cases where there
is a direct and immediate common purpose between the employer and the vendee
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bulatory business was condoned by the court only if the business which
was picketed was actually that of reselling the employer's products; if
the business which was picketed was the ultimate consumer of the employer's products, the picket was not sanctioned. 7 In this manner the
historical desire of the courts to localize labor controversies and to
limit the classes of participants therein asserted itself once again. Thus,
in the New York case of American Gas Stations, Inc. v. Doe8 where the
employer conducting an ambulatory business was a sign painting
company whose employees worked on the customer's premises, the
picketing of the customer's place of business was enjoined because the
party who was picketed was the ultimate consumer of the signs and
was not engaged in selling or distributing them.
Employing the same principle, the California court in Fortenbury v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County9 sustained the
validity of picketing by employees of a poultry farm against the business of the employer's customer who sold the products of the poultry
farm. Not only did the court allow the secondary picket, but further, it
sanctioned a picket of the intermediary distributor's business per se.
This departure from the usual rule that the picket must be restricted
to the product is explained by the fact that secondary boycotts are
generally legal in California. 10
picketed in the sense that the product concerned is merchandised by both the
company with whom the union has its dispute and the retailer against whom the
picket is directed. For example, suppose Jones sold Borden's ice cream at his soda
shop and that Borden had a labor dispute with the union; Jones subsequently discontinues handling Borden's ice cream and begins to handle Mellow ice cream.
The union could not publicize its dispute with Borden by picketing Jones, because
Jones and Borden would no longer have a common purpose of unity of interest
with regard to the product. The theory that supports this requirement is probably
the lingering desire on the part of the judiciary to protect a neutral to a labor
dispute.
Whether the unity of interest requirement is the basis of the prohibition of
consumer picketing in New York or whether each is an independent limitation on
the allowance of a secondary picket is not made clear by the decisions of the
courts in New York.
7In Silverglate v. Kirkman, 171 Misc. 1051, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 5o5 (1939), a picket
of a drug store which had purchased a nonunion manufactured sign was enjoined
because no "labor dispute" existed under the Civil Practice Act § 876-a because
the drug store was not engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation in
which the dispute occurred. Accord: Weil & Co., Inc. v. Doe, 168 Misc. 211, 5 N. Y.
S. (2d) 559 (1938).
'25o App. Div. 227, 293 N. Y. Supp. 1i9 (1937).
116 Cal. (2d) 405, io6 P. (2d) 411 (1940).
W1n the cases of C. S. Smith Metropolitan Market Co., Limited v. Lyons, 16 Cal.
(2d) 389, io6 P. (2d) 414 (194o) and McKay v. Retail Automobile Salesman's Local
Union, 16 Cal. (2d) 311, io6 P. (2d) 373 (194o) decided concurrently with the
Fortenbury case and determinative of the controversy in the Fortenbury case it
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Recognition of the validity of the legality of secondary picketing
was stimulated in 1940 by the timely decision of Thornhill v. Alabama"
which established the rule that peaceful picketing is a form of communication and therefore is entitled to the constitutional protection
which free speech enjoys. After the Thornhill doctrine was propounded, the states of Georgia, 12 Illinois,13 Louisiana, 14 and Pennsylvania 15 were added to the list of states holding secondary picketing
unenjoinable. 16 And in 1947 a prominent authority in the field of
labor law was moved to state that "It is arguable that this [identification of picketing with free speech] means that consumers may now
17
legally be picketed."'
The West Virginia court, in Ohio Valley Advertising Corp. v.
Union Local 2o7, Sign Painters A. F. of L.,1 8 now apparently has

breathed case authority into this speculation. The fact situation in this
case closely resembles that of the New York case of American Gas Stawas held that labor may exert economic pressure upon employers provided that
peaceful means are used and the purpose is one reasonably related to labor conditions, and that the boycott, both primary and secondary, is a proper method of
applying such pressure. See Fortenbury v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. (2d) 405, io6 P.
(2d) 411, 413 (1940).
"3o U. S. 88, 6o S. Ct. 736, 84 L. ed. 1093 (1940).
"2Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Odom, 193 Ga. 471, 18 S. E. (2d) 841 (1942).

"SEllingsen v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union of Chicago, 377 I1. 76, 35 N. E. (2d)
349 (1941); Maywood Farms Co. v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union of Chicago, 313
Ill. App. 24, 38 N. E. (2d) 972 (1942).
"Johnson v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Union Local No. 854, 195 So. 791
(La. App. 1940).

"Alliance Auto Service, Inc. v. Cohen, 341 Pa. 283, 19 A. (2d) 152 (1941).
mOn the other hand the following states have, by statute, outlawed the secondary picket as well as secondary strikes and boycotts: Iowa, Iowa Laws (1947) S. B.
ii; Minnesota, Minn. Laws (1947) c. 487; Idaho, Idaho Laws (1947) c. 265; Oregon,
Oregon Laws (1947) c. 356; Texas, Texas Laws (1947) S. B. 167; North Dakota, North
Dakota Laws (1947) H. B. 16o; Utah, Utah Laws (1947) H. B. 36.
7
' i Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining (1947 Supp.) 54. In People

v. Muller, 286 N. Y. 281, 36 N. E. (2d) 2o6 (1941), the company with whom the
union had a dispute installed a burglar alarm system in the complainant's store,
and the review court held that the union's picket of the store did not constitute
disorderly conduct, because peaceful picketing is protected as an exercise of the
right of free speech. From this decision, Teller drew the conclusion that perhaps the
protected status given peaceful picketing by the Thornhill doctrine would serve
to allow the picketing of a consumer, since in People v. Muller the doctrine relieved the picketers of the consumer from a criminal charge of disorderly conduct.
In the Restatement of Torts (1939) §§ 799-8o no distinction is made between
picketing the retailer and picketing the consumer; each is condoned if carried on
for a "proper object" and through "fair persuasion." "If, for example, A is the manufacturer of the X brand soap, employees may, under the rule stated in this Section, induce wholesalers, retailers, and housewives not to purchase that soap." Restatement, Torts (1939) § 799, comment on clause (a), at 145.
276 S. E. (2d) 113 (W. Va. 1953)-
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tions, Inc. v. Doe'9 as the plaintiff was a sign painting company with
whom the defendant union had a labor dispute. In the West Virginia
case the union attempted to publicize its dispute by picketing the
principal place of plaintiff's business, but because of the ambulatory
nature of the plaintiff's business the picket was ineffective. Therefore,
the union proceeded to picket the plaintiff's employees as they painted
signs on the premises of the plaintiff's customer, a filling station, and
considerable damage resulted to the filling station's business in loss
of trade. The plaintiff sought to have this activity enjoined, but the
court ruled that the picketing was permissible as an ambulatory picket
sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court in Bakery and Pastry
Drivers Local v. Woh120 as long as the information contained on the
picket's bahner was true and indicated that the picketing was limited
to the sign painters. 21 It was reasoned further that under Thornhill v.
Alabama22 "it is repugnant to the First and Fourteenth Amendments
to the federal Constitution to deny the right of free communication
to either party engaged in an industrial dispute ....
" and that in the

exercise of this right the employees cannot be limited to picketing
only those directly involved in the controversy, "so long as the publication is unattended by violence, coercion, or conduct otherwise unlawful."2 3 Thus, the West Virginia decision has definitely affirmed the
legality of the secondary picket, and may be open to the construction
that it approves picketing a consumer-customer of an employer involved
in a labor dispute.
The reliance upon Thornhill v. Alabama is probably not subject
to adverse criticism, since that decision has never been expressly overruled. However, the West Virginia court's espousal of the Thornhill
case is significantly in contrast to the inclination of several courts which
have recently wedged devitalizing exceptions into the free speech doctrine.24 The Supreme Court has recognized that peaceful picketing
"25o App. Div. 227, 293 N. Y. Supp. 1o9 (1937).
-'315 U. S. 769, 62 S. Ct. 816, 86 L. ed. 1178 (1942).
-'Ohio Valley Advertising Corporation v. Union Local 207, Sign Painters A.
F. of L., 76 S. E. (2d) 113 at 119 (W. Va. 1953). The information written on the
signs was clearly directed against the painters, not the filling station. However, the
uncontested testimony of the operator of the filling station was that people were
deterred from buying products of the station irrespective of the statements on the
signs. This may be taken as an indication that while the distinction between picketing vendor's business and employer's product may be logical, it is not significant in
practice.
-31o U. S.88, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. ed. 1093 (1940).
2Ohio Valley Advertising Corp. v. Union Local 207, Sign Painters A. F. of L.,
76 S. E. (2d) 113, 12o (W. Va. 1953).
-"For the conclusion that the Thornhill case has been virtually nullified, see
Burstein, Picketing and Speech (1953) 4 Lab. L. J. 791.
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does not receive constitutional protection under the Thornhill doctrine
where the purpose of picketing is to coerce an employer to violate a
state statute25 or a valid order of a state administrative agency, 26 or
where the purpose of the picket is to achieve a result which the state
may reasonbaly conclude was opposed to the best interests of the
public. 2 7 In InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke28 the
Supreme Court upheld an injunction issued to prohibit the forcing
of a union shop on a business operated by an owner himself without
employees. The highest court of the state of Washington was affirmed
in its holding that the preservation of self-employer economic units was
of greater importance than the protection of the element of communication in picketing.2 9 Thus, the West Virginia court, in feeling
required to follow the Thornhill decision to the letter, was apparently
unimpressed with the waning strength of the free speech doctrine as
evidenced by the decisions of the past few years. Had there been a disposition to declare the secondary picket illegal in the principal case,
the Thornhill case would have offered no deterrent, because the West
Virginia court might have decided that, as a matter of policy, protecting consumers from a picket was of greater importance than protecting the element of communication in picketing. 30
In relying on the Wohl decision, the court is upon somewhat uncertain ground. In that case the Supreme Court sustained the right of
a union to picket small retair bakeries to whom the peddler, with
whom the union had a labor dispute, delivered his pastry products.
This picketing was justified on the ground that the dispute was related
to the retailers, in that it concerned the conditions under which bakery
-Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U. S. 49 o , 69 S. Ct. 684, 93 L. ed.
834 (1949). In Blue Boar Cafeteria Co., Inc. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees &
Bartenders International Union, 254 S. W. (2d) 335 (Ky. 1952) the Kentucky Court
of Appeals held that peaceful picketing was illegal where it was part of a pattern
which could have no other effect than to coerce the employer to violate a statute
by compelling its employees to unionize. Certiorari granted, 346 U. S. 834, 74 S. Ct.
41, 98 L. ed. 46 (1954).
28
Hotel & Restaurant Employees' International Alliance v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U. S. 437, 62 S. Ct. 7o6, 86 L. ed. 946 (1942).
2Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U. S. 460, 70 S. Ct. 718, 94 L. ed. 985 (1950).
2339 U. S. 470, 70 S. Ct. 773, 94 L. ed. 995 (195o).
-'Hanke v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 33 Wash. (2d) 646, 207 P.
(2d) 206 (1949).
3In the Ohio Valley case, the party picketed is properly classified as a "consumer," in the sense that he purchased the product of the employer for use in
advertising his business rather than as a stock in trade for resale. In relation to products purchased for such use, he is a business consumer, and should have the same
status as a private individual consumer.
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products were sold and delivered to retailers. 31 The West Virginia
court recognized that the subject matter of the dispute involved in the
principal case-the painting of signs-could not be followed by pickets
to every place under this view, but expressed its opinion that "the
peculiar nature of the work done by the Ohio Valley Advertising Corporation brings this case squarely within the holding of the 'Wohl
,,32
[case] ....
However, a significant distinction appears when the two situations
are analyzed. In the Wohl case the union picketed a retailer of bakery
products because of a dispute with the distributor of these products.
In the Ohio Valley case the union picketed sign painters employed by
the party with whom the union had a dispute, while those employees
were painting signs on the premises of the gasoline station. There is a
material difference between picketing sign painters at the filling station
and picketing retail bakeries, because the filling station is the consumer of the products of the sign painting company whereas the bakery
is not the consumer of the pastry products. To fail to observe the distinction is impliedly to recognize that the aggrieved employees can
carry this ambulatory device to the consumer. The interests which justify the extension of the picket from the plant to the retailer-(i)
that the public was not effectively made aware of the dispute by a
picket of certain businesses at the plant, and (2) that the retailer, as a
beneficiary of the nonunion distributed products, should not be protected from the union's publication of its dispute through a picket
of the retailer-likewise appear to justify the extension of the picket
from the retailer to the consumer. However, notwithstanding the apparent logic of this transition, the courts have not been swayed in this
33
narrow field from the fundamental theme of localizing the dispute.
mIndependent peddlers in the Wohl case who bought baked goods from
bakeries and sold them to small retailers had a labor dispute with the truck drivers
union because the nonunion peddlers refused to abide by the limited number of
hours in the union work week. To publicize the dispute the union picketed the
bakeries and threatened to picket the retailers with whom the peddlers did business.
The Supreme Court recognized that the ambulatory nature of peddlers' business
insulated them from the public and made it practically impossible for the union to
publicize their grievance except by the means used. Consequently the court allowed
the picket. Bakery and Pastry Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769, 62 S. Ct. 816
86 L. ed. 1178 (1942).
3Ohio Valley Advertising Corp. v. Union Local 207, Sign Painters A. F. of
L., 76 S. E. (2d) 113 , 119 MI. Va. 1953).
'Exemplary of the courts' views is the case of Carpenters & Joiners Union of
America v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722, 726, 62 S. Ct. 807, 809, 86 L. ed. 1143, 1147
(1942) wherein the court affirmed the restraining of a picket of a restaurant, the
owner of which had contracted for the erection of a building by a contractor
employing nonunion labor. In reviewing the case the court indicated its funda-
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It is submitted that the principal decision was not intended to
serve as a precedent for allowing unions henceforth to picket private
individual consumers. It is significant that no reference was made in
the opinion to the fact this was a consumer picket situation. Had the
court meant to establish a general rule validating individual consumer
picketing in ambulatory businesses, surely it would have dearly spelled
out such an intention to make a distinct departure from the prevailing
law. Instead, the court specifically stated that "we do not say that all
businesses of an ambulatory nature may lawfully be picketed at whatever place the employees of that concern may be at work... ."34 Thus,
it is implicit that the businesses must be ambulatory in nature, but it
is not definite from the opinion just what types of ambulatory business are to be subject to the doctrine of the case. Further, the place of
the picket, in order to come within the precise holding of this case,
presumably must be at the premises of business consumers, rather than
private individual consumers. Without question, this decision does
place West Virginia in the camp of states allowing a secondary picket,
but further decisions will be required to establish the scope within
which that type of activity is to be legalized in the jurisdiction.
JOHN P. WARD

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-STATUTORY

DUTY OF PROPERTY OWNER To

BEAR COST OF SIDEWALK MAINTENANCE AS BAR TO His RECOVERY FOR
INJURIES CAUSED BY DEFECTIVE SIDEWALK.

[Pennsylvania] .

The duty of municipal corporations to respond in damages for
torts committed by them through their various instrumentalities
represents one of the most confused areas of the law today. It is agreed,
however, that the general rule is that a municipal corporation is
liable only for torts committed in the exercise of proprietary or private
functions as distinguished from governmental or public functions.,
This rule of immunity came into the common law several centuries
ago when operations of municipal governments were relatively simple
mental position when it approvingly said: "Texas has undertaken to localize industrial conflict by prohibiting the exertion of concerted pressure directed at the
business, wholly outside the economic context of the real dispute, of a person whose
relation to the dispute arises from his business dealings with one of the disputants."
31
Ohio Valley Advertising Corp. v. Union Local 207, Sign Painters A. F. of L.,
76 S. E. (2d) 113, i19 (WV.
Va. 1953) [italics supplied].
26 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed. 1937) §§ 2771, 2792; 38 Am. Jur.,
Municipal Corporations § 572; 63 C. J. S., Municipal Corporations § 746.
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and resources for paying damages were limited.2 Under changing conditions which in modern times have greatly extended the scope of
activities and the taxation powers of municipalities, the rule has
come under severe criticism on the ground that it is incompatible
with the proper conception of the role of government in its relationships with individuals. 3 As a result of these attacks, the modern tendency is to restrict the immunity from tort liability of municipal
corporations, both on the part of the courts in extending the scope of
what is "proprietary" and therefore not immune,4 and by action of
the legislatures through the passage of statutes removing or at least
restricting the general area of immunity. 5 Though immunity is still
recognized in many areas of activity, it is not now generally applied
to injuries resulting from the defective repair and maintenance of
streets and highways.6 Sidewalks also fall within this relaxation of
7
the immunity rule.
2In Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T. R. 667, 1oo Eng. Rep. 359 (K. B. 1788), the
English court denied recovery in an action against the inhabitants of the county
for damages for injuries sustained as the result of the failure of the county to repair a bridge. The court pointed to the fact that the county was only a quasicorporation with meager funds. This case then became authority for a leading
American decision, Mowrer v. The Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812),
which applied the immunity rule to an action brought against a municipal corporation, created by statute and capable of suing and being sued. Other early
American cases which applied the immunity doctrine are: Sheldon v. County
of Litchfield, 1 Root 158 (Conn. 1790); Hurlburt v. Marsh and the Town of
Litchfield, i Root 520 (Conn. 1793).
3Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924) 34 Yale L. J. 1, 129, 229; Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction Between Public and Private Functions
in Respect to the Common-Law Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations (1937),
16 Ore. L. Rev. 250.
'Smoak v. City of Tampa, 123 Fla. 716, 167 So. 528 (1936) (operation of garbage
truck); Matthews v. City of Detroit, 291 Mich. 161, 289 N. W. 115 (1939) (operation
of miniature railroad in city park); City of Okmulgee v. Carlton, i8o Okla. 605,
71 P. (2d) 722 (1937) (municipal hospital); Bell v. City of Pittsburgh, 297 Pa. 185,
146 At. 567 (1929) (operation of elevator in public building which was used for
discharge of both governmental and proprietary functions).
'In New York, the legislature in sweeping terms has waived the general governmental immunity from tort liability, New York Laws (1939) c. 86o, § 8. The
passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 6o Stat. 842 (1946), 28 U. S. C. §§ 921-946
(1946) will undoubtedly have an influence in this direction. See Note (1950) 24 Wash.
L. Rev. 201.
ODistrict of Columbia v. Woodbury, 136 U. S. 450, 10 S. Ct. 990, 34 L. ed.
472 (1890); Hillman v. City of Anniston, 214 Ala. 522, 1o8 So. 539, 46 A. L. R. 89
(1926); Ledbetter v. City of Great Falls, 123 Mont. 270, 213 P. (2d) 246, 13 A. L. R.
(2d) 903 (1949); Hanley v. Fireproof Bldg. Co., 107 Neb. 544, 186 N. W. 534, 24 A. L.
R. 382 (1922); Nelson v. Duquesne Light Co., 338 Pa. 37, 12 A. (2d) 299, 128 A .L. R.
1257 (1940). See generally 63 C. J. S., Municipal Corporations § 782.
7Chicago, R. I. & P. R. v. Redding, 124 Ark. 368, 187 S. W. 651 (1916); Wehr
v. Roland Park Co., 143 Md. 384, 122 Ad. 363 (1923). See generally 25 Am. Jur.,
Highways § 7.
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Demonstrating a lingering reluctance in the courts to hold municipalities liable for tortious conduct, however, is the recent case of
Ignatowicz v. City of Pittsburghs in which the city was sued for
damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff when wooden stairs in a
city street collapsed as she was using them .The street in question was
thirty feet wide and ran in a north-south direction. From its western
edge, twenty-four feet separated the street proper from the property of
plaintiff. The first eighteen feet of this strip was set aside by general
ordinance for a cartway and the last six for a sidewalk, neither of
which had been constructed. The steps involved in the controversy
were thirteen feet from plaintiff's property or almost in the middle
of the proposed cartway, and were used by the public generally. Plaintiff had built a porch onto her house which extended five feet into the
area reserved for a sidewalk and had enclosed the remaining eightfoot area separating the porch from the steps with hedges, using the
enclosure as a lawn.
The defense of the city against liability for plaintiff's injuries
was based on a statute enacted in 18910 which placed upon landowners
the duty to lay, set, and keep in repair, the sidewalks, boardwalks and
curbstones located in front of or alongside their property. Under Pennsylvania decisions, this duty has been held to encompass the primary liability as well as responsibility for the cost of these improvements. By
primary liability, it is meant that the adjoining landowner must eventually pay the damages for injuries sustained by a third person due to a
defective condition in the sidewalk adjacent to his premises.' 0 The
plaintiff apparently contended that the statute did not apply to the
situation at bar and that the case, therefore, came within the rule that
the immunity doctrine does not extend to injuries caused by defects
p375 Pa. 352, 1oo A. (2d) 6o8 (1953).

9This act provides: "The municipal authorities may require sidewalks, 'boardwalks and curbstone to be laid, set and kept in repair, and after notice to the
owner or owners of property to lay, set or repair such walks or stone in front of
his, her or their property, and his, her or their failure to do so, the said municipal
authorities may do the necessary work and assess the cost thereof upon the property
of said owner or owners in front or along which said walk or curbstone so laid, set
or repaired, shall be situate, and file a lien therefor or collect the same by action
of assumpsit." 53 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1931) § 771, Act of May 16, 1891, P. L.
75'The injured party may sue either the adjoining landowner or the city, but
if the city is sued, then it may later sue the landowner to recover any amount paid
out in damages by it. Thus, while the city has a liability to the injured third party,
it is only a secondary liability in the sense that the city may seek indemnification
from the adjoining landowner. Dutton v. Borough of Landsdowne, 198 Pa. 563, 48
Atl. 494, 53 L. R. A. 469 (igoi).
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in streets and sidewalks. Disregarding several persuasive arguments by
which it could have held that the statute did not bar recovery, the
court denied the liability of the city for plaintiff's injuries. It was
the court's opinion that "the steps possess the status of a sidewalk and
that the plaintiffs, having exercised actual dominion and control of
the land bordering on the steps, come within the definition of an abutting property owner. Primary liability for the maintenance of the steps
in good repair attached to... the wife-plaintiff owner... [who has no]
right of recovery against the City which was only secondarily liable."' 1
The dissenting opinion pointed out one obvious basis for removing the case from the effect of the statute. There it was contended
that the thirteen foot strip which separated plaintiff's property from
the steps prevented her from being an "abutting" or an "adjoining"
landowner within the meaning of the municipal ordinance 12 passed
in pursuance of the i8gi Act. If this were true, she would then be removed from the primary liability imposed thereunder in the majority
opinion. In supporting his contention, the dissenting Justice quoted
authority which indicates that in order for different properties to
be "abutting" or "adjoining," they must be in actual direct contact.'3
While a further reading of this authority reveals that these words do
4
not always carry the requirement that a contact must be maintained,'
the dissent's position nevertheless appears to be a sound one. It is clear
that these terms do carry with them at least the requirement of close
proximity, and several cases have held that property "abutting" an
improvement is property between which and the improvement there is
no intervening land.' 5 Furthermore, it is only the city ordinance that
uses the words "abutting" and "adjoining"; the statute under which
the ordinance was enacted referred to property ".... in front or along
which said walk ... shall be situate ... ."16 The use of these words in

the statute adds greater emphasis to the requirement of proximity and
clearly suggests that the intent of the statute and ordinance was to place
nIgnatowicz v. City of Pitsburgh, 375 Pa. 352, ioo A. (2d) 6o8, 61o (1953).
12Ordinance No. 16l, City of Pittsburgh (1930) § 4: "It shall further be the duty
of all owners of property abutting or adjoining streets to maintain all sidewalk
pavements and curbing in proper and safe condition."
'rThe dissent relied on the following cases, quoting from i and 2 W. 9- Ph.
t9i and 393: State ex rel. Boynton v. Bunton, 141 Kan. 1o3, 4o P. (2d) 326 at 328
(1935); Hensler v. City of Anacortes, 140 Wash. 184, 248 Pac. 4o6 at 407 (1926).
"'People ex rel. Whittock v. Willison, 237 IIL 584, 86 N. E. 1094 at 1097
(19o8); Richards v. City of Cincinnati, 31 Ohio St. 5o6 at 513 (1877).
nMillan v. City of Chariton, 145 Iowa 648, 124 N. W. 766 (191o); Anderson v.
Town of Albermarle, 182 N. C. 434, 109 S. E. 262 at 264 (1921); City of Wilburton v. McConnell, 119 Okla. 242, 249 Pac. 7o8 at 71o (1926).
"53 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1931) § 771, Act of May 16, 1891, P. L. 75.
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the burden of maintaining sidewalks on the persons whose properties
were immediately adjacent to the walks.
However, the court seems to have determined that, even if a strict
meaning of the term "abutting" were adopted, since the thirteen
foot strip constituting city property had been moved onto and used
by plaintiff, the statute was satisfied by plaintiff's occupancy of property abutting directly on the steps. But plaintiff clearly did not own
this strip, and the statute specifically places the duty of maintaining
sidewalks on the owners of property. She was not even a lessee or an
otherwise legal possessor but merely an occupier of the strip in question. If not a trespasser, she at least used the property only by the
bare sufferance of the city. There was no evidence that she claimed any
right, title, or interest therein, and even if made, such a claim could
not have been valid since Pennsylvania follows the American view
that public land may not be acquired by adverse possession. 1
The court construed the word "owner" as used in the statute to
mean the "person in dominion and control" rather than the owner
of the fee. This interpretation was supported with the observation
that "It is only just and reasonable to allow the risks and burdens
incident to ownership to fall on those who enjoy benefits through occupancy and control."' s While it would have been reasonable for
the legislature to have placed the duty of repair on the occupier as the
one in dominion and control, the legislature in fact'placed the duty
on the owner. Certainly that imposition is also reasonable, and since
the legislature designated the owner, there appears to be no authority in
the court to transfer the statutory duty to a non-owning occupant. An
attempt was made to justify that action by reference to previous decisions in which it had been held that the duty was not on the owner
but was instead on the lessee of the premises.' 9 However, plaintiff here
was not a lessee; she had no legal basis for exercising dominion or
control over the premises, and was nothing more than an illegal
squatter.
Assuming that plaintiff was an "abutting property owner" in legal
contemplation, though not in fact, still the statute by its express terms
made her liable only to the city for the expense of keeping the sidewalk in repair. The language of the Act plainly indicates that its
purpose is to relieve the city from the expense of laying and repairITHostetter v. Commonwealth, 367 Pa. 6o3,
'Ignatowicz v. City of Pittsburgh, 375 Pa.
"Briggs v. Philadelphia, 316 Pa. 48, 173
of Homestead, 120 Pa. Super. 182, 182 At. 68

8o A. (2d) 7,9 (1951).
352, 1oo A. (2d) 608, 6io (1953).
At. 316 (1934); Baxter v. Borough
(1935).
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ing walks and similar facilities by authorizing the city to do that work
and to charge the adjoining property owner for its cost if he refuses
to have the work done at his own expense. It makes no reference whatever to liability to third parties injured on the walks; and similar
statutes in other jurisdictions have been interpreted to mean that
this duty is merely one owed to the city, and that its scope does not
go beyond the cost of the improvement. 20 By interpreting the statute
as meaning that "the owner or tenant in possession is primarily liable
and responsible for keeping in repair the sidewalk in front of the
property owned or occupied by him," 21 the Pennsylvania courts have
attempted in this and in other cases to shift all of the municipality's
burden of care of preventing injuries to users of its walks upon the
hapless landowner who must now bear the burden of ultimate liability
for injuries suffered by citizens as a result of sidewalks not being
properly kept and maintained. That there was a duty of care owed
here to the plaintiff by the municipality cannot be doubted. In a
recent Pennsylvania case, it was said that "It was the duty of defendant
[city] to keep this public stairway in a reasonably safe condition so
that pedestrians in the exercise of due care could use it without
peril." 22 The city constructed the steps on which plaintiff was injured
for the general use of the public; it had knowledge of their defective
condition; and under the majority and better reasoned view, the city
23
has the primary responsibility for their repair and maintenance.
It is to be regretted that the Pennsylvania courts have interpreted
the legislative will in their state so as to transfer the primary responsibility for the safe and proper care of public sidewalks from the
municipality to the adjoining landowners. Not only is such an interpretation contrary to the present day trend of extending tort liability of municipalities, but it is an obvious invitation to govern24
mental irresponsibility.
WILuAm M. BAILEY

2Spear v. City of Sterling, 126 Kan. 314, 267 Pac. 979 (1928); McGurk v. City
of Shreveport, 191 So. 553 (La. App. 1939); Lucas v. St. Louis & Suburban Ry., 174
Mo. 270, 73 S. W. 589, 61 L. R. A. 452 (19o3); Headley v. Hammond Bldg., Inc., 97
Mont. 243, 33 P. (2d) 574, 93 A. L. R. 974 (1934); Bernstein v. East 167 th Street
Corp., 161 Misc. 836, 293 N. Y. Supp. 109 (1937); Harbin v. Smith, 168 Tenn.
112, 76 S. W. (2d) 107 (1934); 2 Restatement, Torts (1934) § 288.
2
Ignatowicz v. City of Pittsburgh, 375 Pa. 352, OO A. (2d) 608, 61o (1953) [italics
supplied].
2Chidester v. City of Pittsburgh, 354 Pa. 417, 47 A. (2d) 130, 132 (1946).
22See Note 20, supra.
2'"With the ever-increasing scope of municipal government activities, the possibilities of harm to the individual are correspondingly greater. The present legal
doctrines which purport to define the area within which the municipality shall
make recompense to the individual harmed are inadequate in at least two respects.
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PROPERTY-DISQUALIFICATION OF CLOSE RELATIVE OF LANDOWNER To
PURCHASE LAND AT DELINQUENT REALTY TAx SALE. [Oklahoma]

To assure the prompt and efficient collection of ad valorem real
estate taxes, many states provide that a single evaluation shall be made
of each parcel, which may include an appraisal of all the interests and
estates therein whether separately owned or not.1 Very often this assessment may be listed in the name of the owner of the surface freehold.2 In these jurisdictions, purchasers of land at valid sales for delinquent taxes will receive by grant from the sovereign a new and
paramount fee simple title.3 Since the tax lien theoretically attaches to
First, they fail to achieve even an approximate degree of consistency in application
because the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions is not
founded upon any inherent quality of the various activities.. . Second, the doctrines, as applied, do not correspond to current ideas of justice because they require the individuals who are harmed to bear a disproportionate part of the cost
of enterprises undertaken for the benefit of the entire community." Smith, Municipal Tort Liability (1949) 48 Mich. L. Rev. 41, 56. As was pointed out in the dissenting opinion filed by Justice Musmanno, "the City was responsible for the
wife-plaintiff's mishap by inviting her to use an instrumentality which was decayed, rotted, weak and devoid of signs or lights warning the public of the danger
underlying the treads climbing the steep grade of a public thoroughfare. As a
consequence of this invitation [plaintiff] suffered serious injuries." Ignatowicz v.
City of Pittsburgh, 375 Pa. 352, loo A. (ad) 6o8, 611 (1953).
1

For example, compare the following different statutes: 2C N. C. Stat. (Michie,
1950) § 105-295 (establishing factors which shall determine total worth of each
parcel), and § 1o5-3o, par. (5) and par. (8) (providing for separate assessment
of undivided interests of tenants-in-common and of interests of owners of minerals
and other resources, under certain conditions); Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 1978
and 2 Md. Code Ann. (1939) Art. 81, § 14 (granting discretion to assessors in separately assessing severed mineral estates); 3 Ga. Code (1933) § 92-104 (providing that
all owners of interests in land less than fee shall have such interests separately
assessed). Until it was repealed, the Oklahoma statute which required that all mines,
minerals, quarries, and trees be evaluated, for purposes of real estate taxes, as part of
the assessment was unusual. Few jurisdictions had gone so far in making the single
assessment mandatory, irrespective of the wishes of the parties or local assessors. See
Okla. Stat. (1931) § 12331, repealed May 23, 1941, Okla. Sess. Laws (1941) 332, as
quoted
in Cornelius v. Jackson, 2Ol Okla. 667, 2o9 P. (2d) 166, 171 (1948).
2
For example, see: Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) § 132.220, par. (3); 2C N. C. Stat.
(Michie, 195o) § 105-295, par. (9).
1
Hefner v. Northwestern Life Ins. Co., 123 U. S. 747, 8 S. Ct. 337, Vi L. ed.
309 (1887); Helvey v. Sax, 229 P. (2d) 796 (Cal. App. 1951), modified 38 Cal. (2d)
21, 237 P. (2d) 269 (1951); Spitcaufsky v. Hatten, 353 Mo. 94, 182 S. W. (2d) 86, 16o
A. L. R. 990 (1944); Baird v. Hayes, 207 Okla. 426, 250 P. (2d) 433 (1952). However,
where the jurisdiction considers tax sales as proceedings against the person in whose
name the parcel was assessed, the purchaser at a tax sale will receive no more
title than the interest of the person in whose name the land was assessed. Anderon v. Daugherty, 169 Ky. 308, 183 S.W. 545 (igi6). For a summary of the opposing
theories concerning the quantum of estate which the purchaser at a valid sale for
delinquent taxes acquires, see Philippine Islands v. Adriano, 41 Philippine r12 (1920),
as cited in Note (1931) 75 A. L. R. 416 at 417.
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every possible interest in the land, the sale and subsequent grant from
the state may extinguish all prior rights, titles, interests, estates,
equities, and liens. 4 Such action is justified on the ground that a
grant of land free of all burdens will presumably bring a higher bid
at the tax sale, thus facilitating the policy of the sovereign to recover
delinquent taxes.5 However, this policy often conflicts with the equitable principle that legitimate interests and liens should be protected
from destruction at a tax sale whenever the purchaser is one who has
some legal or equitable interest in the property. This principle is
related to the broader equitable ground of denying unjust enrichment
which would result if a party who was entitled to only a fraction of
the total value of land could defeat the interests of others therein. 6
'For examples of prior rights, titles, interests, estates, equities, and liens which
have been extinguished by tax deeds, see: Haspel v. O'Brien, 218 Pa. 146, 67 Atl.
123, 11 Ann. Cas. 470 (1907) (mortgage); Bloxham v. Consumers' Electric Light &
Street R. R. Co., 36 Fla. 519, 18 So. 444, 29 L. R. A. 507 (1895) (judgment); Warren v. Blackman, 62 S. D. 26, 25o N. W. 681 (1933) (special assessment); Byington
v. Carlin, 146 Iowa 3ol, 125 N. W. 233 (igio) (inchoate dower); Jinkiaway v. Ford,
93 Kan. 797, 145 Pac. 885, L. R. A. i9i 5 E, 343 (1915) (estate in remainder). But
as to easements appurtenant to other real estate, see Engle v. Catucci, 197 F. (2d)
597 (C. A. D. C., 1952), noted in (1953) 1o Wash. & Lee Rev. 84 (easement appurtenant held not extinguished by tax deed). Where there has been a severance of the
mineral rights for purposes of taxation, a tax deed issued in pursuance of a sale for
delinquent taxes which were a lien upon the surface only will not affect the mineral
rights, irrespective of the title status of the two estates. McNaughton v. Beattie, 181
Okla. 603, 75 P. (2d) 400 (1938). Accord, Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Cox, 159 La. 81o,
io6 So. 313 (1925); Caston v. Pine Lumber Co., 1io Miss. 165, 69 So. 668 (1915) (as
to lumber rights). However, in Cornelius v. Jackson, 201 Okla. 667, 20o9 P. (2d) 166
(19 48), where there had been no payment of the Oklahoma gross production tax (a
substitute for the ad valorem tax on minerals when produced in sufficient quantities),
the court adopted the theory behind the single assessments statute then in effect
(see note i, supra) and concluded that a tax deed conveyed the separately owned
mineral estate as well as the surface estate.
rLacey v. Davis, 4 Mich. 14o at 152, 66 Am. Dec. 524 at 529 (1856); City of
Walla Walla v. State, 197 Wash. 357, 85 P. (2d) 676 at 678, 119 A. L. R. 1327 at
1329 (1938). See Restatement, Property (1944) § 5o9, comment a: "Incumbrances resulting from conveyance, adverse use or otherwise, however, do effect the sale value
of land. If they are not to be destroyed by a sale for tax purposes they should be
taken account of in assessing land for such purposes and the assessed value accordingly lowered. Under the interpretation of general tax statutes they are, however, not ordinarily taken account of and are held to be cut off by a sale as a result of assessments under such statute." Comment e: "To assess for tax purpose the
various legal interests in land would however produce an exceeding complicated
tax structure and it is therefore commonly attempted only in exceptional situations.
Hence in levying a tax upon land separate legal interests in the land are ordinarily
disregarded."
6"But the doctrine does not rest on duty alone; it is rather based on the
broader ground, akin to unjust enrichment, of the inequity which would result if
one who could protect his own interest in land, without prejudice to others, by pay-
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Occasionally the rule has been broadly stated that a former owner
may not acquire his property at a tax sale to the prejudice of other
owners, 7 with the application of the rule extended to include all parties
in interest. This disqualification has been particularly applied to
purchasers who owed the duty, either to the sovereign or to others
with interests in the land, to pay the taxes.8 Thus, a mortgagor in possession of the encumbered premises ordinarily covenants to pay the
taxes thereon, while at the same time he owes the mortgagee a duty
not to permit the security to become extinguished. The mortgagor
is therefore not permitted to set up his tax deed in bar against the
claim of the mortgagee.9 A second limitation is often invoked to
protect the interests and liens of parties from destruction at tax sales to
other lienholders or parties in interest who were not under a duty to
the state or to others to insure payment of the taxes. In several jurisdictions, for example, the mortgagee who buys in at a tax sale may not,
as against other lienholders or the mortgagor, assert his tax deed from
the state.' 0
ing the taxes were allowed to cut off other interests by tax title." Note (1947) 6o
Harv. L. Rev. 658. See York County Sav. Bank v. Wentworth, 136 Me. 33o, 9 A.
(2d) 265 at 268, 125 A. L. R. 15o9 at 1512 (1939).
'See Note (1947) 6o Harv. L. Rev. 658.
"For example, the duty of a life tenant in possession of real estate to pay the
ordinary taxes thereon is well established, Duffley v. McCaskey, 345 Mo. 55o, 134 S.
W. (2d) 62, 126 A. L. R. 853 (1939), and, burdened with such a duty, he cannot, as
against the remainderman, acquire a title from a sale for delinquent taxes. Rich v.
Allen, 226 Iowa 130 4 , 286 N. W. 434 (1939) (tax sale to judgment creditor of life

tenant did not affect interest of remainderman). By analogy, a purchaser in possession under contract of sale whose duty it is to pay the taxes cannot, by letting them
lapse and buying in the title at tax sale, obtain a title adverse to his vendor. Finch
v. Noble, 49 Wash. 578, 96 Pac. 3, 126 Am. St. Rep. 88o (19o8). Nor may a joint tenant
purchase a tax title to the common property and assert it against the remaining
joint tenants. Chapman v. Aldridge, 228 Ky. 538, 15 S.W. (2d) 454 (1929). See Note
(1949) 2 Fla. L. Rev. 94.

'Almost without exception it has been held that a mortgagor in possession who
allows the premises to be sold for nonpayment of taxes cannot strengthen his title
by buying in the property at a tax sale. Mendenhall v. Hall, 134 U. S.559, 10 S.Ct.
616, 33 L. ed.

12 (189o); Marwalt Realty Co. v. Greene, 224 Wis. 1, 271 N. W.

648 (1937). The mortgagor's disqualification may rest upon particular covenants in
the mortgage to pay the taxes. Horton v. Johnson, 187 Ga. 9, 199 S. E. 226 (1938).
See I Glenn, Mortgages (1943) § 43.
o

"Koch v. Kiron State Bank, 230 Iowa 2o6, 297 N. W. 45 , 14o A. L. R. 273
(1941), noted in (1941) 27 Iowa L. Rev. 159; DeLaine v. DeLaine, 211 S. C. 223, 44 S.
E. (2d) 442 (1947), noted in (r948)
S. C. L. Rev. 179. Contra, Owens v. Williams,

i8o Okla. 324, 68 P. (2d) 836 (1937). See 5 Tiffany, The Law of Real Property (3 d ed.
1939) § 1425. For distinctions between junior lienholders and senior lienholders, see
Note (191gi) 9o U. of Pa. L. Rev. go at 97. A remainderman may acquire a tax title to
the exclusion of the life tenant's interest, Duffley v. McCaskey, 345 Mo. 55o, 134 S.W.
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In order that these rules may not be defeated by indirection or
subterfuge, other disqualifications have been established. Thus, where
the tax sale purchaser occupies such a position of fiduciary relationship with the disqualified party that he was under a moral obligation
to see that the taxes were paid, the fiduciary cannot acquire a tax
title." Similarly, if it is shown that the purchaser represents, or afterwards conveys or assigns the tax title to, one who is himself disqualified as a tax sale purchaser, the tax sale will be set aside upon the
grounds of fraud.12 If the purchaser is a close relative of the delinquent
(2d) 62, 126 A. L. R. 853 (ig3g). Contra: Callihan v. Russell, 66 W. Va. 524, 66 S. E.
695, 26 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1176 (igog). A purchasing co-remainderman may hold to the
exclusion of other remaindermen. Jinkiaway v. Ford, 93 Kan. 797, 145 Pac. 885, L. R.
A. 1915 E, 343 (gs5). Contra: Patty v. Payne, 178 Iowa 593, 159 N .W. 1o12 (1916).
See Note (1949) 2 Fla. L. Rev. 94.

2For example, an agent whose duty it is to pay the taxes cannot become a
purchaser for himself of his principal's land at tax sale. Lamborn v. County Commissioners, 97 U. S. 181, 24 L. ed. 926 (1877); Blake v. O'Neal, 63 W. Va. 483, 61
S. E. 410, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1147 (19o8). The distinguishing factor in this group of
cases is the fiduciary relationship with the delinquent taxpayer which the purchaser occupies. "Then there is the class of persons occupying fiduciary relationships, such as agents, attorneys, guardians, trustees, etc., who may not violate their
trust by becoming purchasers at tax sale of the trust property." Teget v. Lambach,
226 Iowa 1346, 286 N. IV. 522, 525, 123 A. L. R. 392, 397 (1939). Dohms v. Mann,
76 Iowa 723, 39 N. W. 823 (1888) (tax sale to guardian, followed by assignment of
title to third party, conveys no interest which is adverse to ward whose property
was sold); Gaffney v. Harmon, 405 Ill. 273, 90 N. E. (2d) 785, 2o A. L. R. (2d) 1273
(1950) (attorney cannot buy and hold'for himself his client's real estate sold at

tax sale).
2-The weight of authority sustains the proposition that one under a legal or
moral obligation to pay the taxes upon real estate which he has deliberately or
negligently allowed to be sold for nonpayment of taxes may not add to or strengthen
his title by subsequently purchasing the tax title from a stranger who acquired the
premises at a tax sale. Moss v. Shear, 25 Cal. 38, 45, 85 Am. Dec. 94, 96 (1864):
"Otherwise, he would be allowed to gain an advantage from his own fraud or
negligence in failing to pay the taxes. This the law does not permit, either directly or indirectly." Accord, Hanna v. Palmer, 194 Ill. 41, 61 N. E. 1051, 56 L. R. A.
93 (igoi) (tenant for life who allowed premises to be sold at tax sale cannot acquire tax title by purchase from another so as to prevent sale for benefit of her
deceased husband's creditors after her death); Lloyd v. Lynch, 28 Pa. 419, 70 Am.
Dec. 137 (1857) (co-tenant who takes assignment of tax title before period for redemption has expired receives no independent title as against other tenants); Battin
v. Woods, 27 W. Va. 58 (1885). See Duson v. Roos, 123 La. 835, 49 So. 59o, 592, 131
Am. St. Rep. 375, 380 (1909) (remanded on issue of laches, but dictum sustains
proposition that co-tenant who purchased tax title to common property could not
acquire title adverse to other tenants). These cases base their findings upon the
theory that what the party under a legal or moral obligation to pay the taxes cannot
do directly he should not be allowed to do indirectly. The element of collusion seems
unimportant: "In each of these cases the tax title came through a third person,
without collusion, but the court deemed that fact utterly immaterial." Finch v.
Noble, 49 Wash. 578, 96 Pac. 3, 4, 126 Am. St. Rep. 880, 882 (19o8) (vendee under
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taxpayer, the courts will examine the tax sale transaction to see if the
purchasing relative was under a moral obligation to pay the taxes
or was acting as the strawman or agent for the delinquent taxpayer.
If the court can find that either condition exists, the tax sale will be
nullified.' 3 It is often stated positively that a tax sale purchase by the
contract of sale cannot assert tax title which he acquired from stranger against
his vendor).
However, the cases divide when the claimant under the tax title, although he
had an interest in or lien upon the real estate, was under no legal or moral obligation to pay the taxes thereon, and there is no evidence of collusion between
the claimant and the purchaser at the tax sale. In Koch v. Kiron State Bank, 23o
Iowa 206, 297 N. W. 450, 14o A. L. R. 273 (1941), noted in (1941) 27 Iowa L. Rev.
159, the evidence was held to be sufficient to prove that the purchaser at the tax
sale took the deed as a subterfuge and solely for the purpose of reconveying to
a person who, under Iowa decisions, could not take an unencumbered tax deed
directly, although such person was under no legal or moral duty to pay the taxes.
Accordingly, the lien of a senior lienholder reattached to the premises. However,
the court went on to declare that, even in the absence of fraud or collusion, the
disqualified party in interest could not acquire a valid tax title from a stranger. This
dictum has been criticized in an Iowa Law Review Note, where it was argued that
the rule should be limited to those cases wherein the defaulting taxpayer (under
a legal and moral obligation to pay the taxes) is the claimant under a tax title. See
Note (1941) 27 Iowa L. Rev. 159 at 161-163, for leading cases adopting and rejecting the distinction for which the Note argues. The difficulty could perhaps be resolved by simply holding in all cases that if the claimant could not acquire a valid
tax title directly he may not do so indirectly .
Of course, if there is evidence of collusion and inequitable conduct, the court
will render the tax title invalid irrespective of any legal or moral duty on the part
of the claimant to see that the taxes were paid, if the claimant could not have
purchased directly. Hawkeye Life Ins. Co. v. Valley-Des Moines Co., 220 Iowa 556,
260 N. W. 669, io5 A. L. R. 1o18 (1935); Brooks v. Garner, 20 Okla. 236, 94 Pac.
694, 97 Pac. 995 (19o8). This is true even where the purchasing representative
has not conveyed the legal title acquired at the tax sale to his disqualified principal.
Clermont-Minneola Country Club v. Coupland, io6 Fla. 111, 143 So. 133, 84 A. L.
R. 1354 (1932).

"2In the following cases, tax sales to close relatives of delinquent taxpayers
have been rendered void on the theory that the purchasers were under a legal or
moral obligation to see that the taxes were paid: Hudson v. Marlin, 196 Ark. 1070,
121 S. W. (2d) 91 (1938) (disqualified relative had occupied premises with mortgagors and had received benefits therefrom); Charles E. Gibson Co. v. Elze, 88 Colo.
181, 293 Pac. 958 (193o) (disqualified daughter had lived with parents, had paid
taxes in past out of fund of her own money and that of her parents, and had
managed the real estate for her parents); Buffum v. Lytle, 66 Fla. 355, 63 So. 717
(1913) (although court suspected fraud between disqualified son and aged father,
it did not so find, but based disqualification on son's obligation to support father
and to manage realty); Bereman v. Grant, 195 Okla. 330, 157 P. (2d) 743 (1945);
Salts v. Salts, 28 Tenn. App. 318, 19o S. W. (2d) 188 (1945) (son had interest in the
land as heir of deceased and moral obligation to protect interests therein of his
other close relatives).
In other cases, tax sales have been rendered void because of fraud and collusion
between the relatives: Bryan v. Knox, 138 Fla. 452, 189 So. 700 (1939) (record con-

clusively showed that mortgagor's daughter procured tax deed for use and benefit of
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spouse or close relative of one whose interest would prevent him from
acquiring a valid tax title is void, the money paid therefor operating
to discharge the tax obligation and leaving the title in the same condition as before the purported tax sale. 14 However, the recent Oklahoma case of Crane v. Taylor'5 represents a line of authority that a
showing of close family relationship between the tax sale purchaser and
the tax delinquent, without more evidence of a moral obligation
upon the part of the purchaser to pay the taxes or of collusion between the relatives to defeat other parties in interest, is insufficient
to defeat the tax title of the purchasing relative.
In the Crane case, plaintiff sued to quiet his alleged title to the
oil, gas, and other minerals underlying the parcel in question from the
effect of a tax sale deed to defendant, whose father had previously
acquired the real estate by a warranty deed which reserved from the
grant the minerals underlying the parcel. Plaintiff became record owner
of the reserved estate before instituting suit. The agreed statement of
facts showed that seventeen years prior to the decision by the Oklahoma appellate court, the parcel had been sold to the county for nonpayment of taxes, and one month later defendant purchased the tax
sale certificate from the county. At the time, she was the adult, single
daughter of the man in whose name the parcel had been assessed for ad
valorem taxes under an Oklahoma statute providing for a single assessment of the land and all mines and minerals thereunder. 6 It was
shown that her father would have been able to pay the delinquent
taxes on the land at the time of the sale. Defendant and her father
lived in the family home, but not on the parcel in question. Thereafter, defendant made application for a tax deed, which was issued
after plaintiff had been served with notice, as provided by statute.' 7
For over ten years tenants of defendant had been in open possession of
the premises. About four years before this decision, defendant had
received a quit-claim deed from her parents. When plaintiff sought
mortgagor); Adams v. Snyder, 137 Kan. 365, 2o P. (2d) 827 (1933) (conspirators were
father and son-in-law, realty had been mortgaged); Brooks v. Garner, 2o Okla. 236,
94 Pac. 694, 97 Pac. 995 (19o8); Fuller v. Edens, 7o W. Va. 248, 73 S. E. 821 (1912)
(husband conveyed to father of his second wife real estate of his first wife, now deceased, to which he had obtained tax deed, and father-in-law conveyed tax title to
second wife.)
"Rothwell v. Dewees, 67 U. S. 613, 17 L. ed. 3o9 (1862) (applying federal common law); Robinson v. Lewis, 68 Miss. 69, 8 So. 258, 1o L. R. A. 1o (189o); Laton
v. Balcom, 64 N. H. 92, 6 AtI. 37, io Am. St. Rep. 381 (1886).
",261 P. (2d) 587 (Okla. 1953). Accord, Nagle v. Tieperman, 74 Kan. 32, 85 Pac.
941 (19o6), 88 Pac. 969, 9 L. R. A. (N. s.) 674 (19o7).
"GSee
note i, supra.
17Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) Tit. 68, § 451.
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the cancellation of defendant's tax deed on the sole ground that defendant was incapable of purchasing a tax title to plaintiff's prejudice,
the trial court granted judgment for plaintiff which cancelled defendant's tax deed insofar as the mineral estate was concerned. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma reversed, and gave directions
to enter judgment for defendant.
The court concluded that the evidence disclosed no moral obligation on the part of defendant to pay the taxes. It discounted the family relationship as "unimportant except insofar as it may be evidence
tending to prove the moral obligation."' 8 Beyond the bare relationship, there were no other factors which would create the obligation to
pay. The daughter had no authority to act for her father in business matters, and plaintiff admitted that the father had been financially able to pay the taxes at the time of the sale.
The conclusion that defendant was under no moral obligation to
pay the taxes is in harmony with the Oklahoma decisions. In a prior
case, 19 the Oklahoma court had declared that evidence that the purchasing relative, prior to the sale, had lived on the parcel with the
relative in interest, had received benefits from the land, had transacted the tax delinquent's business, and had previously paid the
taxes on the parcel constituted a sufficient showing of a fiduciary relationship between the two relatives which would morally obligate
the purchaser to see that the taxes were paid. Other jurisdictions are
in accord with the Oklahoma view that this amount of evidence would
show the obligation, although several courts have concluded that
fiduciary incapacity may be satisfactorily demonstrated with less evidence.20 In the principal case, plaintiff failed to establish a single one
of these factors. If defendant had generally represented her father, such
evidence would not be so difficult to obtain that the courts should imply such a fiduciary relationship merely from the fact that a family
relationship exists between the two.
However, in the prior decision 2 ' here relied on, the Oklahoma court
had stated that while a showing of the above factors will support a
finding that the purchasing relative was under a moral obligation
to pay the taxes and therefore was disqualified from purchasing, such
evidence was not enough to establish a fraudulent conspiracy between
the two relatives so as to render the tax sale void. In view of this de28261 P. (2d) 587, 589 (Okla. 1953).
"Bereman v. Grant, 195 Okla. 33o, 157 P. (2d) 743 (1945) (purchasing relative
was 20
former owner's son).
See cases cited in note 13, supra.
-Bereman v. Grant, 195 Okla. 3o, 157 P. (2d) 743 at 744 (1945).
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cision, the finding in the principal case that plaintiff's petition contained no allegation of, nor did the proof establish any fraud, collusion,
or inequitable conduct between defendant and her father is not surprising, since plaintiff's evidence in the principal case was much
weaker. However, the court goes beyond the evidence and infers that
defendant could not have acted in bad faith because plaintiff had
admitted that he was properly served with legal notice of defendant's
application for a tax deed. Since the notice to plaintiff was a statutory
prerequisite to defendant's obtaining the tax deed, satisfying that requirement does not necessarily show that she was acting in good faith
rather than in furtherance of a scheme with her father to acquire the
title to the reserved mineral estate for her father's benefit. Futhermore,
in stressing the fact that plaintiff had the privilege of protecting his
interest by paying the real estate taxes, with a lien upon the surface
freehold for reimbursement of the taxes which defendant's father
should have paid, thereby preventing the tax sale and saving his own
estate, the Oklahoma court has lost sight of the fact that plaintiff
was under no legal duty to pay the taxes. Thus, the court seems to be
penalizing plaintiff for failing to assume the risk of saving the surface
estate of freehold for defendant's father. In any event, plaintiff's failure
to exercise his privilege should not excuse the fraud of others.
Actual testimony and documentary evidence which would be conclusive enough for a court to rule that a fraudulent conspiracy between
the two relatives in fact existed would be very difficult for a party
in plaintiff's position to obtain. Only those engaging in the conspiracy would be witnesses to the fraud and they obviously would deny
its existence.
Even though plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence for the
court to conclude that defendant should be precluded from obtaining
a tax title because a fiduciary relationship existed between defendant
and her father, the courts which indicate that a showing of family relationship is sufficient to defeat the tax title upon the theory of fraud
would have affirmed plaintiff's judgment below. 2 2 Recognizing the
-In fact, the Oklahoma court has now apparently overlooked some of the
statements which it made in the leading Oklahoma case affirming the principle
that one under a moral or legal obligation to pay the taxes on real estate cannot
buy the property in at a tax sale, either in person or indirectly through the
agency of another: "In order for the plaintiffs in error to have prevailed in this
cause, it was necessary that Mrs. Scarborough's [grantee of tax deed who was alleged
to have engaged in a conspiracy with her brother, the delinquent taxpayer, in
order to defeat claim of an adversary] title be shown to have been clear and free
from fraud, purchased by her, in good faith, without notice, and for a valuable
consideration." Brooks v. Garner, 2o Okla. 236, 97 Pac. 995, 996 (19o8). The Okla-

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XI

equitable nature of the relief sought, these courts have been more
sensitive to the needs of a party in plaintiff's position when he is confronted with the possibility of inequitable conduct between two relatives with sealed lips. 23 A presumption of fraudulent conduct between
two relatives, such as defendant and her father, does not cast upon
them a burden so great that they cannot overcome it, if they did not
act unconscionably, by submitting facts which will explain their conduct. The family relationship which plaintiff demonstrated does give
rise to certain affirmative inferences which a court of equity should
not discount in a situation where proof of collusion is difficult to obtain. Certainly the relationship indicates that a close confidential
course of dealing between father and daughter was possible. In addition, a motive for collusion was present, which could only arise as the
result of the family relationship, since plaintiff's mineral estate stood
in the way of full ownership of the parcel by defendant's family.
Lastly, while plaintiff's admission that the father could have paid
the delinquent taxes at the time of the sale might be evidence that
defendant was under no moral or legal obligation as a fiduciary to
pay taxes, nevertheless it indicates that the father failed to pay the
taxes for a reason other than financial inability. It is suggested that
the Oklahoma court could have more carefully examined the reason,
homa court concluded that the refusal of Mrs. Scarborough to testify raised the
presumption that the fact had not been proved and did not exist. The Brooks case
apparently stands for the principle that where an instrument is assailed on the
ground of fraud, the law places the burden of proof as to good faith upon the
party claiming under the instrument.
Contrast the following statements from the Brooks case with the present attitude
of the Oklahoma court in the Crane and Bereman cases: "The circumstances surrounding the parties, the relationship existing between them, their subsequent
conduct, may demand higher and more convincing evidence of the fact of consideration than would be if no relationship existed between them, if there were no
circumstances surrounding them exciting just suspicion, and their subsequent
conduct was consistent only with a fair sale and conveyance for a real consideration" [citing Harrell v. Mitchell, 61 Ala. 270, 281 (1878)]. "This condition is particularly true in cases where the question of good faith is involved. The plaintiff,
by reason of this inherent situation, lacks the power of delving into the minds of
the parties and drawing forth physical evidence of the evil motives of his adversaries; .... "2o Okla. 2S6, 94 Pac. 694, 701-702 (19o8).
2Robinson v. Lewis, 68 Miss. 69, 8 So. 258, 259, io L. R. A. iol, io2-1o3 (i89o):
"But the rule is founded upon considerations of public policy, and conclusively
imputes to the one, as derived from the other, knowledge of those facts the existence of which precludes the other from action. The opportunities that would
be afforded for fraudulent practices would be so numerous, and the difficulty of
exposing them so great, that courts apply the doctrine of estoppel to both, and
thus close the door that offers the temptation." Also, Brooks v. Garner, 20 Okla.
236, 97 Pac. 995 (igo8), quoted in note 22, supra.
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where plaintiff has clearly demonstrated that a fraud might have been
committed.
The policy on the part of the sovereign to grant unencumbered tax
titles in order to recover the maximum amount of deliquent taxes
will not be adversely affected by a greater degree of sensitivity on the
part of the courts to possible fraudulent conduct between relatives.
In fact, strict application of the principles outlined by the Oklahoma
court would seriously diminish the marketability of stratified interests in land, since the owner of subsurface minerals would be uncertain of protection from frauds perpetrated at tax sales by the owners
of the surface freeholds.
MARVIN

H.

ANDERSON

PROPERTY-VALIDITY UNDER RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES OF LEASE
FOR OVER TWENTY-ONE YEARS WITH PURCHASE OPTION IN LESSEE.

[XVest Virginia]
Though the Rule against Perpetuities was incorporated into the
common law nearly three centuries ago,' the policy which gave rise to
it is still a basic factor in modern real property law. With a purpose of
preventing the remote vesting of future interests2 and thereby of
thwarting one of the methods utilized to remove land from commerce,
the familiar rule declares that: "No interest is good unless it must vest,
if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the
creation of the interest."3 It is well settled that the period permitted
for the vesting of an interest is simply twenty-one years when there is
no preceding life to which the twenty-one years may be attached.4 In
order to escape destruction, an interest must be certain to vest within
the prescribed period; probability of vesting is not sufficient. 5 After
it is determined that the Rule applies to a given situation, then the
future interest is rendered void ab initio. The Rule is a preemptory
'Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Gas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1681) was the origin
of a limitation on the length of time in which an interest could validly continue
without vesting. However, the precise limits of the period were not established
until 1833 in the case of Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372, 131 Eng. Rep. 859 (1833).
-Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (4 th ed. 1942) § 6o3..
3Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (4th ed. 1942) § 201.
12 Tiffany, Real Property (3rd. ed. 1939) § 399.
5In re Steele's Estate, 124 Cal. 533, 57 Pac. 564 (1899); Linck v. Plankerhorn, 286
Pa. 319, 133 Ad. 51o (1926); Prichard v. Prichard, 91 W. Va. 398, 113 S. E. 256 (1922);
Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (4th ed. 1942) § 214.
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command of law not one of construction;6 thus, it is not used to determine intention but rather to defeat it.
Notwithstanding the long operation of the Rule in Anglo-American
law, the question of the scope of its application is still frequently presented to the courts. The recent West Virginia case of First Huntington National Bank v. Gideon-Broh Realty Co. 7 is one of the rare
instances in which American courts have been confronted with the
problem of whether the Rule against Perpetuities applies to the interest created by a lease for over twenty-one years with an option in the
lessee to purchase the property at the end of the lease. The owner of
four city lots executed an instrument which purported to "grant,
demise and lease" the lots to defendant's assignor for twenty-eight
years with an option to purchase at the expiration of that period.
The sum of twelve hundred dollars a year, divided into monthly installments, was to be paid throughout the twenty-eight years, after
which, upon the payment of one additional dollar, the title was to
vest in the lessee or his successors in interest. The action here was for
a declaration of rights and obligations under this instrument, plaintiffs,
trustees under the will of the owner, contending that they are under
no obligation to convey and defendants claiming a right to a conveyance of the fee title. The first issue which the court thought necessary to resolve was the nature of the interest granted in the agreement. The majority ruled that the instrument created a lease for
twenty-eight years with an option to purchase at the termination of
that period, but the dissenting judges regarded the instrument as a
contract for the present sale of property under which the purchase
money was to be paid throughout a period of twenty-eight years. The
the dissenters took the position that under their interpretation of
the transaction, the Rule against Perpetuities should not apply to
defendant's interest because it was already vested,8 and the Rule applies exclusively to contingent future interests. 9 However, in the ma'Equitable Trust Co. v. Snader, 17 Del. Ch. 203, 152 At. 712 (193o); Johnston v.
Cosby, 374 Ill. 407, 29 N. E. (2d) 6o8 (194o); Andrews v. Lincoln, 95 Me. 541, 50
At. 898 (19Ol); Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (4th ed. 1942) § 629.
779 S. E. (2d) 675 (W. Va. 1953).
First Huntington Nat. Bank v. Gideon-Broh Realty Co., 79 S. E. (2d) 675 at 688
(W. Va. 1953). The dissent reasoned that the instrument as a whole, as distinguished from isolated words or phrases, showed the intention of entering a contract of sale. Thus, it followed that the conveyees had a vested equitable title in
the land and such an interest would not be within the Rule against Perpetuities.
However, the majority of the court held that the conveyee did not acquire an
equitable or legal title, but only an equitable interest which, upon the performance of certain conditions, might ripen into a legal title.
"Andrews v. Lincoln, 95 Me. 541, 5o At.

Perpetuities (4 th ed. 1942) § 4.

898 (19ol); Gray, The Rule Against
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jority opinion, it is implied, though not decided, that even if the
parties intended a contract of sale, the grant would be struck down
by the Rule. 10 Construed as a lease with an option to purchase, the
instrument was held to create in the grantee an interest in the land
and therefore fell within the Rule,:" which rendered the interest
void ab initio. Consequently, plaintiffs were under no legal compulsion
to convey the title upon the payment of one dollar.
Though authority on the specific point in issue is scarce, it is
generally conceded that the Rule against Perpetuities applies to a
similar transaction involving an option in a deed giving the grantee
the right to purchase other property of the grantor, if the option is
exercisable beyond the period of the Rule. 12 Such an agreement infringes upon the present estate in possession in the land under the
option both by discouraging the possessor from improving the land
and by deterring anyone from purchasing it. By striking down these
options as void for remoteness, the courts preserve the value of the
land for development or alienation. The leading decision on the
subject is the English case of London & S. W. R. Co. v. Gomm,13 from
which Gray drew authority for the statement that: "Where... a contract raises an equitable right in property which the obligee can enforce in chancery by a decree for specific performance, such equitable
right is subject to the Rule against Perpetuities."' 4 That case ruled that
an option to purchase land creates such an equitable interest as to
fall within the Rule. The American decisions' 5 echo the holding of
"°First Huntington Nat. Bank v. Gideon-Broh Realty Co., 79 S. E. (2d) 675 at
686 (W. Va. 1953). Supporting this view see Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities
(.ith
ed. 1942) § 33o, n. 2: "An agreement for sale is not void because it does not
expressly limit the time within which the agreement is to be carried out. The vendee has an equitable interest, subject only to the condition that the price shall be
paid, which must be done within a reasonable time, and that would be less than
twenty-one years ....
But an agreement which gives the vendee the right to call for a
conveyance only on fulfillment of a condition which may be too remote, is unenforceable in equity ....
And it seems that if the right to a conveyance were postponed to a remote certain date, the agreement would likewise be invalid, even
though the price had been paid and there was no unfulfilled condition except the
lapse of time."
"See London & S. W. R. Co. v. Gomm, 2o Ch. D. 562, 581 (1882).
'2Eastman Marble Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., 236 Mass. 138, 128 N. E. 177
(192o); Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92 At. 312 (i914); Skeen v. Clinchfield Coal
Corp., 137 Va. 397, 119 S.E. 89 (1923); Starcher Bros. v. Duty, 61 W. Va. 371, 56
S. E. 527 (19o7); London &S. W. R. Co. v. Gomm, 2o Ch. D. 562 (1882).
132o Ch. D. 562 (1882).
"Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (4th ed. 1942) § 33o.
I-Eastman Marble Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., 236 Mass. 138, 128 N. E. 177
(1920); Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92 At. 312 (1914); Skeen v. Clinchfield Coal
Corp., 137 Va. 397, ii9 S. E. 89 (1923); Starcher Bros. v. Duty, 61 W. Va. 371, 56
S. E. 527 (1907).
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the Gomm case, but it must be kept in mind that these cases deal
only with options held by strangers to the title.
When, as in the principal case, the holder of the option is not
a stranger to the title, the situation may involve a remoteness in vesting which falls within the literal words of the Rule, 16 but its application is not easily justified on the basis of the policy against restraint on
the use and sale of land. Thus, where the lessee is the holder of an
option to purchase the leased property he is safe in improving the land
as he knows that his tenure is secure under his option to purchase and
that there is no stranger-optionee who might deprive him of the improved property. 17 It is to be noted that the courts of both England
and the United States hold that options for an indefinite period to
renew leases are valid,' 8 the Rule against Perpetuities being regarded
as inapplicable even though the interest created falls within the letter
of the Rule. These decisions are said to create an exception to the
Rule for which it is difficult to find logical justification, 19 unless it
be on the tenuous theory that the covenant to renew is part of the
lessee's present interest and this right is not subject to a condition precedent. 20 In regard to the applicability of the Rule against Perpetuities,
it is difficult to perceive any legal difference between an option in
the lessee to renew a lease and an option in the lessee to purchase
the leased premises. There is as much of a present interest in one
situation as in the other, and in each case the option, being exercisable
by one not a stranger to the title, is equally compatible with the
policy of keeping land free for alienation and improvement. Those
who feel the interest under the purchase-option should be voided
"The English authority on the question holds also that the Rule against
Perpetuities is applicable if the option to purchase is possessed by a person not a
stranger to the title. Rider v. Ford, [1923] 1 Oh. 541; Woodall v. Clifton, [1905] 2
Ch. 257.
'-Keogh v. Peck, 316 Ill. 318, 147 N. E. 266 at 270 (1925); Leach, Perpetuities in
a Nutshell (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 638, 661; Abbot, Leases and the Rule Against
Perpetuities (1918) 27 Yale L. J. 878, 886.
IVokins v. McGaughey, 2o6 Ky. 42, 266 S. W. 907, 39 A. L. R. 275 (1924);
Nichols v. Day, 128 Miss. 756, 91 So. 451 (1922); Thaw v. Gaffney, 75 V. Va. 229,
83 S. E. 983, 3 A. L. R. 495 ('914); See Rider v. Ford, [1923] 1 Ch. 541, 546; Woodall v. Clifton, [i9o5]

2 Ch. 257,
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' 9Woodwall v. Clifton, [19o5] 2 Ch. 257 at 265. Explanation may be found
in the fact that such interests had already been established as valid before the
Rule was developed in the English courts.
"Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (4 th ed. 1942) §§ 230, 230.1. The argument is that a present interest exists, defeasible on the condition subsequent of the
lessee not giving proper notice or not paying a certain sum. However, it would
seem more realistic to say that a condition precedent is in existence in that the
right to renew must be affirmatively exercised within a certain time and a sum
must be paid before renewal is complete.
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by the Rule maintain that the interest under the renewal-option
is allowed to stand only because it is a well-entrenched exception
which should not be extended to other situations, or because the
covenant to renew is part of the present interest, which is not true of
an option to purchase since the present interest of the optionee is a
tenancy for years and the interest to be purchased is a fee. 2 '
In the only two American cases passing on the validity of interests
of the same nature as that involved in the principal case, the Rule
against Perpetuities was held to be inapplicable. 22 In 19o8 the Maryland Court of Appeals in Hollander v. Central Metal & Supply Co.23
held that the interest created by a lease for ninety-nine years with an
option to purchase at anytime during that period was valid. Though
the decision was rested partly on the analogy of a lease with an option
to renew, the court did admit that certain peculiar factors in the real
property law in Maryland 24 gave special support for the result of the
case and caused the relaxation of the "technical rules applicable to
such estates, for the purpose of enforcing the contracts of the parties
2
thereto." 5
Seventeen years later, the Illinois court reached the same result in
Keogh v. Peck.20 Here also it was reasoned that if an option in the
lessee to renew the lease is not void for remoteness, an option in the
lessee to purchase should not be nullified. 27 Further, the opinion was
expressed that the Rule against Perpetuities was not applicable to the
situation because "no interest in land is created in the holder of the
option by the option agreement." 28 This theory that the option gives
2

Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (4 th ed. 1942) § 230.3.
2Keogh v. Peck, 316 Ill. 318, 147 N. E. 266 (1925); Hollander v. Central Metal
& Supply Co., 109 Md. 131, 71 At. 442 (19o8). The American cases of Prout v.
Roby, 15 Wall. 471, 21 L. ed. 58 (1872) and Blakeman v. Miller, 136 Cal. 138, 68
Pac. 587 (19o) dealt with leases followed by options to purchase, but the former
made no mention of the Rule and the latter was decided under a special statute.
23iog Md. 131, 71 At. 442 (19o8).
"The system of leasing land with the lessee having the option to purchase
the fee was introduced in Maryland in colonial times and became widely accepted.
Titles to property of great value are held under this type lease throughout the
entire state. This system does not seem to have been widely adopted in any other
state.
'-Hollander v. Central Metal & Supply Co., iog Md. 131, 71 At. 442, 447 (1908).
-316 Ill. 318, 147 N. E. 266 (1925).
-In considering this point the West Virginia court in the principal case decided
that renewal options were exceptions to the general rule and that the exception
had no logical justification. First Huntington Nat. Bank v. Gideon-Broh Realty Co.,
79 S. E. (2d) 675 at 686 (W. Va. 1953).
2Keogh v. Peck, 316 11. 318, 147 N. E. 266, 271 (1925). The holder of the option
has a right to obtain an interest in the land" upon the fulfillment of certain conditions. The court seemed to believe that the option is a personal interest as opposed to a property interest.
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the optionee no interest in land has met with criticism, 29 but if it is correct, then the Rule would not apply.
The practical argument, advanced to supplement these theoretical
arguments in favor of sustaining the purchase-option, that such arrangements do not violate the policy behind the Rule against Perpetuities to prevent the full use and free alienation of land, is open
to two partial answers. First, it can be demonstrated that recognition
of the validity of a lease for over twenty-one years with option to
purchase would open the way for the use of a conveyancing device
which would in fact contravene the policy of the Rule against Perpetuities. For example: A, owner in fee, could lease to B for a term
of thirty years with an option to purchase at a fixed price at any time
before the end of the term. B could then lease back to A for twentyeight years. Consequently, A could continue in occupancy of the premises for twenty-eight years, achieving the same result as if A had given
B only a bare option to purchase the fee at any time within a twentyeight year period. By such arrangements, speculators would be able to
tie up large quantities of land at a very small cost.30 However, it is
to be noted that the same practical result could be reached, even if purchase-options in long leases are held to be too remote, by the device of
leasing lands for a period of twenty years with the lessee having the
option to purchase anytime during that period and with a further
covenant "for an indefinite series of renewal leases, each containing
a similar option." 3 ' A second argument in support of the principal
case is that since the prohibition against remoteness in vesting is a rule
of law and not one of construction, it should be applied to all situations coming within its literal bounds, regardless of whether underlying policy considerations are served. However, there seems to be
little justification for such rigid adherence to even so ancient a rule
unless the original purpose of the Rule is served. Since the law permits leases for terms which exceed the period of the Rule, it is desirable that the lessee be protected in his improvement of the land
by being accorded the opportunity to become owner of the improve'Note (1925) 35 Yale L. J. 213, 219, 'n.31, argues that the authority cited
by the court in the Keogh case does not seem to sustain its contention. In Gall v.
Stoll, 259 Ill. 174, 102 N. E. 225 (1913), cited by the Illinois court and discussed
in the Yale Law Journal Note, it was held that no title is vested in the purchaser
of land by virtue of a contract to convey to the purchaser upon his making certain
specified payments. Title does not vest until those payments are made. That is
different from saying the holder of an option has no interest in land.
3Brief for Appellees, pp. 86, 87, First Huntington Nat. Bank v. Gideon-Broh
Realty Co., 79 S. E. (2d) 675 (W. Va. 1953).
"3Abbot,Leases and the Rule against Perpetuities (1918) 27 Yale L. J. 878, 889.
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ments at his own option. In such case the land is no more inalienable
than it would be under a lease for a period greater than that established by the Rule with option to renew the lease term. In both instances the marketability of the reversion is hindered by the uncertainty
of whether the option will be exercised. Thus, it would seem that the
Maryland and Illinois courts have obtained a better result than the
principal case, though their reasoning is somewhat devious. A better
procedure might be candidly to recognize another exception to the
Rule against Perpetuities, under which a lessee for more than twentyone years can validly be accorded an option to purchase the leasehold
property.
JOHN

F.

KAY, JR.

SALES-RIGHT OF VENDEE To RECOVER DOWN PAYMENT AFTER DEFAULTING ON CONTRACT To PURCHASE GOODS. [Federal]

A survey of American decisions discloses the reluctance of courts
to accord relief in any form to the defaulting vendee of a contract for
the sale of chattels.' The general rule applicable to the purchaser in
default who seeks a recovery of his advance payment on the contract
price was succinctly stated by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Hansbroughv. Peck:2 ".... no rule in respect to the contract is better settled than this: That the party who has advanced money, or done
an act in part-performance of the agreement, and then stops short and
refuses to proceed to its ultimate conclusion, the other party being
ready and willing to proceed and fulfil all his stipulations according
to the contract, will not be permitted to recover back what has thus
been advanced or done." Thus, regardless of the extent or cause of the
'Tomboy Gold & Copper Co. v. Marks, 185 Cal. 336, 197 Pac. 94 (1921) (sale of
120 Colo. 253, 208 P. (2d) 1159, 11 A. L. R.
(2d) 690 (1949) (sale of sheep); Foss-Hughes Co. v. Norman, 32 Del. 1o8, 119 Atl.
854 (1923) (sale of motor vehicle); Gibbons v. Hayden, 3 Kan. App. 38, 44 Pac. 445
(1896) (sale of hay); Lizak v. Rottenbucher, 14o N. J. Eq. 76, 53 A. (2d) 362 (1947)
(sale of tavern business with furniture and fixtures); Genovese v. Lenobel, 154 Misc.
91, 275 N. Y. Supp. 521 (1934) (sale of new automobile); Livesley v. Strauss, 104 Ore.
356, 2o6 Pac. 85o (1922) (sale of hops); Atlantic City Tire & Rubber Corp. v. Southwark Foundry & Machine Co., 289 Pa. 569, 137 Atl. 807 (1927) (sale of vulcanizing machinery).
272 U. S. 497, 5o6, 18 L. ed. 520, 523 (1866). Although the Hansbrough case
involved a sale of real property, it is often quoted in cases involving personal property. Thach v. Durham, 12o Colo. 253, 208 P. (2d) 1159 at i61, 1163, 11 A. L. R.
(2d) 690 at 699 (1949); Atlantic City Tire & Rubber Corp. v. Southwark Foundry
& Machine Co., 289 Pa. 569, 137 Atl. 807 at 809 (1927).

milling machine); Thach v. Durham,
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breach,3 or of the fact that the vendor later sold the goods to a third
party,4 the courts usually persist in their adherence to the principle
that the vendor is entitled to retain any down payments made by the
defaulting vendee. Support for this view is derived from the policy
that the law should encourage the performance of contracts, 5 and
from the principle that a man should not be permitted, in a court of
justice, to take advantage of his own wrong or neglect. 6 It is reasoned
that if the defaulting vendee be allowed to recover the money advanced
by him as a down payment on the contract price, then any vendee
who makes a bad bargain and later regrets it may wilfully breach his
agreement and receive legal approval for the act in the form of recovering the amount of the down payment less the damages incurred
by the seller.7 Therefore, allowing such recovery to the defaulting
buyer would have "a tendency to encourage the violation of contracts-to diminish, in the minds of contracting parties, a sense of the
8
obligation which rests upon them to perform their agreements."
Recognizing the harsh and inequitable consequences of the general
rule in certain instances where the breach is slight or unintentional, the
courts of some jurisdictions have modified the traditional subservience
to this doctrine by finding exceptions to the rule and allowing restitution in those exceptional situations. A few courts have been able to
avoid the general rule entirely by allowing restitution to the defaulting
purchaser on the convenient finding of a rescission of the agreement
35 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1937) 4127: "Recovery has been allowed in
some cases, but it would probably be more commonly denied, and no emphasis
placed upon the reason why the plaintiff had made the default, whether it involved willfulness or merely misfortunes as unexpected as those of Antonio in
the Merchant of Venice." Also Porreca v. Freeman, 117 F. (2d) 326 (C. C. A. 3rd,
1941); Wynroth v. Pirman, 267 App. Div. 258, 45 N. Y. S. (2d) 5o8 (1943); Helm v.
Rone, 43 Okla. 137, 141 Pac. 678, 679: "The rule is, without exception, that where
a party advances money in part performance of an executory contract, he cannot
recover the money paid."
'Arkelian v. National Bank of Visalia, 1o3 Cal. App. 764, 284 Pac. 933 (1930);
Tomboy Gold & Copper Co. v. Marks, 185 Cal. 336, 197 Pac. 94 (1921); Ashbrook
v. Hite, 9 Ohio St. 357, 75 Am. Dec. 468 (1856); Dluge v. Whitesome, 292 Pa.

o

334, 141 Ad. 230 (1928); Neis v. O'Brien, 12 Wash. 358, 41 Pac. 59, 5 Am. St. Rep.
894 (1895).

5"It is the duty of the court to enforce the performance of contracts, not to
encourage their violation." Levine v. Reynolds, 143 Me. 15, 54 A. (2d) 514, 519
(1947)-

6Rounds v. Baxter, 4 Me. 454 (1827); Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Installments Paid (1931) 40 Yale L. J. 1013, 1o14; Note
(1954) 38 Minn. L. Rev. 172.
7
Ketchum v. Evertson, 13 Johns. 359, 7 Am. Dec. 384 (N. Y. I8x6).
gWitherow v. Witherow, 16 Ohio 238, 242 (1847).
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after the purchaser's breach.9 Such a rescission may be mutual, consisting of a valid offer and acceptance, 10 or it may be by the unilateral
act of the vendor, as where the vendor sells the goods or notifies the
purchaser that the contract has been terminated." Several other devices have been employed to mitigate the severity of the legal consequences of the purchaser's default. Thus, where the purchaser has
substantially conformed to the terms of the contract and his ensuing
breach is not deliberate, he may be allowed to recover from the vendor
the amount of his advance payment less the amount of damages suffered by the vendor as a result of the breach.' 2 Similarly, in cases in
which the vendee has given the deposit as security for his future performance of the agreement, it has been held that he is entitled to the
return of his deposit less the amount of actual damages incurred by
the vendor from the breach of contract.' 3 By the application of the concept of the divisibility of contracts, the courts are sometimes able to
mitigate the rigors of the general rule by subdividing the contract
into a series of contracts, each calling for a definite unit of payment for
4
a definite amount of performance.'
05 Corbin, Contracts (1951) § 1131. Accord: Seekins v. King, 66 R. I. 105, 17
A. (2d) 869, 134 A. L. R. io6o (1941); Dooley v. Stillson, 46 R. I. 332, 128 Atl. 217,
52 A. L. R. 1505 (1925).
"OKing v. Seebeck, 20 Idaho 223, 118 Pac. 292 (1911); Evangelista v. Antonio De
Cubellis, 85 A. (2d) 69 (R. I. 1951); Dooley v. Stillson, 46 R. I. 332, 128 At. 217, 52
A. L. R. 1505 (1925) (Plaintiff, in possession of the farm with all the personal
property thereon, was unable to complete payments. The property was returned to
defendant-vendor who resold the farm to another without loss. It was held to be
a question for the jury whether there was a rescission indicated by the acts and
intentions of the parties).
"Steiner v. Baker, ini Ala. 374, 19 So. 976 (1895); Freedman v. Rector, Wardens
8: Vesterymen of St. Mathis Parish, 27 Cal. (2d) 16, 230 P. (2d) 629 (1951); Maimberg v. Baugh, 62 Utah 331, 218 Pac. 975 (1923).

"-Thomas Haverty Co. v. Jones, 185 Cal. 285, 197 Pac. io5 (ig21); Zarthar v.
Saliba, 282 Mass. 558, 185 N. E. 367 (1933); Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 23o N. Y.
239, 129 N. E. 889 (1921). In Levine v. Reynolds, 143 Me. 15, 54 A. (2d) 514 (1947),

a buyer of cattle took part of them and paid on account more than their stated
price. He failed to take the remainder within the agreed time, and on a later demand, the seller refused delivery. If time was not of the essence, then the seller's
refusal was the only major breach. In the buyer's suit for restitution of part of
the money paid, the court treated the buyer as the only party in default and discussed "divisibility" and "entirety" of contracts. The jury verdict for the plaintiff was set aside and a new trial was ordered. It seems that this would have been
a proper case for the application of the doctrine of substantial performance.
"3Waldman v. Greenberg, 265 App. Div. 827, 37 N. Y. S. (2d) 565 (1942); Terrell, Atkins & Harvin v. Proctor, 172 S. W. 996 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
"'United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U. S. 289, 298, 62 S. Ct. 581, 587, 86
L. ed. 855, 862 (1942): "Whether a number of promises constitute one contract
or more than one is to be determined by inquiring 'whether the parties assented
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The general rule is completely disregarded in the few jurisdictions
which allow restitution to the defaulting vendee on the theory of unjust enrichment. 15 Under this view, recovery is not based upon any contractual right of the breaching party, but is founded rather upon the
equitable consideration that it is unfair for the non-breaching party to
keep the money paid by the defaulting party when the former has not
been put to the detriment of performing his part of the contract and
the latter has not received any of the benefits for which the money was
paid. 1 The application of this principle has. led to the unfortunate
result of granting restitution to a wilful defaulter, thereby tending
17
to encourage the breach of contracts.
In the recent case of Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Printing
Press & Mfg. Co.,' 8 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has taken the occasion to advocate further extension of the
contract defaulter's right to recover his down payment. Amtorg, the
Soviet purchasing agency in New York, contracted with Miehle for
the purchase of thirty printing presses especially designed to print
Russian currency. Amtorg accepted and paid for ten presses and made
a down payment on the balance. The parties applied for an exporting
license as required by Federal law, 19 but this license was denied, and
to all the promises as a single whole, so that there would have been no bargain
whatever, if any promise or set of promises were struck out' Williston on Contracts
(rev. ed) § 863...." Also Carrig v. Gilbert-Varker Corp., 314 Mass. 351, 5o N. E.
(2d) 59, 147 A. L. R. 927 (1943); Barlow Mfg. Co. v. Stone, 200 Mass. 158, 86 N. E.
306 (19o8); Englander v. Abramson-Kaplan Co., 94 N. J. L. 25, 1O9 At. 307 (1920);
Matthews v. Jenkins, 8o Va. 463 (j885).
"-Theleading case adopting this view is Hickock v. Hoyt, 33 Conn. 553 (1866).
Also, Blake v. Mosher, 11 Cal. App. (2d) 532, 54 P. (2d) 492 (1936); Wonder Products, Inc. v. Blake, 330 Mich. 159, 47 N. W. (2d) 61 (1951); Humphrey v. Sagouspe,
50 Nev. 157, 254 Pac. 1074 (1927); Breding v. Champlain Marine & Realty Co.,
io6 Vt. 288, 172 Ad. 625 (1934).
"Michigan Yacht & Power Co. v. Busch, 143 Fed. 929 (C. C. A. 6th, 19o6);
Hickock v. Hoyt, 33 Conn. 553 (1866).
" Michigan Yacht & Power Co. v. Busch, 143 Fed. 929 (C. C. A. 6th, s9o6) (buyer
of a yacht, having made down payment, refused further payments after unjustifiably
demanding that defendant give security for performance); Cherry Valley Iron
Works v. Florence Iron River Co., 64 Fed. 569 (C. C. A. 6th, 1894) (vendee of ore,
deliverable in installments, had paid for more ore than he had received, when he
unjustifiably broke his contract, apparently because of a fall in the price of ore);
McCrea v. Ford, 24 Colo. 5o6, 135 Pac. 465 (1913) (buyer of a stock of drugs, having paid $2,5oo down, repudiated the contract, erroneously claiming that he was
defrauded). In cases granting recovery, the courts fail to mention whether the
breach was wilful; but from the facts of the cases, it is often obvious that the vendee has wilfully defaulted because he had made a bad bargain.
l20o6 F. (2d) 103 (C. A. 2nd, 1953).
"On March 1, 1948, there became effective regulations 13 Fed. Reg. 1120-22 of
the Department of Commerce's Office of International Trade Pursuant to the
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Amtorg therefore refused Miehle's tender of the remaining twenty
presses. Miehle brought suit in New York for the amount of the contract price less the down payment already made. Amtorg counterclaimed for the return of its down payment, whereupon Miehle discontinued it action without prejudice to Amtorg's claim, after selling
the remaining twenty presses to the United States Bureau of Engraving and Printing for a price above that stipulated in the original contract with Amtorg.2 0 In the present action, Amtorg sued Miehle for the
return of the down payment and for the profit made by Miehle on the
resale of the twenty presses.
The Federal District Court applied New York contract law in accord with the principle of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins2l and held
that Amtorg was entitled to recover neither its advanced payment nor
the profit which accrued to Miehle by the subsequent sale of the
presses.2 2 This decision was based on the federal court's finding that
the New York law was in accord with the general rule which permits
the seller to retain the advance payment made by the defaulting purchaser as a down payment on the contract price.
On appeal, Amtorg challenged the decision of the District Court
and sought summary judgment on the grounds of (1) frustration of
contract, (2) restitution, and (3) inequitable penalty and forfeiture.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in the claim of frustration of
the contract, 23 but held that Amtorg was entitled to restitution of
the down payment minus any sum necessary to recompense Miehle for
injury suffered from Amtorg's breach, though not to the profit which
accrued to Miehle from the resale of the presses to another purchaser.
The Court of Appeals considered Section 204 of the Foreign Aid
Appropriations Act of 1949,24 and turned its decision on the conclusion

that Congress there intended to grant to American producers and exporters an interim period in which they would be protected from
losses due to the operation of the export license system, in order to
Export Control Law of 1940, 54 Stat. 714 (1940), 50 U. S. C. A. Appendix, § 7o1
(1951), as amended, barring further export of certain goods to Russia unless an

export license therefor was obtained.
Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 275 App. Div.
748, 88 N. Y. S. (2d) 271 (1949) which was discontinued in 278 App. Div. 682, 1o
N. Y. S. (2d) 493 (1951).
'3o4 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. ed. 1188 (1938).
=-1o8 F. Supp. 17o (S. D. N. Y. 1952).
=There was no impossibility of performance because the contract stated that
delivery to Amtorg was to take place in the United States. Thus, the Act requiring
an export license would not be applicable to this type of transaction.
162 Stat. 1o59 (1948), U. S. Cong. Serv. (1948) 744.
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allow them to adjust their businesses to the new regulations. It was
reasoned that Amtorg should not be denied the intended remedial
benefits under the Act since Miehle had been wholly recompensed
by profits received from the subsequent resale of the presses. The court
then went on to review the applicable New York law and concluded
that the District Court's interpretation of New York law was the
correct view of state decisions up to the time this case was decided,
but that changes effectuated in the law after those decisions indicate
that the New York court might not at present follow the traditional
rule excluding a defaulting vendee from recovery. In dealing with this
general problem, the New York Law Revision Commission, advocating departure from the general common law rule, made a complete
analysis which indicated that the courts25 have applied such mitigating
doctrines as those of substantial performance and severability of contracts in order to allow recovery to the contract defaulter in appropriate circumstances. 26 It also recognized the inconsistency in the New
York law as to the rights of different defaulting parties to a sale contract, in that Section 12527 of the Personal Property Law allows recovery for part performance by a defaulting vendor for goods retained
by the vendee, 28 while the New York courts refuse to allow recovery
nThe New York Law Revision Commision attempted to show the spirit of the

law by citing instances in which the general rule does not apply in situations
analogous to those involving sale contracts breached by the buyer. The doctrine

of severability of contracts was illustrated by cases involving personal service contracts. Schneider v. Hagerstown Brewing Co., 136 Md. 151, 11o At. 218 (19o);
Coletti v. Knox Hat Co., 252 N. Y. 468, 169 N. E. 648 (1930); Matthews v. Jenkins,
8o Va. 463 (1885); La Coursier v. Russell, 82 Wis. 265, 52 N. W. 176 (1892). The
doctrine of substantial performance was illustrated by cases involving building
and construction contracts. Chinigo v. Ehrenberg, 112 Conn. 381, 152 Atl. 305
(193o); Dyer v. Lintz, 76 N. J. L. 204, 68 At. 9o8 (19o8); Jacobs & Young, Inc. v.
Kent, 23o N. Y. 239, 129 N. E. 889 (1921); J. G. Jansen, Inc. v. Rilling, 2o3 Wis.

19"3,
232 N. W. 887 (193o). Further, the New York Law Revision Commission approved the doctrine of Hickock v. Hoyt, 33 Conn. 553 (1866), which allows restitution to the buyer in default of a contract to sell goods. Other jurisdictions
also have adopted this principle. Michigan Yacht & Power Co. v. Busch, 143 Fed.
929 (C. C. A. 6th, 19o6); McCrea v. Ford, 24 Colo. App. 5o6, 135 Pac. 465 (1913);
Foster v. Warner, 42 Idaho 729, 249 Pac. 771 (1926).

The cases involving restitution to the contract defaulter in a building contract or a personal service contract are analogous to the problem of the defaulting
vendee of a contract for the sale of goods in that the contractor, employer, or
vendor would be unjustly enriched if the defaulter were not allowed to recover.
-OActs, Recommendations and Study relating to Recovery for Benefits Conferred
by Party in Default, N. Y. Law Revision Commission, 1942 Report, Recommendations and Studies, 179-243.
27

This is Section 44 of the Uniform Sales Act.
"85 N. Y. Consol. Laws Ann. (Baldwin, 1938) Personal Property Law, Art. 5,
§ 125: "Delivery of wrong quantity.-. Where the seller delivers to the buyer a
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to a defaulting vendee who has made a down payment, there being
no statutory authorization for the latter action. On September 1,1952,
the New York Legislature passed Section 145-a of the Personal Property Law which prevents total forfeiture by the buyer where the net
benefit conferred upon the seller exceeds twenty per cent of the value
of the total performance for which the buyer is obligated under the contract.2 9 Thus the Court of Appeals, recognizing that a change of policy
was developing and that the state courts had not recently ruled upon
the status of the state law on the question, fortunately avoided the
necessity of following the older New York decisions. At the same time
the federal court provided the state courts with some persuasive reasoning for adopting a more liberal attitude toward defaulting vendees who may in future cases seek to recover down payments.30
The view espoused in the principal case, previously applied in at
least two federal court decisions31 and adopted by the American Law
Institute, exemplifies the equitable application of the theory of restitution by allowing the defaulting purchaser to obtain judgment for
the amount by which his advance payment exceeds the damage he has
caused to the vendor, if the purchaser's breach was innocent or if
the vendor, in bad faith, continued to perform with the knowledge
quantity of goods less than he contracted to sell, the buyer may reject them, but if
the buyer accepts or retains the goods so delivered, knowing that the seller is not
going to perform the contract in full, he must pay for them at contract rate. If,
however, the buyer has used or disposed of the goods delivered before he knows
that the seller is not going to perform his contract in full, the buyer shall not be
liable for more than the fair value to him of the goods so received ....
"
-Section 145-a of the New York Personal Property Law: "When buyer in default entitled to restitution. 1. Where the seller fails or refuses to deliver the goods,
and is justified therein by the buyer's repudiation or default in performance of
the contract, but the buyer has conferred a net benefit on the seller by the payment of money or the transfer or delivery of property in part performance, and
the net benefit exceeds twenty percent of the value of the total performance for
which the buyer is obligated under the contract, the buyer has a right to obtain
restitution for the amount of such net benefit in excess of such twenty per cent. Net
benefit shall be determined by deducting from the amount of such payment, or
the value of the property transferred or delivered, the amount or value of the
benefits, if any, received by the buyer or a third party beneficiary by reason of the
contract, and the amount of the damages to which the seller is entitled by reason
of the buyer's default. In an action or counterclaim the buyer seeking restitution
for such net benefit shall have the burden of proving the amount thereof."
mThe United States Court of Appeals was not bound to follow New York
contract law because the principle of Erie Rd. Co. v. Tompkins yields to overriding
national policy and law, which the court found to exist in the Foreign Aid Appropriations Act of 1949. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363, 63 S. Ct.
573, 87 L. ed. 838 (1942).

2
Schwasnick v. Blandin, 65 F. (2d) 354 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1933); Michigan Yacht
and 'Power Co. v. Busch, 143 Fed. 929 (C. C. A. 6th, 19o6).
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of the purchaser's pending breach.32 Thus, relief is provided only
where appropriate, since restitution is denied if: (i) the purchaser's
breach is wilful; (2) the seller has not rescinded and remains ready and
willing to perform, and still has a right to the specific performance of
the purchaser; (3) the purchaser has not shown that the injury caused
by his default is less than the advance payment received by the seller;
or (4) there is an express provision in the contract that the seller
may retain the amount of down payment as liquidated damages, not as
a penalty or forfeiture. 33 Support for the Restatement view can be
found in the decisions of some of the state courts, as exemplified by
the decisions of the Massachusetts courts. In Dodge v. Kimball,34 recovery was allowed on the theory of quasi-contract when the default
of the contract was in good faith, but relief was denied on any theory
in Smedley v. Walden3 5 when the breach of the contract was wilful.
Courts following the pattern suggested by the Restatement for
passing on the defaulting vendee's right of recovery are relieved of
12Restatement, Contracts (1932) § 357. Restitution in favor of a plaintiff who is
himself in default.
"(i) Where the defendant fails or refuses to perform his contract and is justified
therein by the plaintiff's own breach of duty or non-performance of a condition, but
the plaintiff has rendered a part performance under the contract that is a net
benefit to the defendant, the plaintiff can get judgment, except as stated in Subsection (2), for the amount of such benefit in excess of the harm that he has caused
to the defendant by his own breach, in no case exceeding a ratable proportion of
the agreed compensation if (a) the plaintiff's breach or non-performance is not
wilful and deliberate; or (b) the defendant with knowledge that the plaintiff's
breach of duty or non-performance of condition has occurred or will thereafter occur,
assents to the rendition of the part performance, or accepts the benefit of it, or
retains property received although its return in specie is still not unreasonably
difficult or injurious.
"(2) The plaintiff has no right to compensation for his part performance if it
is merely a payment of earnest money, or if the contract provides that it may be
retained and it is not so greatly in excess of the defendant's harm that the provision is rejected as imposing a penalty.
"(3) The measure of the defendant's benefit from the plaintiff's part performance is the amount by which he has been enriched as a result of such performance
unless the facts are those stated in Subsection (ib), in which case it is the price
fixed by the contract for such part performance, or, if no price is so fixed, a ratable
proportion of the total contract price."
3'5 Corbin, Contracts (1951) 541, 6o5.
1"2o3 Mass. 364, 89 N. E. 524, 133 Am. St. Rep. 3o2 (19og).
-246 Mass. 393, 141 N. E. 281 (1923). Also Schwasnick v. Blandin, 65 F. (2d)
354 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1933) (plaintiff in wilful default, should not recover at all).
Most of the cases that consider whether the plaintiff's breach was wilful involve employment contracts or building contracts. The same reasoning should apply to cases
involving the sale of goods. Hanusin v. Materoh, 255 Ill. App. 27 (1930) [defaulting
vendee not entitled to return of earnest money; decision applies rule subsequently
adopted in Restatement, Contracts (1932) § 357 (2)].
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the necessity of indulging in tenuous reasoning to find exceptions to
the general rule in a situation in which considerations of fairness call
for a return of the money to the vendee. Still, recovery will be kept
within the bounds of justice in that the wilful defaulter will be denied relief while the non-defaulting vendor will be prevented from
taking oppressive advantage of an unintentional default. And by
allowing the vendor to retain the down payment money only to the extent needed to cover his damages arising from the vendee's breach,
the courts are giving proper deference to the principle that contract
damages are awarded to compensate for the loss rather than to
penalize for the breach. 36
RICHARD

F. BRouDY

TORTS-IMMUNITY OF CHARITABLE HOSPITAL FROM LIABILITY FOR INJURIES NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED BY NURSE ON PAYING PATIENT.
[Washington]
The doctrine which grants a charitable hospital freedom from liability for injuries sustained by a patient through the negligence of the
hospital's employees first appeared in 1861 in the English decision of
Holliday v. St. Leonard's,1 where it was ruled that the funds of a
charity were held in trust for the public benefit and could not be diverted for the purpose of satisfying a judgment obtained in a damage
suit against a charity. This ruling relied upon dicta in two earlier decisions,2 but in 1866 these dicta were repudiateds and in 1871 the
Holliday case was overruled. 4 The rule was then established in England that charitable hospitals should be liable on the same basis as
any other employer for injuries caused by the negligence of employees. 5
"The Restatement view avoids the illogical result reached by a strict adherence to the general rule that the buyer who has made no down payment at all would
be in a better position financially than the one who has made a down payment,
but who is not allowed to recover his deposit. Thus, a continued application of
this harsh doctrine would tend to penalize the party who had attempted to perform
and reward the non-performing party in an analogous situation.
Iii C. B. (N. s.) 192, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (186).
2
Duncan v. Findlater, 6 Cl. & Fin. 894, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (1839); The Feoffees of
Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Cl. & Fin. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1509 (1846).
-Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, 11 H. L. C. 686, 11 Eng. Rep. 15oo (1866).
'Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury, L. R., 6 Q. B. 214 (1871).
'HilIyer v. The Governors of St. Bartholomew's Hospital, 2 K. B. 820, 825
(igog). In denying the defendant immunity in an action for damages for injuries
caused the plaintiff during an operation by the negligence of a member of the
hospital staff, the court said: "It is now settled that a public body is liable for
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Unmindful of the English courts' denunciation of the doctrine,
the Massachusetts court embraced the trust fund theory of immunity
in 1876 in McDonald v. Massachusetts General HospitalO citing as
its sole authority the Holliday case which had been overruled in
England five years previously. In the half century following this decision, the various state courts, without benefit of legislative sanction,
firmly established the immunity doctrine as a policy of American tort
7
law.
In the past several decades, however, a reaction against that policy
has gained increasing strength. One court, in reviewing this development, has pointed out that: In 1918 the immunity rule was adherred
to by the "overwhelming" weight of authority; s twenty years later the
rule was followed by the "greater" weight of authority; 9 and in 1943
the most that could be said was that "more of the states adhere to
the [immunity] rule ... than to any other."'1

Joining the trend, the Washington Supreme Court, with its recent decision in Piercev. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n," has
repudiated the doctrine of immunity of charitable institutions which
had prevailed in that jurisdiction for sixty years. 12 Plaintiff Pierce, a
paying patient of the defendant charitable, non-profit hospital, had
sustained injuries when a hospital nurse injected a foreign substance
into his arm, causing pain and permanent injury. Defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's action for damages was sustained by the trial
court. The issue presented to the Washington Supreme Court was
whether a charitable hospital could be held liable to a paying pathe negligence of its servants in the same way as private individuals would be
liable under similar circumstances, notwithstanding that it is acting in the performance of public duties, like a local board of health, or of eleemosynary and charitable functions, like a public hospital."
Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529 (1876).
lioFletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations (Perm. Ed. 1931) § 4923; Note (1940)
i Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 257.
"Magnuson v. Swedish Hospital, 99 Wash. 399, 169 Pac. 828 (1918).
OMiller v. Mohr, 198 Wash. 619, 89 P. (2d) 807 (1939).
'-Weiss v. Swedish Hospital, 16 Wash. (2d) 446, 133 P. (2d) 978, 981 (1943).
1126o P. (2d) 765 (Wash. 1953).
"-In Richardson v. Carbon Hill Coal Co., 6 Wash. 52, 32 Pac. 1012, 2o L. R. A.
338 (1893), io Wash. 648, 39 Pac. 95 (1895), it was decided that a charitable hospital
maintained by the defendant coal company was not liable for injuries sustained
by an employee through malpractice of the physician employed by the company
but was responsible only for want of ordinary care in selecting the physician. The
majority opinion in the Pierce case preferred to view the immunity rule as first
appearing in Washington as an established matter of public policy in a declaration made by the court in Magnuson v. Swedish Hospital, 99 Wash. 399, i69 Pac.
828 (1918).
'12o
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tient for an injury caused by the negligence of its employee when
there was no showing of administrative negligence by the hospital
in failing to furnish proper equipment or in its selection and retention
of the nurse. In ordering that the defendant's demurrer be overruled,
the court declared that "there is today no factual justification for
immunity in a case such as this, and... principles of law, logic and
3
intrinsic justice demand that the mantle of immunity be withdrawn."'
Two Justices dissented, one on the ground that, regardless of the
merits of the controversy, an abrogation of the immunity rule, involving a matter of long established public policy, should come from
the legislature and not from the courts, 14 and the other on the view that
the immunity rule still represents sound public policy and should
be maintained to protect the operation of charitable institutions. 5
The issue was thus posed as to whether present day conditions
have rendered invalid the reasoning upon which the courts developed
the immunity doctrine during the last part of the nineteenth and first
part of the twentieth century. Besides the trust fund theory, support
for the immunity rule has been found in various other considerations.
Because charities receive no profit from the work of their servants, some
courts have held the doctrine of respondeat superior inapplicable to
charitable institutions. 16 The theory of implied waiver or assumption
of risk, under which the beneficiary of the charity's care is said to
have waived his right to sue for injuries which he might sustain as a
result of the negligence of the charity's servants, has found favor with
some courts.' 7 In other cases, the immunity rule has been invoked on
3260 P. (2d) 765, 774 (Wash. 1953).
1"26o P. (2d) 765, 775 (Wash. 1953). Justice Hill's view that the court by its
initial and subsequent decisions in the field of immunity of charities did not undertake to establish public policy but simply attempted to apply principles of the common law as it understood them, is dearly incompatible with the contention that
since the immunity rule was initiated by the court as a matter of public policy the
logical method of abolishing it is through the courts. The courts, according to
Justice Hill, were not intended as policy making bodies, and the public policy
unconsciously established by the court should be changed through the legislature
which affords all interested parties an opportunity to be heard.
"260 P. (2d) 765, 776, 777 (Wash. 1953). Justice Donworth's view is that there is
no factual support for the belief that charities have been supplanted by various
governmental agencies to the extent that governmental encouragement of charities is no longer needed. He sees charity as "still a virtue" and "entitled to the
same encouragement that it has always received at the hands of this court."
IGHearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 At. 595, 31 L. R. A. 224 (1895);
Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis. 66, 16o N. IV. 173 (1916); Bachman v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n, 179 Wis. 178, 191 N. W. 751, 30 A. L. R. 448 (1922).
"Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 59 Idaho 350, 82 P. (2d)
849 (1938); Averback v. Y. M. C. A. of Covington, 25o Ky. 34, 61 S. W. (2d) io66
(1933); Greatrex v. Evangelical Deaconess Hospital, 261 Mich. 327, 246 N. W.
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the principle that charitable institutions, engaged as they are in
quasi-governmental activities, are entitled to the protection of the rule
of governmental immunity.18 But regardless of which specific legal
theory is called upon to support any particular decision, it can properly be asserted that successful invocation of the rule rests finally
on the court's approval of immunity as a matter of public policy19that is, the loss resulting from an injury should fall upon the individual rather than on the institution which operates for the good of
all. More important than recompensing individuals for injuries
which they have sustained through no negligence of their own is the
continued operation of charities, which can be assured only if such
institutions are free from the financial drain of satisfying judgments
for negligently inflicted injuries.
Courts which have abrogated or limited the immunity rule have,
for one reason or another, questioned the soundness of the policy
served by the rule. The paternalistic role assumed by the state and
federal governments during the past fifty years, as well as the improved financial condition of charities in general, have raised doubts
as to the wisdom of according to charities an immunity which in some
degree condones the negligence of hospital employees and requires the
injured individuals to bear the full loss of the harm resulting from
that negligence. 20 The rule was adopted by the courts when charities
137, 86 A. L. R. 487 (1933); Winslow v. Veterans of Foreign Wars Nat. Home,
328 Mich. 488, 44 N. W. (2d) 19 (1950); Sisters of Charity v. Duvelius, 123 Ohio
52, 173 N. E. 737 (1930); Weston's Adm'r v. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va.
587, 107 S. E. 785, 23 A. L. R. 907 (1921).
IsFordyce & McKee v. Woman's Christian Nat. Library Ass'n, 79 Ark. 550,
96 S.W. 155, 7 L. R. A. (N.s.) 485 (19o6); University of Louisville v. Hammock, 127
Ky. 564, io6 S. W. 219, 14 L. R. A. (N. s.) 784 (1907); Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis.
166, 16o N. W. 173 (1918); Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess Soc. of Wisconsin,
218 Wis. 169, 26o N. W. 476 (1935).
'"President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 79 App. D. C. 123,
13o F. (2d) 8io (1942); Andrews v. Y. M. C. A., 226 Iowa 374, 284 N. W. 186 (1939);
Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa 269, 45 N. W. (2d) 151 (195o).
2uSee Note (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 1485, where the public policy considerations
against granting special immunity to charitable institutions are reviewed:
"s) At the time the exemption rules originated there were few charitable institutions; they were so weak that a single negligence action might easily have destroyed
them, and it was necessary to encourage their creation. Today there are a great
many heavily endowed charities, and the fears that recovery against them for their
servants' negligence will cripple them or will discourage contributors are groundless. In the jurisdiction treating charitable institutions the same as profit-making
ones, no calamities appear to have overtaken them. 2) It is more than a mere legal
platitude that individuals and organizations should be just before generous. Immunity from respondeat superior unjustly forces contributions to charity from the
very people the charity is intended to benefit and often makes the victims burdens
on the state or other charities. 3) The modern tendency in tort law, as evidenced
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stood almost alone in the field of social welfare and when it was felt
that greater good would result to the general public by immunizing them from liability than by permitting their hard-pressed purses to
be open to a multitude of tort actions. The reason for the rule vanishes, however, as the purses of charities expand and their field of opera21
tions becomes increasingly more the concern of government.
While the protection which insurance can afford to charities removes the need for granting such institutions the protection given by
the immunity rule,22 some courts have continued to apply rules of
by Workman's Compensation Acts, absolute liability for blasting, proposed automobile compensation plans, and the extending of respondeat superior to governmental bodies, is toward shifting the burden from the innocent victim to the
community at large. If the doctrine of respondeat superior is applied to charitable
institutions, and they in turn carry insurance against loss, the risk of negligent
injuries can be spread over the community with a slight increase in charges to
paying patients to meet premiums. 4) Immunity from liability, although originally
intended to encourage charities, has resulted in giving greater protection to property
rights, in the form of charitable trust funds, than to personal rights, in the form
of the inviolability of one's person. From a standpoint of legal development, a
doctrine having such an effect should be abandoned just as the fellow servant
doctrine has been. Moreover, a rule which differentiates between two patients
paying the same full amount for treatment merely because one has selected a profitmaking hospital and the other a charitably endowed institution does not seem just,
especially in view of the fact that a person may not know what type of hospital he
is patronizing. 5) Immunity from liability encourages carelessness and callousness
in charitable institutions, where protection of the patients is most needed because
of the human tendency to be less painstaking in the absence of monetary incentive.
In view of modern complicated medical methods in use today, and in view of the
enormous size of charitable institutions and the resulting impersonality in relations with their patients, it is vital that strict regulation and care be encouraged."
"Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915); Mulliner
v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 175 N. W. 699 (1920); Note
(1932) 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 93, 94.
In Wendt v. Servite Fathers, 332 Ill. App. 618, 76 N. E. (2d) 342 ('947) noted
in (1948) 5 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 272, a five year old boy who was injured while playing on the premises of a charity sued for damages. The institution carried a general
liability insurance policy under which up to $1o,ooo was to be 'paid to anyone to
whom the Servite Fathers might become obligated because of liability imposed
on the institution. The court held that "where insurance exists and provides a
fund from which tort liability may be collected so as not to impair the trust fund,
the defense of immunity is not available." In O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitorium Association, 1o5 Colo. 29, 96 P. (2d) 835 (194o) noted in (1940) 1 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 257, plaintiff contended that defendant should not be allowed the
protection of the immunity rule in her action for negligence in the care and medical
treatment furnished her while a paying patient in defendant's sanitorium because
it had secured a contract of insurance indemnifying it against all liability for the
torts of its agents or servants in conduct of the hospital business. The Colorado
Supreme Court, in reversing the trial court's judgment of dismissal, asserted that
where the charitable institution is adequately protected by insurance against
liability for the negligence of its servants, public policy reasons for affording such
institutions immunity from tort liability fail.
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exemption when the institution is insured against the very loss which
has occurred. 23 In the principal case, it was asserted that the question
whether a particular charity has insurance is irrelevant in deciding
whether it should be held liable in a specific case for the negligence of
its employees. 24 However, the c*ourt indicated that the general availability of insurance to charities is an appropriate consideration to be
weighed in determining whether, as a matter of public policy, charities
are entitled to immunity as a general rule.2 5 Unless the protection
which insurance can afford is so expensive that the charity loses its
ability to function effectively, there seems to be no reason why insurance cannot play the protective role assumed heretofore by the immunity rule, and it would seem that "what is at stake, so far as the charity is concerned, is the cost of reasonable protection.., not the award26
ing over in damages of its entire assets."
If it is concluded that strict adherence to the immunity doctrine
no longer represents sound public policy, the courts must still meet
the issue of whether they are the proper agencies to abrogate or
limit the application of the rule, or whether such a change, based as it
is on public policy, must be left to the legislatures. Those who favor
action by the courts point out that the rule originated with the courts
and so can be abrogated by the courts.27 In the language of the case
under review: "We closed our courtroom doors without legislative
help, and we can likewise open them." 28 Futhermore, it may be argued
that the immunity doctrine has never really gained the position of a
true expression of public policy . The state legislatures have not seen
fit to indorsethe policy of immunity by enacting it into statutory law,
nLevy v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 171, 239 Pac. 11o (1925); Enman'v.
Trustees of Boston Univ., 270 Mass. 299, 17o N. E. 43 (1930).
2
See Note (1948) 5 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 272, 273 stating that the weight of
authority is that "where liability is not first imposed by law upon the charity,
then the existence of insurance will not create a right of action or impose liability
or additional liability." See also, Susmann v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 1o Wash.
487, 495, 172 Pac. 554 (1918).
2Pierce v. Yakima Valley Hospital Ass'n, 26o P. (2d) 765, 771 (Wash. 1953).
Accord: President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 76 App. D. C.
123, 13o F. (2d) 81o (1942); Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55
S. (2d) 142, 25 A. L. R. (2d) 12 (1951).
2
6President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 76 App. D. C. 123,
13o F. (2d) 81o, 824 (1942).
27 Woods v. Lancet, 303 N. Y. 349, 102 N. E. (2d) 691, 694, 27 A. L. R. (2d)
1250, 1254 (1951): "Legislative action there could, of course, be, but we abdicate
our own function, in a field peculiarly nonstatutory, when we refuse to reconsider
an old and unsatisfactory court-made rule." Accord: Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. (2d)
642, 251 P. (2d) 149 (1952).
18Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 26o P. (2d) 765, 774 (Wash.
1953).
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and the courts themselves have not been able to agree on the scope
of the principle. There is, in fact, no single "immunity rule" but rather
a great variety of irreconcilable and inconsistent decisions granting
immunity from liability in some specific situations and denying it in
other circumstances. Therefore, when the courts overrule their earlier
decisions, they are not overruling any firm and widespread public
20
policy.
Chief Justice Grady, in his concurring opinion in the Pierce case,
while expressing a general preference for legislative action to accomplish a change in rules of law relating to public policy, was convinced
of the propriety of judicial action where the rule to be abrogated or
altered involves immunity from liability. The legislature in this situation often faces such strong opposition from the beneficiaries of the
rule that "proponents of change find efforts to secure corrective legislation futile." 30 Under these circumstances, the court is the only
agency which is capable of acting and is, therefore, justified in effecting the change to serve the public interest.
Those who believe that changes in the immunity rule should be
accomplished through legislation, deny a court's authority or capacity adequately to resolve issues upon which the people, through their
elected representatives, should be given opportunity to express their
opinions.31 It is argued that the courts were not intended to be lawmaking bodies, and the taking of judicial notice of changed conditions
and attitudes cannot be considered a satisfactory substitute for legis32
lative inquiry.
While this argument for legislative responsibility has undeniable
merit, the Pierce case apparently represents the thinking of the grow"Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital, go N. H. 337, 9 A. (2d) 761 at 764
('939).
"126o P. (2d) 765, 775 (Wash. 1953)aTucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4, L. R. A. 1915D, 1167
(1915); Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 46 N. W. (2d) 151
(1950); Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 6o6, 55 S. (2d) 142, 25
A. L. R. (2d) 12 (1951); Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R. I. 411, 34 Am. Rep.
675 (1879).
=Although Justice Donworth's dissenting opinion in the Pierce case points out
the "inability of any court to intelligently function on a matter of public policy
in a case of this kind because of its lack of facilities for ascertaining the necessary
factual background," he commits himself to the unequivocal observation that: "While
public hospitals render a valuable and necessary service, they cannot take care of
even a small fraction of all persons who need physical or mental care in this
state." "In my opinion, nothing has happened in this state in the last ten years ...
which justifies our abandoning our consistent policy of the last sixty years." 260 P.
(2d) 765, 776, 777 (Wash. 1953). He thus purports to determine the very issue which
he argues the courts cannot intelligently decide.
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ing number of courts which have repudiated or limited the application
of the immunity rule in the past quarter of a century. Ignoring the
protest of the dissent, the majority of the Washington Supreme Court
relied heavily for the rationale of its decision upon the judicial origin
of the rule and maintained that "it is not necessary that the courts
be slow to exercise a judicial function simply because they have been
33
fast to exercise a legislative one."
Although the majority of the court was very positive in its disapproval of the immunity principle, the opinion does not make it clear
whether the Pierce case completely abolishes the immunity rule in
Washington. One dissenting Justice assumed that the decision applies
only to paying patients and that "the original rule still will remain
operative as to free patrons of charitable institutions and those who
are financially able to pay only a part of the prevailing rate for the service rendered." 34 This interpretation of the decision is corroborated
by the concluding statement of the majority: "It is our opinion that a
charitable, nonprofit hospital should no longer be held immune from
liability for injuries to paying patients caused by the negligence of employees of the hospital." 35 It therefore remains to be seen whether the
Washington court will continue to recognize the immunity of charitable
institutions from liability for injuries to non-paying patients or will
extend the scope of the rule adopted in the principal case.
ROBERT 0.
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Although the general common law rule is that contribution will not
be allowed between joint tort-feasors,1 prominent among several ex326o P. (2d) 765, 774 (Wash. 1953).
,'26o P. (2d) 765, 776 (Wash. 1953).
-26o P. (2d) 765, 775 (Wash. 1953).
"Spaulding v. Parry Navigation Co. (Todd Shipyards Corporation, Third-party
Defendant), go F. Supp. 564 at 565 (S. D. N. Y. 1950); Granquist v. Crystal
Springs Lumber Co., 19o Miss. 572, 1 S. (2d) 216 (1941); Frank Martz Coach Co.
v. Hudson Bus Transp. Co., 133 N. J. L. 342, 44 A. (2d) 488 (1945); Parker v. Rodgers,
125 Pa. Super. 48, i8g At. 693 (1937); Austin Road Co. v. Pope, 147 Tenn. 430,
216

S.W. (2d) 563 at 564, 565 (1949); 13 Am. Jur., Contribution § 37 Prosser, Torts

(1941) 1113The general rule has been increasingly restricted in recent years to operate only
against a willful tort-feasor plaintiff or a tort-feasor plaintiff who is in pari
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ceptions to this rule2 is the right of an employer to be indemnified by
his employee when the employee's negligence has caused injury to a
third person and the employer has been held liable to the injured
person solely upon the principle of respondeat superior.3
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946,4
the United States was never placed in the position of an employer
seeking indemnity from any of its employees, since it was not liable
to suit for tort, and any damage claims which were satisfied were paid
on a voluntary basis.6 With the passage of the Act, however, the
delicto with the defendant. E.g., Snohomish County v. Great Northern Ry. Co.,
13o F. (2d) 996 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942); Mills v. City of New York, 189 Misc. 291, 71
N. Y. S. (2d) 507 (1947); Davis v. Broad Street Garage, 191 Tenn. 320, 232 S. W.
(2d) 355 (1950); see 1 3 Am. Jur., Contribution § 46.
2For exceptions, see Note (1942) 14o A. L. R. 13o6; 13 Am. Jur., Contribution

§ 47.
'Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Great Lakes Engineering Works Co., 184 Fed. 426, 36
L. R. A. (N. s.) 6o (C. C. A. 6th, 1911); Burks v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 337
(S. D. Tex. 1953); Johnston v. City of San Fernando, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 244, 95 P.
(2d) 147 (1939); Myers v. Tranquility Irr. Dist., 26 Cal. App. (2d) 385, 79 P. (2d)
419 (1938); Smith v. Foran, 43 Conn. 244, 41 Am. Rep. 647 (1875); Grand Trunk
Ry. Co. v. Latham, 63 Me. 177 (1874); Frank Martz Coach Co. v. Hudson Bus
Transp. Co., 133 N. J. L. 342, 44 A. (2d) 488 (1945); Fedden v. Brooklyn Eastern
District Terminal, 204 App. Div. 741, 199 N. Y. Supp. 9 (1923); Gregg v. City of
Wilmington, 155 N. C. 18, 70 S. E. 1070 (1911); Doremus v. Root, 23 Wash. 71o, 63
Pac. 572, 54 L. R. A. 649 (19o); Restatement, Agency (1933) § 401. Actually, it is
clear that the employer is not a tort-feasor at all. He has done no wrong; while
negligence may be said to be imputed to him, this is only a legal rationale employed
to reach a result-liability-which is based entirely upon policy considerations.
That the employer is not a joint tort-feasor, see Gardner v. Marshall, 24 Cal. (2d)
686, 151 P. (2d) 122 (1944); Bradley v. Rosenthal, 154 Cal. 420, 97 Pac. 875 (1908);
Stulginski v. Cizauskas, 125 Conn. 293, 5 A. (2d) 10 (1939); Holbrook v. Nolan, 1o
Ind. App. 75, 1o N. E. (2d) 744 (1937); Gray v. Boston Gas Light Co., 114 Mass. 149,
19 Am. Rep. 324 (1873); Granquist v. Crystal Springs Lumber Co., 190 Miss. 572,
1 S. (2d) 216 (1941); Doremus v. Root, 23 Wash. 71o, 63 Pac. 572 (0O); also
cases cited 23 Words and Phrases 11o. But as noted above, the courts have largely
considered the employer's right to recover over against the employee as an exception
to the general rule against contribution between joint tort-feasors. It is treated
similarly elsewhere. 13 Am. Jur., Contribution § 47; Prosser, Torts (1941) 1114.
'For summaries of the progressive restricting of the federal government's
immunity to suit since 1855 when the Court of Claims was established, see Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924) 34 Yale L. J. i at 28-41; Note (1947)
i Rut. L. Rev. 302-304.
GCf. Blanton, Subrogation, Indemnity, Contribution and Election of Remedies
Aspects of the Tort Claims Act (1954) 7 Vand. L. Rev. 19o, 20o: "Prior to the Tort
Claims Act the Congress enacted legislation for the relief of individuals injured
through the negligence of Government employees. Throughout the history of this
country no case has been found wherein the United States sought to recover the
amount so expended from its employeesl It must be concluded that there has
never existed a right of indemnity in favor of the United States against its employees."
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United States became liable in the federal courts for torts committed
by its employees, with certain exceptions, 6 in the same way as are
private persons.7 Seemingly unrecognized, there lurked behind the
major change wrought by the Act an ancillary question-namely,
whether the United States, having been held liable for the tort of its
employee under the Tort Claims Act, could claim the right enjoyed by
the private employer to be indemnified by the employee. This question was first litigated in the recent case of Gilman v. United States s
which originated in a suit brought against the United States under
authority of the Tort Claims Act to recover for the loss the claimant
sustained as the result of the collision of his car with a Government
vehicle. The district court allowed the Government to implead the
driver of the Government vehicle as a third-party defendant, under
Rule 14 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 9 Along with
a judgment for damages against the United States, the court rendered
judgment in favor of the Government against the driver, its employee,
for indemnity. The driver-employee appealed the judgment against
him.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled, in a 2 to l decision, that the Government had no cause of action. This court
reasoned that the only basis for the private employer's right to be
indemnified at common law is the prevention of unjust enrichment of
the employee, since the employer has paid a claim which in equity
and good conscience the employee ought to have paid. The Tort
Claims Act provides in Section 2676 that judgment against the Government under Section 1346 (b) of the Act 10 is a complete bar to any action
6

The exceptions are broad in scope. 6o Stat. 845 (1946), 28 U. S. C. A. § 2680

(1950).
'63 Stat. 62 (1949), 28 U. S. C. A. § 1346 (b) (1950) is as follows: "Subject to
the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts ... shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages,
accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government, while acting within the scope of his office or employment,
under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred."
'2o6 F. (2d) 846 (C. A. 9th, 1953).
Rule 14 (a) is as follows (in part): "Before the service of his answer a defendant may move ex parte or, after the service of his answer, on notice to the plaintiff, for leave as a third-party plaintiff to serve a summons and complaint upon a
person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim against him." 28 U. S. C. A. Rule 14 (a) (1950).
' 0See note 7, supra.
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by the claimant against the employee." It followed, the court reasoned,
that when the Government paid the judgment, it was not paying a
claim that the employee ought to have paid, since "any obligation on
his part was completely wiped out." The right of action arising by
quasi-contract, 12 the inevitable conclusion from these premises was
that there was no legal basis for the Government's action against the
employee.
The main purpose of the Congress in passing the Tort Claims
Act was simply to abolish in part 13 the Government's immunity to
tort actions so as to relieve the Congress of the burden of passing
separate bills providing for compensation to tort claimants. 14 The
view taken by the court in the Gilman case, that not only did the
Government surrender its immunity but that it gave up in addition a
common-law right to be indemnified which it might reasonably have
been expected to claim,' 5 warrants close examination.' 6
1162 Stat. 984 (1948), 28 U. S. C. A. § 2676 (1950) is as follows: "The judgment in
an action under section 1346 (b) of this title shall constitute a complete bar to
any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim."
""Since the right of indemnity here asserted arises, in the case of employers
generally, only by quasi-contract...0." 206 F. (2d) 846, 848 (C. A. 9th, 1953). Cf.
Armstrong County v. Clarion County, 66 Pa. 218, 221, 5 Am. Rep. 368, 371 (1871),
citing Dering v. Earl of Winchelsea, 1 Cox 318, 321, 29 Eng. Rep. 1184, 1185
(1787): "Contribution is bottomed and fixed on general principles of natural
justice, and does not spring from contract." The two statements are not inconsistent, of course.
"See note 6, supra.
"'Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15 at 25, 73 S. Ct. 956 at 962, 97 L. ed. 1427
at 1435 (1953). See the Joint Committee Report quoted at 92 Cong. Record 10048.

The Federal Tort Claims Act was passed by the Congress as Title IV of the Congressional Reorganization Act of 1946, commonly known as the LaFollette-Monroney Bill (S. 2177). 6o Stat. 812 (1946). The purpose of the Act as stated by the
Chief Clerk in stating its title in the Senate was: "... to provide for increased efficiency in the legislative branch of the Government." 92 Cong. Record 6344. As
to the extent of the burden imposed on Congress by the necessity of passing separate
bills for the relief of individuals, prior to the passage of the Act, the number of
such bills introduced in each of the five Congresses preceding the passage of the
Act averaged over two thousand. H. R. Rep. No. 1287, 7 9th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2.
"Discussion of the Act on the floor of the two Houses in the Congress furnishes
no evidence of the legislative intent on this point. Of 196 pages in the Congressional
Record devoted to debate of the bill in both Houses, only 5 contain any discussion
of the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 92 Cong. Record 579 for history of the bill, S.
2177. The court in the Gilman case, however, finds the legislative history of the
Act "not at variance with" its holding. 206 F. (2d) 846 at 848 (C. A. 9th, 1953).
"District Judge Harrison in his dissent made these points: (i) The Act waives
the Government's immunity to suit for tort but nowhere does it waive its right
to sue; if the Congress intended to waive this common law right, why was not
this waiver written plainly into the Act? (2) Under United States v. Yellow Cab
Co., 340 U. S. 543, 71 S. Ct. 399, 95 L. ed. 523 (1951), the Government need pay
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This view has already been rejected by another federal court,
which sustained the Government's right of action on a similar set of
facts. In a forceful opinion, that court declared:
"Where the Government, by statute, measures its primary liability by common law standards, as though it were a private employer, it does not require 'judicial legislation' to recognize and
enforce other common law incidents resulting from that relationship. Where the United States has found itself in what I may
refer to as other common law relationships, the courts... have
not been reluctant to draw on and apply well established common law principles.. .."17
Where a private employer has been held liable for his employee's
tortious act solely on the principle of respondeat superior, the claimant's right of action against the employee is destroyed as soon as the
judgment is satisfied by the employer,1 8 and it is not until then that the
employer's right of action against the employee arises.' 9 When the
employer pays the judgment, however, he is paying a claim for which
up to this moment the employee was liable. When the Government
pays a judgment under the Tort Claims Act, the same condition is not
present, because the statute specifically bars the bringing of an action
by the injured party against the employee after the judgment is rendered against the Government. However, this statutory variation of the
common law in the case of Government liability for tort does not
indicate a legislative intent to deny the right of indemnification to the
Government as an employer. The justice of denying the claimant
any right of action against the employee once a judgment has been
rendered against the Government is dear: the Government is certain
only its portion of the liability where it is (really) a joint tort-feasor; yet under the
majority view, here it must pay all and cannot recoup from "the one who is
primarily liable." (3) 63 Stat. 62 (1949), 28 U. S. C. A. § 1346 (b) (195o) and 62
Stat. 983 (1948), 28 U. S. C. A. § 2674 (1950) provide that the United States is to
be in the same position as "a private individual under like circumstances" respecting its liability under the Tort Claims Act.
"Burks v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 337, 340 (S.D. Tex. 1953). The court
cites Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363, 63 S.Ct. 573, 87 L. ed.
838 (1943) (United States, as maker of a check, is allowed to recover from one who
honored it on a forged indorsement), and Wisconsin Central R. Co. v. United States,
164 U. S.190, 17 S.Ct. 45, 41 L. ed. 399 (1896) (government may recover money paid
under mistake).
'2Karcher v. Burbank, 303 Mass. 393, 21 N. E. (2d) 542, 124 A. L. R. 1292
(1939).
'Dunn v. Uvalde Asphalt Paving Co., 175 N. Y. 214, 67 N. E. 439 (193o);
Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola, Ltd., 134 N. Y.
461, 31 N. E. 987 (1892); Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Capolino, 65 N. E. (2d) 287
(Ohio App. 1945); Gaffner v. Johnson, 39 Wash. 437, 81 Pac. 859 (1905); see 2 Sedgwick, Damages (gth ed. 1920) § 785.
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to pay the judgment, while the private employer in the same situation
may be unwilling or unable to pay. There would appear to be a sufficient explanation, therefore, of why the rendering of the judgment
was made to terminate the employee's liability to the claimant: the
claimant is sufficiently protected without preserving that liability.
The unsoundness of the decision in the Gilman case is demonstrated
not only by the court's failure to recognize this factor as the explanation of the controversial clause in the statute, but also by the facility
with which the Government may avoid the effect of the decision,
simply by paying the claim at any time previous to the rendering of
judgment.20 It seems doubtful that the denial of a substantive right
should be based upon a consideration which may be so easily circumvented.
Any analysis of the Gilman opinion must take into account that
the use of the term "unjust enrichment" is unfortunate. It is a misnomer, for in cases of tortious injury, nobody is enriched. 21 A loss
has been sustained, and the question is who should ultimately bear
the loss. Futhermore, a review of the cases does not bear out the
court's assertion that unjust enrichment is the only rationale for the
employer's right to recover over against the tort-feasor employee. While
decisions without number merely affirm the employer's right of action,
without accounting for it, 22 many cases specifically base his right of ac**A party does not lose his right of indemnity by reason of the fact that he
pays the claim without waiting for the judgment to be rendered, so long as he is
liable for payment. Snohomish County v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 13o F. (2d) 996
(C. C. A. 9th, 1942); Gray v. Boston Gas Light Co., 114 Mass. 149, 19 Am. Rep. 324
(1873); Wise Shoes v. Blatt, 107 Pa. Super. 473, 164 At. 89 (1933); cases cited 31 C. J.
453, n. 42. It does cast upon him the burden of proving that he was liable and
that the amount he paid and for which he seeks reimbursement was not unreasonably large. The Toledo, 122 F. (2d) 255 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); Smith v. Foran, 43
Conn. 244, 21 Am. Rep. 647 (1875); Miles v. Southeastern Motor Truck Lines, 295
Ky. 156, 173 S. W. (2d) 99o (1943); Frank Martz Coach Co. v. Hudson Bus Transp.
Co., 133 N. J. L. 342, 44 A. (2d) 488 (1945); Dunn v. Uvalde Asphalt Paving Co.,
175 N. Y. 214, 67 N. E. 439 (1903); cases cited 31 C. J. 453, n. 43.
"Itwould seem that the use of this term ought to be restricted to cases involving contracts.
"Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Great Lakes Engineering Works Co., 184 Fed. 426, 36 L.
R. A. (N. s.) 6o (C. C. A. 6th, igi); Johnston v. City of San Fernando, 35 Cal. App.
(2d) 244, 95 P. (2d) 147 (1939); Smith v. Foran, 43 Conn. 244, 41 Am. Rep. 647
(1875); Costa v. Yoachim, 104 La. 170, 28 So. 992 (19oo); Grank Trunk Ry. v.
Latham, 63 Me. 177 (1874); Karcher v. Burbank, 3o3 Mass. 393, 21 N. E. (2d) 542,
124 A. L. R. 1292 (1939); Glover v. Richardson & Elmer Co., 64 Wash. 403, 116
Pac. 861 (1911); Gaffner v. Johnson, 39 Wash. 437, 81 Pac. 859 (19o5). Cf. Frank
Martz Coach Co. v. Hudson Bus Transp. Co., 133 N. J. L. 342, 44 A. (2d) 488, 490
(1945) where the court gives no reason for the employer's right to recover over
against his employee other than that the employer "is not regarded technically
as a tort-feasor at all, but is held to liability ...being, in effect, the servant's
surety."
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tion upon a breach of a duty owed to him2 3 or upon the injury caused
him 24 by the employee's tortious act. Still other cases simply rely
upon the maxim that everyone is responsible for the consequences
of his own negligence. 25 In addition, eminent classical authorities sustain the proposition that unjust enrichment has not usually been
26
regarded as the sole basis for the employer's right of action.
The reasoning of the court appears vulnerable also in the significance which the court finds in the statement that quasi-contract
is the sole basis of this type of action. In any case of liability arising
out of tort, it may be truly said that there is a quasi-contractual duty
on the part of the wrongdoer to indemnify the party who has suffered
an injury as a result of the tort. A defendant is said to be liable for negligence or liable for tort, but generally it could as well be said that he is
liable in quasi-contract, since that is only to say that in the interest of
justice the law will allow a recovery although no contract was intended
to be made.2 7 Regardless of which terminology may be used, the damages will be measured by the amount of injury sustained by the plaintiff. To say that the right of the employer to be indemnified by his
-3Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N. Y. 253, 164 N. E. 42, 64
A. L. R. 293 (1928); Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Capolino, 65 N. E. (2d) 287 (Ohio
App.2 1945)'Nashua Iron and Steel Co. v. Worcester & Nashua R. R. Co., 62 N. H. 159
(1882); Fedden v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 204 App. Div. 741, 199 N. Y.
Supp. 9 (1923); Zulkee v. Wing, 20 Wis. 408, 91 Am. Dec. 425 (1866). Accord:
Georgia S. and F. Ry. Co. v. Jossey, 1O5 Ga. 271, 31 S. E. 179 (1898).
2Bradley v. Rosenthal, 158 Cal. 420, 97 Pac. 875 (19o8); Granquist v. Crystal
Springs Lumber Co., 190 Miss. 572, 1 S. (2d) 216 (1941); Oceanic Steam Nay. Co., Ltd.
v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola, 134 N. Y. 461, 3' N. E. 987 (1892); Trustees of
Village of Geneva v. Brush Electric Co., 5o Hun. 581, 3 N. Y. Supp. 595 (1889); Parker
v. Rodgers, 125 Pa. Super. 48, 189 At. 693 (1937); Doremus v. Root, 23 Wash. 71o,
63 Pac. 572, 54 L. I. A. 649 (19O1). Accord: Robertson v. City of Paducah, 146
Ky. 188, 142 S. W. 370 (1912); Gregg v. City of Wilmington, 155 N. C. 18, 70 S. E.

1070 (1911).

261 Cooley, Law of Torts (rd
ed. 1906) 254; Story, Agency (9th ed.) 259, as
cited in Georgia S. & F. Ry. Co. v. Jossey, 1o5 Ga. 271, 31 S. E. 179 (1898). As the
court in the Gilman case points out, a recognized writer in the field of
quasi-contracts has this to say: "In such cases, the obligation may well be rested
Italics supplied]. Woodward, The Law
upon quasi contractual principles....["
of Quasi-Contracts (1913) 409. Such a suggestion is quite properly made in a
book on the subject of quasi-contracts. But it is clear that it does not exclude
all other explanations.
'"They [quasi-contracts] arise where there is a legal duty to respond in money
which by a legal fiction may be enforced as upon an implied promise. In such
case there is no element of contract strictly so-called. There is only the duty to
which the law fixes a legal obligation of performance as in case of a promise
inter-parties." Wojahn v. National Union Bank of Oshkosh, 144 Wis. 646, 129 N. W.
so68, 1077 (1911). See also cases cited 35 Words and Phrases 621.
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employee rests upon quasi-contract therefore signifies little except to
suggest that it rests perhaps more upon the court's innate sense of
28
justice than upon any particular formalized rules of law.
29
One of the very authorities cited by the court in support of its
thesis that quasi-contract is the sole basis of this type of action states
clearly that this theory is not exclusive:
"One whom the law holds to an absolute liability for the wrongful act of another [respondeat superior] has been injured just
as really, even though indirectly, by that wrongful act as though
his property had been struck by the other's automobile in the
first place. Even though we may properly refer to the right to
indemnity in such circumstances as a quasi-contractual right
based upon unjust enrichment, it is actually supported by
simple, fundamental tort law principles just as clearly as is
the right to recover for injuries caused directly by the tortious
act."30
In explaining that the words "ought to have paid" mean "in
equity and good conscience should have been paid. . ."31 the court un-

dermined its own rationale of its holding. Granting that the judgment
against the Government conferred upon the employee a legal immunity from suit by the claimant, it seems clear that he is still in good
conscience bound to pay the claimant for the loss which he in fact
caused him. Under the definition given it by the court, the principle
"in equity and good conscience" is restricted to situations where the
party upon whom it is brought to bear is under a legal compulsion
to pay, anyway. Thus restricted, the principle is wholly vitiated. The
law should not sanction a "conscience" which allows a party to stand
behind the shield of a legal immunity while someone else, wholly innocent, pays for the damage which his tortious act caused.
In essence, the question presented by the Gilman case may be suf-Cf. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tort-feasors (1932) 81 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 130, 146-147: "Other types of the right to indemnity are commonly
called quasi-contractual, or arising out of a 'contract implied by law.' Indemnity
between persons liable for a tort falls within this type of case. As between such
persons, the obligation to indemnify is not a consensual one; it is based 1,together
upon the law's notion-influenced by an equitable background-of what is fair
and proper between the parties ....
"
2_o6 F. (2d) 846 at 848, n. i (C. A. 9th, 1953).
-ILeflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tort-feasors (1932) 81 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 130, 148.
3It is not clear whether the court cites Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 97
Eng. Rep. 676 (176o) [2o6 F. (2d) 846 at 848 (C. A. 9th, 1953)] as authority for its
holding that the employer cannot recover from the employee unless the employee
should have in equity and good conscience paid the claim. It seems unlikely, since
the case clearly has no application.
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ficiently answered by simply placing the question in its proper frame
of reference. The private employer at common law has the right to
seek indemnity from the tort-feasor employee, where the employer
has been rendered liable for the employee's tort solely on the basis of
respondeat superior. The Tort Claims Act did away with a part of
the Government's immunity to suit for tort, making the Government
liable "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." 32 Since the right of action exists in
all employers save the United States at common law, and since the
statute was passed by the Congress simply to remove the Government's
immunity, there is no substantial reason why the Government should
not enjoy what would seem to be a concomitant right flowing from
3
the liability which it voluntarily assumed.
DONALD S. LATouREFrE

262 Stat. 983 (1948), 28 U. S. C. A. § 2674 (1950).
-Favoring the view that the United States should be able to recover over
against its tort-feasor employee are 3 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1948 ) § 14.29;
Notes (1954) 40 Va. L. Rev. 352; (1947) 56 Yale L. J. 534 at 56o, n. 177. For a contrary view, see Blanton, Subrogation, Indemnity, Contribution and Election of
Remedies Aspects of the Tort Claims Act (1954) 7 Vand. L. Rev. 19o at 200.

